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Q What spending habits are you making
reference to there?
A There would be more details with my
brothers' depositions and other folks that will be coming
through, but the difficulties I seen that I had was there
was alot of money, exorbitant amount of money, going out
for rent which I believe was used to support Q I'm sorry, I wasn't listening as well as I
should have. Could you say that again? I apologize.
A The money that Ron was taking as rent
money out of the bUSiness he was supporting other
businesses with, so that was - I mean, it was avery it was 15 grand amonth. It was a very difficult number
to work with, so the difficulties we sustained was that
cash flow could have sure helped us and not sustained to
buy shop and other things.
Q Do you know of any money being taken out
of the Thomas Motors business by Ron or Elaine Thomas
other than that which was used to pay rent?
A Not to my -- I'd have to find out. I'd
have to look into that. Not at this meeting I wouldn't
be able to say.
Q To tell you the truth, I've asked afew
people this and not one person has identified acent
being taken out by them other than the rent and I'm just
29

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

wondering if you have any reason to disagree at all,
whether ifs amatter of Rob Wilde telling you or your
brothers telling you or you saw something, I don~t know,
whatever.
A I do have reasons to believe.
Q Okay, hit me with it.
A Well, rd have to talk to a few people and
get something thafs more than just my word saying I
think I know. I can try to provide that for you.
Q I don't understand. Do you personal~
know that Ron or Elaine Thomas took anything out of the
Thomas -- anything finandal out of the Thomas Motors
business, any money out of the Thomas Motors business
other than the amounts that were taken out for rent, that
were paid for rent?
A There were checks cut other than rent.
There was one for 70,000. I mean, Jan Rowers would be
the one proba~ that could real~ define that for you.
Q Would Rob Wilde be somebody that would
know something about that? He was maintaining the
company books at the time.
.
A Possib~, but Jan and Penny were actually
day to day at the dealership and they were the ones
seeing the checks from upstairs go through Shirley and
Ron and checks other than rent would be the ones they
30

1
Q Yes?
2
A Yes.
3
Q Were you aware of those at the time they
4 were being done?
5
A Maybe not all of them, but I was aware of
6 some.
7
(Exhibit No. 9 was marked for
8 identification by the Notary Public.)
9
Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whafs been
10 marked as Exhibit No. 9 - it might be alittle confusing
11 here. The green sticker represents the actual exhibit
12 number.
13
A Right
14
Q I mean, you can see the Exhibit Eon the
15 bottom, it was for a prior affidavit, so we're talking
16 about Exhibit No. 9for your deposition. Do you
17 recognize those as copies of checks that were made out to
18 Thomas Motors that were from your dad's rental, your mom
19 and dad's rental, account?
20
A I believe that would be correct. looks
21 right.
22
Q And are these the checks you were just
23 talking about that you were aware of that your morn and
24 dad were writing into Thomas Motors, in other words,
25 providing money to Thomas Motors from their own personal
32

would know.
Q But Rob at that point was doing month~
financials, wasnt he?
A He was doing the financials on the
information provided by Ron and Shirley to my
knowledge.
Q What was the 70,000 check fori to your
knowledge, or at least whether you've heard it through
the grapevine or otherwise?
A Nol John, I dont know exact~. I just
know it was acheck that never carne back into the
dealership checking per Jan.
Q When was it?
A rd have to -- I don't know. I don't
remember, but I remember it was done.
Q You dont have any idea what year it was?
Was it close to the end?
A No, 00, it was probab~, I would guess,
'03ish, '04ish, rtght in that area.
Q You understand in that time frame your dad
was also and your mom were also writing checks going into
Thomas Motors' business?
A Uh-huh.
Q You've seen those checks?
A Uh-huh.
31
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sources?
A I dont recognize all of them, but there's
acouple or three I do recognize.
Q Tell me which ones. Uke the 75/000page 2 is February of '04/ 75,000, is that one?
A I don't remember, no, tha~s in '04.
Q I went to that one first because the first
page is kind of hard to read, but I can tell you it's
March-o
A -- 28th.
11
Q Yeah, for 25,000. I have the originals
12 somewhere, but anyhow, thafs why I went to page 2.
13 Which ones do you recognize? .
14
A Irs been awhile, but I think I remember
15 seeing the 10,000 and maybe one of the 30's, but the rest
16 I don't remember.
17
Q Well, what did you understand·· whatever
18 checks you do recognize, you at least understood back
19 then factually that your mom and dad were contributing
monies into Thomas Motors as opposed to taking it out?
A fts well as spending and taking out, yes,
new tools, new equipment
Q There's where I'm going. What do you
understand was the purpose of these checks, the monies
they were putting in out of their
accounts?
1
A Well, I would imagine -- it's my
2 understanding it was money to operate the - working
3 capital.
4
Q Did you understand, also, as you'll see if
5 you tum to page, the cleaner copies, page 3, for
6 exam~e, June '04, it says in the memo section "Company
7 Loan"?
8
A Uh-huh.
9
Q Next one does the same; next one does the
10 same; next one does the same. The rest of them basically
11 do, that they're essentially boiling down to Ron and
12 Elaine lending the Thomas Motors business money for
13 working capital purposes?
14
A Okay, I understand.
15
Q I mean, is that right?
16
A That sounds right
17
Q And did you have any olSCUssions with your
18 mom and dad back then about what was going on in that
19 regard?
20
A Not that I can specifically remember,
21 no.
22
Q Okay; so before I leave this subject, this
23 spending habits reference in your affidavit, I guess I'm
24 still not sure what you're talking about there.
25
A Well, as far as the dealership side that I
34
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seen and, again, there's all kind of facets, but, I mean,
new hoists, new tools, knew machinery, new -- I mean,
just it was aspend, spend. I mean, we needed to rein it
in a little bit and it just seemed like the more harder
we worked to try to get ahead the more he would spend.
Q Well, I'm just looking through the checks,
it looks he writing quite abit of money into the
business as well.
A Putting it back in, yeah.
Q So when you're talking about spending
habits here in paragraph 19 of Exhibit 8, you're talking
about him causing new eqUipment, buSiness-related things,
being purchased; is that the idea?
A To my knowledge, yes.
Q Let me ask this kind of big picture
question: The agreement that serves as the basis for
this lawsuit, that you're claiming in this lawsuit, okay,
lers say that actually came to fruitionr it happened.
At the time the business would be transferred to you,
iers just call that March of 106 time frame, tell me in
your mind based on that agreement who on each side of the
agreement, that is, you and your mom and dad, who would
do what, who would pay what, who would get what?
A What Ron told me was when he denied he was
selling the dealership 35

1
Q No, forget the actual what happened. I
2 just want to know your understanding of the agreement.
3
A Okay.
4
Q Who was going to get what, who was going
5 to do what, who was going pay what?
6
A The way he described it was that when he
7 retired that him and Mom would take asmall check, not
8 much, but everything would come over to the dealership,
9 the checkbook. I believe even Aunt Shirley was going to
10 actually be moving in with us which I had no problem with
11 because that's his direct connection to the businesses,
12 so we would be in control of the spending, how the money
13 was spent, where it was going, that type of thing.
14
Q So you understood that if the agreement
15 materialized that they would be getting this small check?
16 Tha~s the 3to $5,000 thing we talked about before?
17
A Uh-huh.
18
Q Correct?
19
A Yes.
20
Q And what about the debt of the business
21 that would exist? It has to have debt at some point that
22 the transfer is made.
23
A My dad told me he would stay in the saddle
24 through the transition until we could get everything
25 transferred into my name and move on.
36
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Q I don't understand what - well, it
doesn't matter if I understand it, what do you understand
that to mean?
A I understood that he would still be a
guarantor while I seeked financial possibilities to
actually move them completely out, but that he said that
he would stay -- his words were I'll stay in the saddle
with you until we can get that done, everything will be
fine.
Q So that would leave open, you know, kind
of a bunch of possibilities, then, as one, how long.
A Huge possibilities.
Q Right?
A Yes.
Q Kind of infinite almost in fact; right?
A Well, hopefully, get something done so
they can enjoy their retirement.
Q So number one that would be left open is
how long he would have to "stay in the saddle"; right?
A Correct.
Q I mean, that could be ashort period of
time, it could be along period of time?
A Correct.
Q But there had been no specific agreement
as to, like, cutting it off at some point?

37

1
A Not that I remember, no.
2
Q So basically indefinite and aperiod of
3 time that would have to be dealt with down the road?
4
A I would agree.
S
Q The other thing that you talked about is
6 that him staying in the saddle would be to provide some
7 finandal backing while you were trying to obtain your
8 own personal financing?
9
A Right, whether it be apartner or
10 whatever, yes.
11
Q And I've heard you make reference to that
12 before and as I prepared for this depo, rm reminded you
13 testified about this earlier, too, that the prospect
14 existed that you would have apartner in this bUSiness.
15 I mean, did you have somebody really in mind?
16
A Roy Long was one, Ontario Auto Brokers.
l7 Lanny Berg, I was going to propose something with him,
l8 but I think if the word would have got out, Don Ovitt
.9 would have probab~ been apossibility, but we never got
~O to that point.
1
MR. JANIS: Off the record.
2
(Off the record discussion.)
3
Q BY MR. JANIS: But in any event, the point
~ was that you understood under this agreement that you had
) with your dad that again serves as the basis for this
38
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1 lawsuit that at the time of transfer, your dad's
2 obligation would actually be ongoing for awhile to serve
3 as financial backing while you dea~ with this question
4 of obtaining financing yourself?
5
A I would agree with that.
6
Q And, again, how long that would take place
7 is just uncertain?
8
A Uncertain I would agree with.
9
Q And there were several things or several
10 avenues that you could pursue in the way of obtaining
11 some kind of financing that would cut off your dad's
12 ongoing responsibility to stay in the saddle; right?
13
A I agree.
14
Q One of which would be getting apartner?
15
A Possible.
16
Q And you already had some people in your
17 head. Had you talked to those guys about this?
18
A We never had got that far, John.
19
Q Okay, but at least in your head you had
20 some thoughts as to who might be partners; right?
21
A Correct.
22
Q And when you said Lanny Berg, by the way,
23 did you say junior or senior or both?
24
A I didn't say either one. I would have
25 talked to both.
39

1
Q Okay, but then, of course, what
2 arrangement you would have to have with any such partner,
3 that, too, was up in the air and subject to future
4 negotiation; right?
5
A I would agree.
6
Q Another a~emative that would exist at
7 the time of transfer and, again, which would dictate when
8 your dad would be relieved of any ongoing obligation
9 under the agreement to stay on board with some financing
10 assistance is for you to obtain aline of credit without
11 apartner?
12
A That would be apossibility, probably not
13 as likely.
14
Q Well, thaes the question I was having in
15 my head. Did you have in your mind at some point which
16 would be the likely avenue you would pursue?
17
A Ukely with apartner, Dad being apartner
18 out of the gate and then transfer to another.
19
Q So in order for the transfer to become
20 complete and for the time for your dad's performance to
21 end, it would have to be subject to you working out a
22 deal with one of these partner types?
23
A I would agree.
24
Q And even then, whenever that would take
25 place, there would have to be some discussion, if you
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will, because even then the business would still have
some debt and some receivables outstanding; right?
A I would agree with that, yeah.
Q I mean, that would always be true. Just
pick out adate at random and there's going to be some
debt and there's going to be some receivables due;
right?
A I would agree.
Q And it is, of course, conceivable that at
the time that transfer took place, in other words, when
you found apartner to help you finance the operation and
so your dad doesn't have to be involved any more, that
the debt at that point could be substantial.
A Possible.
Q And so you'd have to work out who would be
responsible for that debt or do you think you had worked
that out already?
A We'd have to work that out.
Q And had you had any discussions about this
money that I was talking about that were contributed by
your mom and dad for working capital purposes and several
of the checks indicated they were intended as being loans
whether that would be part of the debt that would be paid
back to them?
A Never had that conversation.
41

1
Q So how that part would be treated would
2 still be subject to future discussion?
3
A Correct.
4
Q Then, of course, another part of the debt
5 that would exist at the time of any particular transfer
6 would be whatever the existing line of credit is or,
7 excuse me, what the balance is with the line of credit
8 with the lending institution that your dad had; right?
9
A I didn't understand the question.
10
Q Yeah, because it was abad question is
11 why. I was stumbling through it for sure, but all I was
12 trying to get at is that at any particular point another
13 debt thafs going to exist for the business is the line
14 of credit with the bank and whatever the balance is?
15
A Correct.
16
Q And we knowf for example, because I think
17 your affidavit says, that at the time it was sold to
18 Buckner the debt to the bank was approximately $200,000.
19 Does that sound consistent with your memory?
20
A It sounds consistent.
21
Q I could probably find it in this affidavit
22 if you make me look for it. rm not finding it in the
23 affidavit right away, so lefs move on and talk about the
24 second affidavit.
25
42
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(Exhibit No. 10 was marked for
2 identifICation by the Notary Public.)
3
Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whafs marked
4 as Deposition Exhibit No. 10, that's asecond affidavit
5 you filed in this case; is that right?
6
A Yes.
7
Q I found it. rm going back to Exhibit No.
8 8, paragraph No. 24, it's on page 10.
9
A Uh-huh.
10
Q You're talking about -- see the very last
11 sentence there, last two lines?
12
A Uh-huh.
13
Q By the time he sold Thomas Motors in 2006,
14 Thomas Motors owed more than $200,000 on the flooring
15 line issued by KeyBank?
16
A I believe thafs correct.
17
Q So I assume that you said that in an
18 affidavit that was filed in August of 2007 that at the
19 time you would have put that you would have been certain
20 of those facts?
21
A I believe thafs correct.
22
Q Lefs go back to this now Exhibit 10.
23 This is the affidavit you submitted in April of 2008. Do
24 you see the date on page 3 there?
25
A Uh-huh.

43
1
Q Let me ask you to tum to paragraph 5at
2 page 2. This has to do with this land issue and I know
3 yo!fve attended a few hearings and you've heard about
4 this land issue and as I understand what you're saying in
5 this affidavit is that you understood that part and
6 parcel of the agreement you had with your mom and dad
7 about the business being transferred to you was not just
8 the business and whatever assets the business owned, but
9 the land on which it was situated?
10
A Correct.
11
Q And when you say the land on which it was
12 situated - I actually said those words. You said "the
13 real property that Thomas Motors was on," what does that
14 mean?
15
A The way I understood it was the complete
16 amount of land that the dealership sat on on that side of
17 the street, that the money that we were paying to rent
18 was paying on the complete property. At one time my dad
19 told me he was making double payments on all of the
20 property so when we did expand, we had more room. We
21 were going to face it to the west.
22
Q Hopefully, I don't have to drag the
23 agreements out here. Would that track with the
24 commerdallease written agreement and what parcels were
25 being discussed in those documents? Do you see what I'm
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1 saying?
2
A The way my dad talked about it was, again,
3 he was making double payments on the whole property
4 and5
Q I don't know what you mean the whole
6 property.
7
A Everything that was encompassed on the
8 south side of the highway that we owned, all the parcels.
9
Q That we owned?
10
A That our family owned or Ron Thomas and
11 Elaine Thomas owned.
12
Q So irs my understanding that all they
13 owned out there on the same side where Thomas Motors is
14 located is neighborhoodish of eight acres; does that
15 sound about right?
16
A Roughly.
17
Q Maybe it was nine.
18
A I think it was seven.
19
Q Oh, maybe it was seven point something.
20
A I believe thars right.
21
Q But that Thomas Motors was effectively
22 using only a part of it.
23
A We were using a part of it, yes,
24 correct.
25
Q So when you're talking about the land

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 being part of the deal that was going to be transferred
2 to you, are you talking the part that Thomas Motors was
3 using or the entire seven point something acres?
4
A The entire seven point was what Ron, what
5 my dad, told me. For the expansion, he talked about a
6 little Kellogg. He talked about a huge growth and we
7 would need that property to remodel and change the face
8 of the dealership which he had me working on somewhat
9 with ideas.
10
Q And so your understanding of the agreement
11 of having the business always contemplated the business
12 would be located where it actually was located, not
13 moving it anywhere?
14
A Correct, the building, right.
15
Q And so as I understand what you're telling
t6 me, then, your understanding of the agreement is that the
l7 land was simply part and parcel of the whole deal?
1.8
A It was and part of the reasoning if this
.9 helps was when we had enough inventory which we were
',0 cramped, the north side of the building, between ~ and
1 Highway 16, was really small. The east side of the
2 building was very small. Because of the street, we
3 couldn't expand that way, so the only thing that made
t sense was we would take the west side of the building and
make that the face and thars why he had the new approach

1
Q So ~ was never adeal in your mind that
2 the business was separate or divisible from the land?
3
A Correct, not the way I understood it with
4 all of the conversations we had. You couldn' have had
5 it separated for the plans that he had. You wouldn't
6 have had any room.
7
Q So as far as the agreement as far as
8 you're concerned, the two are indivisible?
9
A Yes, I would agree.
10
Q You know from the agreements that are
11 marked as Exhibits 4,5 and·· no, excuse me, 3, 4 and 5
12 to your first deposition, actually particularly Exhibit
13 5, there is in the sale of the business assets, there's a
14 certain price. We're talking about the written contracts
15 that were prepared in or around August and September of
16 2000, okay?
17
A Yes.
18
Q That as drafted by carl Harder and as
19 signed by you at one point that the sale of the business
20 assets had one price and the other part of the deal was
21 to lease the land with an eventual purchase price.
22
A Correct, which would all be together.
23
Q But I mean, there were two separate
24 written agreements with two different prices, in other
25 words.
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way put in off of the highway legally so we could use
that as an approach way to the new frontage of the
dealership when we expanded. Thars why that new
entranceway was put in by my dad.
Q So from your perspective, then, the
agreement about getting the business was basically
inextricably interwoven with the land?
A Yes, correct.
Q Otherwise stated, the agreement-that you
had·· in other words, the agreement thars at issue in
this case, your understanding of the agreement you had
with your mom and dad that the business would be
transferred to you at or about retirement at or about 63
based on the terms we've been talking about all morning
was apackaged deal, business and land?
A The way I understood it through the years,
yes. He never had aconversation where he ever said
anything about separating the two, it was all one piece
for expansion in the future for my generation, for my
kids' generation, thars why we needed the land.
Q And I take it from your standpoint irs
kind of like with one comes the other; right?
A The way I understood~. I mean, John, we
walked the property, drove the property talking about the
new ideas and how we were going to do it.

47
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A Okay, I understand.
Q I mean, thars true, isn't it? .
A I believe thafs right.
Q I mean, we can just look at it and see the
commerdallease has lease terms and the option at the
end amount. The rent term is on page 2of 10,000 amonth
for parcel one. Do you see where I'm at?
A Uh-huh.
Q You know, you can see this. I'm not
hying to be specific, just that it had a specified rent
payment and then an eventual purchase amount; right?
A Agreed.
Q And then the sale of business assets had
an entirely different purchase price for what the assets
would cost or be valued at?
A Agreed.
Q Okay. Now, so when we're talking about
the amount that you agreed to pay your mom and dad of
this uncertain somewhere 3and $5,000 amonth, is that
part of the land, too, or cIo you pay separate for the
land as was clone in the written contract?
A I would say the 3to 5 would be aseparate
check from the bUSiness, not from the land.
Q You lost me there. I understand that
you're saying, in fact these written contracts

49
1 contemplate, that you could assign the obligations to a
2 corporate entity that you prepare so that if the business
3 had ultimately been transferred to you, Drew Thomas, you
4 may have been tumed it into something called Drew Thomas
5 Motors or something like that.
6
A Black canyon Dodge was the name I
7 preferred.
8
Q Okay; so you were planning on creating a
9 business entity to serve as the actual owner of the
10 business?
11
A I would agree.
12
Q And that if the payments were going to be
13 made pursuant to the agreement to your mom and dad of
14 this somewhere between 3and $5,000 a month, it would
15 actually be made by that business entity, albeit you
16 would be the one authorizing the payments?
17
A I would agree.
18
Q Okay; so now what I'm trying to get at
19 here is would the land based on your understanding of the
20 agreement reached with your mom and dad, would that be
21 something dea~ with separately and apart from the
22 business paying 3to $5,000 for the transfer of the
23 business?
24
A I would agree.
25
Q It would be something different?
50 .
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A The payment or, say, call it a retirement
payment?
Q No, no. Would you pay separately for the
land is the easier way to ask it?
A Would I pay separately to -Q Have the right to either rent the land or
purchase the land other than this 3to $5,000 amonth
you'd pay your mom and dad?
A I would agree.
Q That you would pay something else?
A I would agree.
Q But you just hadn't worked out how much
you would pay? I mean, you had this commerdallease
agreement, but it's your view that this commercial lease
agreement has no force and effect?
A It never came to fruition at all.
Q Okay; so ifs your view the commerdal
lease agreement has no force and effect; right?
A Correct.
Q All right; so you otherwise believe that
there would be an amount that you would pay for either
the renting or purchase of the property, the real
property, aside from the 3 to $5,000 amonth you would
pay your mom and dad for the business?
A Okay, I get you. We never discussed
51

1 whether that would be involved together and separated out
2 or if it would be together. We never discussed that
3 part.
4
Q So that was to be another part that would
5 be negotiated at the time of transfer?
6
A According to my dad, yeah.
7
Q And according to you?
8
A Yeah, would have had to have been talked
9 about sooner or later.
10
Q Would you have at least expected - well,
11 strike that You tell me, what would you have expected
12 to have happen relative to the real property? Would you
13 have to pay separate for it something?
14
A I would imagine.
15
MR. JANIS: can I have just acouple of
16 minutes?
17
(Recess.)
18
Q BY MR. JANIS: OkayI le~s wrap this up
19 here. Drew, let me just say this as we wrap this up and
20 the reason we are here again is at least I thought there
21 was some apparent confusion on what is it that represents
22 the terms of this agreement and whether there was a
23 change from what was the deposition to the affidavits or
24 whatever and again, I'm not being accusatory here, I'm
25 just saying thafs what led to this. Thars all I'm
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1 saying.
2
A But I'm still alittle confused on the
3 question about this against what I agreed to do with my
4 dad. Irs like they're intertwined, but this doesn~
5 even come into what I agreed to with him, so thars where
6 I was confused.
7
Q The record is going to be bad on what
8 you're saying here, Drew, and let me tell you what I am
9 understanding because I think I know what you're saying.
to When you're saying "this," you're talking about the
11 written contracts that you signed in September of 2000,
12 you're saying they have nothing to do with this?
13
A That dea~ separately with the land. What
14 I'm saying is when I agreed to come overfrom Berg to my
15 dad and this never came to fruition, this never
16 happened-17
Q The written contract?
18
A -- the written contract never happened, he
19 said when I retire, the business is yours which included
20 the land so we could expand and Mom and him would take a
21 modest check out for retirement. Thars all it was, and
22 so he goes get back to work, dig in, you're worrying too
23 much, I've got this taken care of.
24
Q But I thought before the break you were
125 telling me besides this modest retirement that they'd be

r
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1 "paid" that for the land part you would have expected to
2 have to pay something else, either in the form of alease
3 or an actual purchase price or something besides the
4 modest-S
A Not according to Ron, no, that was not our
6 agreement. In this it dea~ with it separately, but this
7 he never pushed through. This was never done and, again,
8 I was told why would you want to buy something I'm giving
9 to you, you're worrying too much, get back to work, so I
10 did and from this point on to the end of the sale, thaes
11 exactly what I did.
12
Q And thiS, again, probably illustrates why
13 we're having this deposition because now I'm confused
14 again, but let me try to put this in what I believe you
t5 are telling me in my words, but what you are telling me
l6 and you correct me if I'm wrong, how is that? I'm
.7 understanding that the agreement that you're claiming
8 that is the basis of this lawsuit had certain terms,
9 conditions, if you will, that would have happened had it
o gone to fruition. Are you with me so far?
1
A Are we talking about this [indicating]?
2
Q No, I'm talking about the agreement that
l you're claiming in this lawsuit. Lees close the book on
I this for the moment.
A Okay.
54
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1
Q I'm going to stand while I think this out.
2 Okay, you're claiming in this lawsuit that you had an
3 oral agreement with your mother and father that had
4 certain terms or conditions. Am I right so far?
5
A Such as if you Q Just that it has certain terms and
6
7 conditions.
8
A Okay.
9
Q We're going to get to what they are in a
10 minute.
11
A Okay, I agree.
12
Q So far you're with me?
13
A So far rm with you.
14
Q All right, because before I leave this
.
15 deposition, what I want to understand is exactly what
16 those terms and conditions are, and here's what I
17 understand you've told me today or clarified again for me
18 today that at the time had this deal actually occurred,
19 materialized, happened 20
A Upon his retirement.
21
Q - upon his retirement at or about 63
22 years old and the transfer of the business took place,
23 one of the conditions that would have happened is that
24 you would pay your mom and dad some stream of monthly
25 income between 3and $5,000.
55
1
A Correct.
2
Q Another condition that would have happened
3 is your dad would have stayed in the saddle, as you put
4 it or that he put it, that is to say, he would have
S continued his involvement in the business largely for his
6 financing reasons while you sought financing elsewhere,
7 finandng options elsewhere.
8
A Agreed.
9
Q And so acondition of the agreement that
10 serves as the basis of this lawsuit is that Ron Thomas
11 would have had to stay connected with the business
12 insofar as afinancial commitment?
13
A Correct.
14
Q And then in the undetermined future, from
15 that point you would be able to obtain some kind of
16 finandng option which would then relieve him of the
17 obligation to continue staying in the saddle, that is,
18 staying connected with the business financially?
19
A For the flooring line.
20
Q But he'd be out of the business
21 altogether?
22
A Right.
23
Q Other than receMng 3to $5,000 a
24 month?
25
A Right
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1
Q And that it is impossible to tell at this
2 point that had the business been transferred to you how
3 long it would have taken you to obtain this a~emative
4 financing?
5
A Correct. It could have been short, it
6 could have been medium, it could have been long.
7
Q In fact, there were various options and
8 irs impossible to predict which of those would have
9 happened, too?
10
A Correct.
11
Q So there really is no telling when Ron
12 under the agreement that serves as the basis of this
13 lawsuit that Ron Thomas and by connection Elaine Thomas
14 would be completely out of the financial commitment
15 picture; right?
16
A I didn't understand.
17
Q Sure. Based on what we just talked about
18 that one of the conditions of the agreement would be that
19 while you are paying them through your business the 3 to
20 $5,000 amonth, Ron and by connection Elaine are
21 continuing their financial commitment to the business to
22 serve as finandal backing; right?
23
A Until such time, correct.
24
Q Right; so based on what was actually going
25 to happen in your mind as the conditions of this
57
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A Correct.

Q And another condition that I can think of
that I don't think we talked about actually so far is
that in order for you to continue with the business,
whether under the name you told me about before or some
other name, you would have to be, you, Drew, would have
to be, approved as an authorized franchise owner by Dodge
Chrysler.
A Or have apartner that could be, but yes,
you would have to be authorized.
Q And Wthat couldn~ happen, the deal
couldn't happen; correct?
A Correct.
Q And so that, too, was acondition of the
agreement that was left to be dea~ with after the
transfer took place?
A During the transfer and after, yes.
Q During the transfer process, it would have
to be deaft with?
A You would have to discuss it.
Q And one of the possibilities is it may
have been the case that you personally would not have
been solely approved to be afranchise owner by Dodge
Chrysler, that it would have required you to be involved
with somebody else?
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1 agreement, it is impossible to tell how long it would
2 have taken for them to be completely relieved of any
3 obligations for finandal backing associated with the
4 business because you don't know how long it would have
5 taken you to get your alternative finandngi right?
6
A Correct.
7
Q Okay. All right, and another thing that
8 is basically a condition of the agreement would be that
9 there would have to be some discussion between you and
10 your dad and by connection your mother as to what would
11 happen with the debt that the business had as of the time
12 he would have been completely relieved of his financial
13 backing obligation; right?
14
A The way he stated that on the debt, we
15 would work out of the debt, whether you reduce inventory,
16 whatever you do to reduce some debt.
17
Q But at the time of transfer, as we talked
18 about before, there's got to be some debt.
19
A Correct, I would agree.
20
Q And so the question as to who was going to
21 pay what part of the debt was still open?
22
A Was not discussed, correct.
23
Q And so that was left as acondition of the
24 deal that would have to be met one way or the other, but
25 it was left for future negotiation?
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1
A Possibly, but not impossible either.
2 You'd have to walk into that water to find out at the
3 time.
4
Q Exactly, and thars precisely what rm
5 understanding is the bottom line is we don' know, we'd
6 have to try it before you figure out what actually
7 happened in that regard.
8
A And like Dad said, he would stay with me
9 through that transition until we could get that
10 accomplished.
11
Q But there's no guarantee it could be
12 accomplished. Ifs just an open Question is the bottom
13 line.
14
A No guarantee ~ couldn', but you could
15 look at it 16
Q Either way?
17
A Either way.
18
Q Thafs my point is it's acondition of the
19 agreement that would have to be dealt with one way or the
20 other and there is no ability to predict what would have
21 happened either way on that partiCular point.
22
A Well, we both could predict, but truly,
23 the outcome we couldn't say.
24
Q Okay. Now, what I've tried to do after
25 the break is kind of review with you what I have
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understood you to testify would have been the terms of
the agreement, would have been the conditions in order to
make the agreement complete, who would have had to do
what, who would have had to pay what, and in your mind,
are there any other conditions, terms of the agreement
that we have not discussed that would have had to have
been dealt with at the time of transfer?
A No.
MR. JANIS: Okay, thaes all the questions
I have, then.
MR. WIlKINSON: Thanks.
(The Deposition conduded at 2:50 p.m.)
(Signature requested.)
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

ss.

5

I, CONSTANCE S. BUCY, a Notary Public in and for

6

the State of Idaho, do hereby certify:
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10
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11

truth;
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63

61
VERIFICATION
3

STATE OF _ _ _ _ _ __
COUNTY OF_ _ _ _ _ __

.s.

5
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9
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11

have read the said deposition and know the contents

12

thereof; that the questions contained therein were

13
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14
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15
16
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MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:
(208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISB No.
2451, 6023
wmorrow@morrowdinius.com
dwilkinson@morrowdinius. com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his
counsel of record, the law firm of Morrow Dinius, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, and hereby files Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Second

Motion for Summary Judgment. This response in opposition to Defendants' second motion for
summary judgment is supported by the Affidavit of Dennis P. Wilkinson in Opposition to

Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment ("Wilkinson Aff. "), together with the file
and record in this case. The aforementioned affidavit has been filed contemporaneously with
this memorandum.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The motion before the Court is the Defendants' second attempt at summary judgment.
Prior to the Court's ruling on the Defendants' first motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
had claims for breach of an oral contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
unjust enrichment and fraud.

The Court, in its Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment, granted the motion as to all claims except for the breach of the oral contract. It is this
single claim that is yet again being attacked by the Defendants. The argument made by the
Defendant again focuses on the lack of definiteness as to the terms of the oral contract and the
statute of frauds.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Idaho law, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); see also Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho
714,718,918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996). In applying this standard, the Court liberally construes all
disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and will draw all reasonable inferences and
conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. See McKay v.

fAt'ens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). If the adverse party sets forth facts
sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial, the moving party is not entitled to
summary judgment. See Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs remaining claim
asserting they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Defendants argue that the oral
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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contract lacks essential material terms rendering the contract unenforceable. In so arguing the
Defendants claim that the price of the business had not been specifically agreed to, nor had the
manner in which the parties would deal with the business debts and receivables. The second
argument focuses on the statute of frauds. In this memorandum the Plaintiff will first address the
indefiniteness issue and then the statute of frauds issue.

As established by the record, the

arguments set forth herein, and the Court's prior ruling on these issues, the Defendants are still
not entitled to summary judgment.

A.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED
ON THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE CONTRACT LACKS MATERIAL
TERMS
The argument made by the defense is virtually identical to the argument made in their

first motion for summary judgment. The Defendants argued unsuccessfully that the absence of
any agreed upon price term in the oral agreement rendered the contract unenforceable. This
Court held that "in consideration of Plaintiff leaving his employment at Lanny Berg and
contributing his efforts and experience to building Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to
transfer Thomas Motors upon the retirement of Ronald Thomas is supported by sufficient
evidence in the record to preclude summary judgment dismissing the claim for breach of that
contract." Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9-10, entered November 26,

The trier of fact's inquiry into an oral agreement is three-fold; first, to determine whether
an agreement exists; second, interpreting the terms of the agreement; and third, construing the
agreement for its intended legal effect. R.D. Bischoffv. Quong-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho
826, 828 (Ct.App.1987). The question as to whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds
is to be determined by the trier of fact. Jd at 412. Whether an oral contract exists is a question of
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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fact and thus is a question for the jury in this case. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P. 2d
714.

The issues related to this alleged oral agreement are questions of fact for a jury to

determine and not ripe for summary judgment.
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has held there was an issue of material fact as to the
existence of an oral contract under circumstances which were strikingly similar to the
circumstances in this case. In Harbaugh v. Myron Harbaugh Alotor, Jnc., 100 Idaho 295, 597
P.2d 18 (1979), the Supreme Court found that in a factual situation virtually identical to this
case, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether two sons entered into an agreement for
the transfer of an automobile business from their father.
In Harbaugh, it was alleged by two sons that they had entered into an agreement with
their father for the purchase of their father's business. Jd. They left promising careers in other
fields and took control of their father's business upon the promise that the business would
ultimately be transferred to them. Jd.

The defense denied that such a contract existed and

claimed that the parties could never reach a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations for the
sale. Jd.
The Court relied heavily on the testimony of the only non-interested person to testify
regarding the existence of the contract.

Jd.

That person testified that the father acted

consistently with the existence of a contract. Jd. The Court ruled in a unanimous decision that it
was wholly unable to say that as a matter of law no contract was entered into between the parties.

Id.
In the present case we are dealing with almost an identical factual situation; a situation
where an affidavit was submitted by a non-interested party, Jan Flowers. In paragraph 9 of the
Affidavit of Janis Flowers in Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Aff. Flowers Opp. Summ.
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Jdgmt."), filed August 13, 2007, Ms. Flowers stated that "Throughout my employment at
Thomas Motors, I heard Ron state to various Thomas Motors employees that Thomas Motors
was going to be Drew's business when Ron retired. I heard Ron make such statements on
numerous occasions."
There is no doubt that an agreement existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
This is a case where a factual determination must be made regarding the existence and terms of
that agreement. That factual determination should be left to the jury and summary judgment is
wholly inappropriate given the legal standards and strength of the case law in favor of the
Plaintiff.

1.

The Price Issue.

It appears that although the Plaintiff and Defendant discussed whether the Plaintiff would
provide the Defendants with retirement income from Thomas Motors, the parties never agreed
that the Plaintiff receiving Thomas Motors was contingent on him providing the retirement
inc6me to Defendants. The following deposition excerpt is illustrative of the agreement that
existed between the Plaintiff and Defendant:
Q: (by Mr. Janis) The depo excerpts, if will, that you just
read, would you agree with me that they basically boil down to you
testifying to the effect that you always understood that if and when
there was going to be a transfer of Thomas Motors business to you
that you would never get it for free, but there would be someyou'd have to pay something for it:
A: (by Drew Thomas) It all comes back to we had an
agreement that if I left Lanny Berg Chevrolet, came to Emmett, ran
the store until he retired that it would be mine to take on to the next
generation and, if so, to the next generation. When you say "free,"
I expected as I stated, that they should-I had no problem with
them having something of a retirement check out of it and it would
have been healthy for all of us, but it comes back to one simple
thing for me: If I leave Lanny Berg, go to Emmett and work the
dealership, at the end of the day, which was around 63, he always
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said that it would be mine to take on for my lifetime and then my
kids' lifetime.
Deposition Transcript of Drew Thomas ("D. Thomas Aff."), p. 10 1113-25, p.ll111-6.
The Plaintiff was clear throughout his deposition testimony that he was willing to pay the
Defendant something by way of a retirement income. The agreement to transfer the business
however was not dependent on him making these payments. As has been established in the
record and in the Court's prior ruling, the Plaintiff left the security of his job at Lanny Berg and
went to work at the dealership in Emmett based on the promise that he would receive the
business at the retirement of the Defendant. The deposition goes on:
Q: (by Mr. Janis) Let's put it this way: At no point during
the timeframes you ever talked about the transfer of the business to
you or this agreement that serves as the basis of this lawsuit did
you dad ever say to you you'll get it for free; is that fair to say?
A: (by Drew Thomas) His statement was this place will be
yours.
Q:

He never said -

A:

He never said the word "free."

Q:
He never indicated to you in any way that the
business would be given to you for free, did he?
It would be-if you use that whole sentence and
A:
dropped off the word "free," that would be more accurate. It will
be yours. That's the agreement we had.

D. Thomas Aff., p. 13 1123-25, p. 14111-12.
The evidence unquestionably establishes the terms of the agreement between the Plaintiff
and Defendant: the Plaintiff would leave his employment at Lanny Berg to devote his time and
energy to building and operating Thomas Motors, and, in exchange, the Defendant agreed to give
him Thomas Motors upon his retirement. The deposition excerpts above remain consistent with
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Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas in Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Aff. R.
Drew Thomas Opp. Summ. Jdgmt."), filed August 13,2007. Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit reads
as follows:
Throughout the nearly nine and half year period, from when Ron
proposed that I come to work with him to establish Thomas Motors
until he sold the business in March of 2006, Ron never stated I
would pay any purchase price for the business. Our agreement was
that I would leave Lanny Berg and give my efforts and experience
in building Thomas Motors in exchange for his "giving" me the
business whenever her retired. While I felt it would be fair and
wanted to ensure that Ron and my mother received some
retirement income from the business, I need to clarify that my
receiving the business was not contingent upon my paying them
retirement income. The retirement income might have been in the
form of rental payments or a return for financial or other assistance
my father would provide. The amount of the retirement income
that was discussed was to be $3,000 to $5,000.
This issue of paying the Defendant some retirement income was considered during the
Defendant's first attempt at summary judgment and the price issue was determined to be
immaterial. It was clearly discussed in the Plaintiffs affidavit and relied upon by this Court in
making the determination that the price issue was immaterial to the formation of the contract.
The issue of price remains immaterial and the Defendant presents no persuasive
information or case law that should affect the Court's prior ruling on this issue. The fact of the
matter is that there is no "price." The Defendant has offered nothing to show that there was a
purchase price somehow connected with the transfer of the business only that the parties
discussed the payment of some retirement income which the Plaintiff was happy to provide.
While, the parties clearly discussed whether the Plaintiff would provide the Defendants
with retirement income from Thomas Motors, the parties never agreed that the Plaintiff's
receiving Thomas Motors would be contingent upon his providing the Defendants with income
during their retirement. The record shows, the Plaintiff simply wanted to ensure his parents were
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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provided for during their retirement with income from the family business. The amount of
payments to the Defendants, if any, was to be determined after Thomas Motors had been
transferred.

2.

The Accounts ReceivablelDebts Issue.

There is absolutely no evidence that suggests that the issue of accounts receivable or
debts is somehow a material term to the agreement. The defense uses deposition excerpts in an
attempt to illustrate that the manner in which the parties would deal with this issue was a
condition of the agreement. The promise by the Defendant was plain, concise and simple. If the
Plaintiff left his job with Lanny Berg and helped establish the Thomas Motors dealership, the
Defendant would transfer the business to Plaintiff upon Defendant's retirement. Transferring the
business would clearly include its assets and liabilities.
This was in fact an issue that was discussed by the parties. The following excerpt is an
expression of the agreement between the parties:

Q. (by Mr. Janis) Who was going to get what, who was
going to do what, who was going to pay what?
A. The way he described it was that when he retired that
him and Mom would take a small check, not much, but everything
would come over to the dealership, the checkbook. I believe even
Aunt Shirley was going to actually be moving in with us which I
had no problem with because that's his direct connection to the
business, so we would be in control of the spending, how the
money was spent, where it was going, that type of thing.
Q. So you understood that if the agreement materialized
that they would be getting this small check? That's the $3 to
$5,000 that we talked about before?
A. Uh-huh.

Q. Correct?
A. Yes,
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Q. And what about the debt of the business that would
exist? It has to have debt at some point that the transfer is made.
A. My dad told me that he would stay in the saddle
through the transition until we could get everything transferred into
my name and move on.

D. Thomas Aff., p. 36 11 4-25
The agreement was to transfer the business which would encompass everything within
the business, including debts and receivables. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant may have
to "stay in the saddle" until the transition was accomplished but that does not change the nature
of what is being transferred.

When the Defendant first approached the Plaintiff about him

managing the car lot in Emmett in 1997, the Defendant said that he wouldn't even purchase the
dealership if the Plaintiff wouldn't agree to come and manage the business.

Aff. R. Drew

Thomas Opp. Summ. Jdgmt., Paragraph 3. The Plaintiff fulfilled his end of the bargain only to
have the business sold out from under him.
This issue regarding debts and accounts receivable is a concoction of the defense.
Simply because it is argued that this issue is clearly material to the formation of the contract does
not make it so. In almost any transaction some unexpected event could occur and there are a
myriad of ways that an agreement can change or be breached. This agreement was presented to
the Plaintiff in a very simple manner. Whether this alleged contract by the Plaintiff exists is a
question for the trier of fact. The terms of that contract are also questions for the trier of fact.
The law is black and white on this point - it is clearly in the province of the jury.
For these reasons, Plaintiff and Defendant's contract was definite and certain in all its
material terms. However, to the extent there are any doubts concerning the terms of the parties'
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contract, the record clearly contains sufficient evidence concerning the parties' intent to allow
the matter to be decided by a jury.

B.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED
ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The evidence establishes that the oral contract was for the transfer of a business, Thomas

Motors, not a contract for the transfer of real property. The Plaintiff has argued throughout and
testified via affidavit and deposition that it was his understanding that the real property was part
of the agreement. This Court specifically found in its Order on Defendant's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, entered May 19, 2008, that there was no evidence in the record indicating
that Thomas Motors owned the real estate that the business was on and that there was evidence,
suggested by Plaintiffs affidavit that the business would continue to pay rent, indicating that
Ron Thomas would continue to own the property after the business was transferred. By making
that ruling the Court specifically found that the real property is not part of the agreement between
the parties. Thjs, in and of itself, makes the contract divisible.
The evidence presented in prior hearings and relied upon by this Court clearly indicates
that the business could be transferred without the need for the real property to go with it. The
Defendant makes the argument that the agreement, as alleged by the Plaintiff, is indivisible. In
so arguing the defense relies on Coppedge v. Leiser, 71 Idaho 248, 229 P.2d 977 (1951). The

Coppedge Court held that "a contract may both in its nature and by its terms be severable, and
yet rendered entire by intention of parties and best test is whether all of things as a whole are of
essence of contract and if it appears that purpose was to take whole or none, then contract is
entire, otherwise it is severable." In the present case the promise was for the business. There is
no evidence submitted in the record that indicates that it was the parties' intention that the
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Plaintiff take "whole or none." Quite the opposite, it was entirely possible for the Plaintiff to
own and operate the business without owning the real property. They are completely severable.
The agreement, as has been argued in prior submissions, was primarily for the transfer of
the business. The agreement between the parties was not strictly a real estate agreement. The
transfer of the business was not dependent upon the transfer of the real property. The transfer of
the real property was merely incidental to the agreement to transfer the business which takes the
transfer out of the statute of frauds.
Clearly, the evidence establishes that the oral contract was for the transfer of a business,
Thomas Motors, not the transfer of real property. Even if real estate on which the business was
located, or onto which the business might expand, was also to become the Plaintiffs upon the
Defendant's retirement, the transaction involving the real estate would have been incidental to
the Defendant's oral contract to transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff. In other words, the oral
agreement concerning Thomas Motors did not depend upon transfer of land. See Spence v.
Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 771, 890 P.2d 714, 722 (1995).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the
Plaintiffs claim should be denied.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2009.

By: __~~~__________________
De IS P. Wilkinson
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617-0188

)(

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342-2927

,x..

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196

I

d(()\JUM. rvW~
for MORROW DINIUS

ImtlT:\Clients\T\Thomas, R Drew 21 971\Thomas Motors, Inc.OOO\Pleadings\Response to Defendants Second Motion for Summary Judgment.docl<
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 22()

Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:
Facsimile:

(208) 475-2200
(208) 475·2201

ISB No.
2451, 6023
wmorrow@mofl"Owdinius.com
dwilkinsotz@morrowdinius.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV. 2006-492

)
vs.

)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAlNB K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Coxporation,

)
)
)

Defendants.

-----------------------------

PLAINTIFF'S PRETRIAL
MEMORANDUM

)
)

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys of record, the law finn of
Morrow Dinius, and as and for Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum prepared in confonnance with

the Court's Scheduling Order, und hereby states and discloses the following:
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PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF RECOVERY

This is an action to recoveJ' damages on a breach of an oral contract. The Plaintiff has
alleged that sometime during July or early August of 1997, he and the Defendant, Ron Thomas,
fonned an oral contract whereby the Defendant would purchase Johannesen Motors for the
purpose of establishing a Chrysler dealership on those premises, the Plaintiff would leave his
employment with Lanny Berg and contribute his knowledge, experience, and all necessary
efforts J at below-market compensation if necessary, in order to establish a new car dealership,
Thomas Motors, which the Defendant would then give to the Plaintiff upon the retirement of the
Defendant.
Sometime in or around March of 2006, the Defendant sold the business to a third party
and did not honor his agreement with the Plaintiff. Initially, the Plaintiff filed causes of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealingJ quasi contract and fraud. Those
causes of action have been dismi "isM through summary judgment leaving only the breach of
contract action. The trial has been bifurcated. The trial scheduled for June of2009, deals solely
with whether there was an oral contract and whether the defendant breached that contract. The

issue of damages will be tried at a future date.

B.

STIPULATED FACTS, WITNESSES, AND EXHIBITS
1.

Stipulated Facts.

The parties have not yet stipulated to any facts.

2.

Witnesses.

a.

R. Drew Thomas,

b.

Monte Thomas,

c.

Rick Thomas,
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d.

Ronald O. Thomas,

e.

Elaine K. Thomas,

f.

J. Robin Wilde,

g.

Jan Flowers.

h.

Penny Hulb{rt,

i.

Shirley Youngstrom.

j.

Katie Peters< ln,

k.

Kyle Thomas,

1.

Sandy Mills.

m.

Doug Mills.

n.

Vaughn Waggoner, Washington Trust Bank,

o.

John NwtJe). Chrysler Financial

p.

Erling Johannesen,

q.

Don Rogers.

r.

Tracy Lankford,

s.

Richard Nunn,

t.

KaryOamer,

u.

Cory Thomes,

v.

D. Spillett,

w.

John Cales,

x.

Heather Strand.

The Plaintiff also specifically reserves the right to call any vvitness disclosed by the
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM - 3

"
() ( J' 1. U

C;k,

.-vu"t I \J~'V

· ....

3.

~ 005/008

I

Exhibits

a.

September I, 2000 Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets
between Thomas Motors, Inc., R. Drew Thomas, and Ronald O. and

Elaine K. Thomas;
b.

September 1 2000 Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement between
Ronald O. and Elaine K. Thomas, Thomas Motors, Inc, and R. Drew
Thomas;

c.

September 1, 2000 Management Contract between Ronald O. and Elaine
K. Thomas, Thomas Motors, Inc., and R. Drew Thomas;

d.

2006 Federal and State tax returns for Thomas Motors, Inc.;

e.

2006 Federal and State tax returns for Ronald O. Thomas Enterprises, Inc.;

f.

2006 Federal and State tax returns for Ronald O. and Elaine K. Thomas;

g.

Documents pertaining to the sale of Thomas Motors, Inc. to Bill Buckner
Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc.;

h.

January 18, ~006 Agreement for the Sale of Assets of Thomas Motors,
Inc. between Ronald O. Thomas, Thomas Motors, Inc. and Quality
Investments, Inc.;

i.

Daimler Chrysler 2006 Dealer Financial Statement for Thomas Motors,
Inc.;

j.

2006 Federal tax return for Bill Buckner Chrysler Jeep Dodge. Inc.;

k.

1997·2005 h~deral and State tax returns for Thomas Motors, Inc.

The Plaintiff reserves the right to use any exhibits listed or provided by the Defendant.
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C.

SETTLEMENT DISCUS~IONS
The parties have not participated in any extra-judicial procedures in an effort to resolve

this dispute. The parties have not discussed settlement or exchanged any settlement offers.
DATED this

V

day of April, 2009.

CI!:RTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & Brody
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise.ID 83701-2582

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342-2927

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196

~~mj~
for MORROW DINIUS
(
Imtl'r:ICJi;nlll\'JiThomn•• R Drvw 2J971\Thonllll Motor!!.

IIlC,OOO\Plcading..~\Pn:tri81

Memo.doll
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise,ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N, Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2006-492
DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL
STATEMENT

*****
DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT - )

COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys ofrecord, Hepworth, Janis & Brody. and submit the foUowing as their Pre-Trial Statement.
A. The Legal Elements of the Defense.

The defendants have recently filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment which
specifies in detail the legal defenses the defendants have to the plaintiff's singular clam of breach
of oral contract in this case. While there are some factual disagreements over whether any kind of
an agreement was actually made, the legal theories of the defense can be summarized as follows:
1, It is absolutely undisputed and undeniable that whatever agreement was or was
not reached between the parties here, there were a number of material and essential terms that were
never agreed upon, thus rendering any agreement here unenforceable as a matter of clear Idaho law.
2. It is also undisputed that the alleged agreement being claimed by the plaintiff
involved the transfer of land which was "indivisible" from the transfer of the business, Since the
Statute of Frauds has already been held to bar any claim associated with a land transfer. the entire
agreement is void and unenforceable since the land portion of the deal is indivisible flom the nonland portion of the al1eged deal.
3. The written contracts entered into between the parties in September of 2000
superceded any prior oral agreements, and there is no doubt the plaintiff did not comply with any of
the obligations required under the written contracts.
B. WitnesseslExhibits/StipiuJations.
The trial of this case has now been bifurcated, such that if it occurs it will involve
only the liability issues, which in tum will require much less testimony. The defendants feel very
strongly, however, that there should be no trial, as the issues at this point have become very clear" that
DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT - 2
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the plaintiff's singular cause of action shou1d be dismissed as a matter of law. The facts Iegarding
these legal issues are undisputed and frankly undeniable, as is the applicable Jaw. In any event,
counsel for the defendants would anticipate that the parties would largely agree on exhibits being
admitted and at least agtee on the authenticity and relevance of such documents, although no formal
agreement has been reached at this point The anticipated witnesses and exhibits by the defense are
as follows:
A.

Possible Defense Witnesses, in alphabetical order:
Mark Bottles
Kent Corbett
Jan Flowers
Sandy Mills
Elaine Thomas
Drew Thomas
Monte Thomas
Rick Thomas
Ron Thomas
Vaughn Waggonner
Rob Wilde
Shirley Youngstrom

B.

Possible Defense Exbibits:
- Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets - dated 9/1/00
- Management Contract - dated 9/1/00

DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT -.3
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- Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement - dated 911/00
- Tax returns for Thomas Motors - 1997 - 2005, inclusive (each marked
separately)
-Advertisements for auction sale of Thomas Motors through Corbett Auctions
- Closing documents re: sale of Thomas Motors and surrounding land to
Buckner Group
- Ron Thomas Promissory Note to Mark Bottles for commission on sale of
Thomas Motors
- Closing documents for sale ofproperty adjacent to Thomas MOtOIS business
- Checks from Ron and Elaine Thomas to Thomas Motors business
- Social Security earnings statement - Drew Thomas
- Affidavits of Drew Thomas
- Affidavit of Monte Thomas
- Affidavit of Rick Thomas
- Affidavits of Rob Wilde
- Affidavit of Jan Flowers
- Affidavit of John Nunley
C. Settlement Discussions.
Counsel for the parties have on a number of occasions discussed the subject of
settlement in ways in which this family dispute could be resolved, without success.
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DATED this:2 0 day of April, 2009.

Atto
?

,-r---

DATED this ~ day of April, 2009.

Byl{~t~
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney for Defend ts

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 20th day of April, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DlNTIJS
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 8.3687

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[x] E-mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[ x] U.S. Mail
[ J Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail
[ J Telecopy (Fax)
[xl E-mail
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:
(208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISB No.
2451, 6023
wmorrow@morrowdinius.com
dwilkinson@morrowdinius.com

.':-(

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

---------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS
WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

)

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Canyon
)
DENNIS WILKINSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

~~

~

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I

~

'y':::",

"--tJ (J 1 U

1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action,

and make this Affidavit on the basis of my own personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference as if set

forth in full is a true and correct copy of the transcript from the March 31, 2009 continued
deposition of R. Drew Thomas.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2009.

Dennis Wilkinson

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Dennis Wilkinson this 23rd day of April,
2009.

(SEAL)

0(~m0~¥4:

Notary Public for Idaho
My Commission Expires:

01-19-2013

AFFIDA VIT OF DENNIS WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise,ID 83701-2582

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342-2927

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
l09N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emrnett,ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196

cr&w..m:i~
for MORROW DINIUS

ImtlT:\Clients\TIThomas, R Drew 2'1 9711Tbomas Motors, Inc,OOO\PleadingslAff of DPW.Response to 2nd SJdoc
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SHEET 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
3

R. DREW THOMAS,

WITNESS

EXAMINAT ION BY

R. DREW THOMAS

Mr. Janis

PAGE

5

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2006-492

VS.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,
9

10

Defendants.

10

11

11

12

12

13

DEPOSITION OF R. DREW THOMAS
14

14

15

15

March 31,

2009

16

16

Boise, Idaho

17

17

18

18

19

19

20

20

21

21

22

22

23

23

24

24

2S

25

DEPOSITION OF R. DREW THOMAS, taken

1
2

at the instance of the Defendants at the law offices of

3

Morrow Dinius, 5680 East Franklin Road, in the City of

4

Nampa, state of Idaho l

5

Tuesday, March ::n, 2009 1 before CONSTANCE S. SUey, CSR

commencing at 1: 30 p.m., on

6

8187, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho,

7

pursuant to Notice and in

8

of Clvil Procedure.

accordan~e

with the Idaho Rules

9

8
9

12
13
14

APPEARANCES

15
16
For the Plaintiff:

MORROW DINIUS
by Dennis P. Wilkinson, Esq.
5680'East franklin Road
suite 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

For the Defendants:

HEPWORTH, JANIS , BRODY
by John J. Janis, Esq.
Post Office Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701

18

19

21

22
23
24

25

r

N 0 E
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PAGE

8 - Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas in Opposition
to Summary Judgment
9 - Copies of checks
10 - Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas in Support of
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

10

11

20

DESCRIPTION

32
43

1 NAMPA, IDAHO, TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 2009, 1:30 P. M.
2
3
R. DREW THOMAS,
4
S produced as awitness at the instance of the Defendants,
6 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
7 as follows:

10

17

E )( H I BIT S

EXAMINAnON

11 BY MR. JANIS:
12
Q Let the record reflect this is the time
13 and place set for the continued, I guess, deposition of
14 Drew Thomas which was first taken on June 26, 2007.
15 Today is being taken pursuant to Notice and to be
16 govemed by the Idaho Rules of CMI Procedure.
17 Mr. Thomas, you are·· have you read the first deposition
18 you took?
19
A I have not.
20
Q I mean ever?
21
A Not completely,
Q Because I meant to kind of ask it in two
22
23 steps: Have you read it to kind of prepare for this
24 deposition?
A I have not.
25
4

CSB REPORTING
(208) 890-5198

DEPOSITION

IREW THOMAS TAKEN ON

1
Q And then, secondly, I was going to ask you
2 if you read it ever.
3
A I have not read it completely ever.
4
Q Okay; so at some point you read parts of
5 it, but more recently you haven't read any of it?
6
A Correct.
Q Okay, but did you read anything else to
7
8 kind of prepare for this deposition?
9
A Briefly just some affidavit stuff.
Q Yeah, that's good because that's what
10
11 we're going to be talking about today. Before we get to
12 that, though, are you currently working?
A No.
13
Q When did you stop working?
14
15
A I was laid off from Bill Buckner Chrylser
16 Jeep Dodge October 1st of '08 after the owner passed
17 away.
Q I'm sorry, after what?
18
A After Don Ovitt passed away.
19
Q So October I, 2008, that's about five or
20
21 six months ago, I guess-22
A Yes.
Q _. is when you were laid off?
23
24
A Yes.
Q And so it wasn't a matter of you quitting
25
5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

LVLr'.........U
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Q Okay, and are you seeking employment,
part-time employment or doing anything work-wise?
A I'm on unemployment at the moment. I'm
speaking with my prior employers, Lanny Berg, about a
possible job with them when the weather changes, possibly
May, but we have not done anything in concrete.
Q And would that be over here - we're not
in caldwell. Would that be over there in caldwell?
A Yeah.
Q And are they running anew car business
over there still or just aused car?
A No, just a used car. Lanny sold the new
car franchise.
Q Lanny senior did?
A Uh-huh.
Q So when you say you're talking to Lanny,
you're talking about Lanny junior?
A Both senior and junior.
Q Oh, both senior and junior still run the
used car lot?
A Yes.
Q I see, and, you know, I'm hearing, of
course, you know what's going on in the car industry as
we speak on a national level at least, I'm hearing at
least that locally the dealerships, both used and new,
7

1 are, what's the word, having troubles, if you will.
1 or a matter of you getting fired, it was, what would you
2 call that, a reduction in force-type thing?
2
A Some of them.
A Yeah, they were reducing staff.
3
3
Q Do you know of ones that are doing well?
4
Q And you were one of the casualties, I
4 I don't know of any that are doing well is the reason I'm
5 asking.
5 guess?
A Yes.
6
6
A My cousin works at Sundance, larry Miller
Q
How
much
staff
did
they
reduce
other
than
7
7 Sundance Dodge, they're not breaking the bank by any
8 you?
8 means, but they're seeing a resurgence in profitability
9
A I don't know the exact number. I think,
9 and in unit sales.
10 if I was guessing, probably four or fIVe people.
10
Q You mean like this month-type thing, very
11
Q And that was before the, I'll call it the,
11 recent?
t2 Buckner agency or Buckner car company folded; r~ht?
12
A Last month, this month. I talk to him
3
A This was prior to them, yes, closing the
13 periodically.
4 doors.
14
Q But generally speaking, I mean, you
5
Q The closing of the doors thing, I'm trying
15 probably know more about the car industry than I do -; to put in my head as to when it happened. I heard about
16
A It's hurting.
I
it when it happened, but was it a month ago or two?
17
Q locally? I mean, it's consistent with the
A I believe it was -- I want to say December
18 economic crisis we're dealing with and .sounds right.
19
A I would agree.
Q Oh, so it was only about two months before
20
Q Yeah.
you were laid off?
21
(Exhibit No.8 was marked for
A After.
22 identification by the Notary Public.)
Q You were laid off about two months before
23
Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you what's been
it happened?
24 marked as Exhibit No.8, do you recognize that as an
A Yes.
25 affidavit you s~ned in the summer of 200n
6
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A Yes.
Q And you understood that when you were
signing this affidavit as it kind of says on the first
page that it amounted to swom testimony on your
behalf?
A Yes.
Q Or, excuse me, sworn testimony by you, not
on your behalf.
A Okay, yes.
Q Let me ask you to turn to paragraph 12
which is on page 5and 6and what I'll ask you to do
right now is just to read it so you familiarize yourself.
Are you there?
A Uh-huh.
Q Now, going over these affidavits is
largely the reason we're here and I want to ask you some
follow-up questions here. In the first deposition, which
I can show you where I'm talking about if you likel you
testified to me or you testifiedl not to mel several
times that you never understood that you were going to
21 get the Thomas Motors business for freel that you always
22 understood you were going to pay something for it. Do
you remember testifying to that effect?
A Yes.
Q Againl I have this all highlighted with
1 stickies and the like. I could show you the excerpts
2 because I know you told me earlier you had not read the
3 deposition, do you want to do that?
4
A Yeah.
5
Q The ones I'm talking about here -- this is
6 not going to be very good on the record -- are the green
7 stickies, not the yellow onesl and ifs just the
8 highlighted onesl not the non-highlighted ones. I should
9 also tell you thafs not all of them. Thafs just places
10 that I have it. Irs going to be abit of reading, so
11 we're going to go off the record for asecond.
12
(Pause in proceedings.)
13
Q BY MR. JANIS: The depo excerpts, if you
14 will, that you just read, would you agree with me that
15 they baSically boil down to you testifying to the effect
16 that you always understood that if and when there was
17 going to be atransfer of the Thomas Motors business to
18 you that you would never get it for free, but there would
19 be some·· you'd have to pay something for it?
120
A It all comes back to we had an agreement
21 that if I left lanny Berg Chevrolet, came to Emmett, ran
22 the store until he retired that it would be mine to take
23 on to the next generation and, if sci, to the next
24 generation. When you say "free,.' I expected, as I
25 stated, that they should •• I had no problem with them
10

~

MARCH 31, 2009

r---------------1 having something of aretirement check out of it and it
2 would have been healthy for aU of us, but it comes back
3 to one simple thing for me: If I leave Lanny Berg, go to
4 Emmett and work the dealership, at the end of the day,
5 which was around 63, he always said that it would be mine
6 to take on for my lifetime and then my kids' lifetime.
7
Q I'm asking adifferent question.
8
A Okay.
9
Q I was just looking at these depo excerpts
10 and would you agree with me, for example, this first one
11 says, this is you, "I never thought I was going to get
12 this place for free. That never crossed my mind that I
13 would ever get it for free." From that, I'm
14 understanding that your understanding was you were always
15 going to pay something for the business.
16
A I was going to -- my labor and my time was
17 alot of what I figured was paying for the dealership.
18 At the end when Dad got tired or wanted to retire or him
19 and Mom wanted to travel that they would receive asmall
20 check. He always said I don't need much to live on,
21 between 3and 5,000, so I would take that as my labor and
22 my time through the eight years probably in my opinion
23 paid for the majority of the dealership, but I never
24 wanted to have them not have anything or be involved. If
25 they were still involved, that would have been great,
11
1 too.

2
Q We're getting aside from my question here.
3 I'm only trying to figure out when you testify that you
4 never understood you were going to get the place for
5 free, are you changing that testimony? Were you
6 intending to change that testimony with this affidavit?
7
A No, I can't say that I was.
8
Q So it would be also true today as you said
9 June of '07 that you always understood that regardless of
10 how much it was going to be, you were going to pay your
11 mom and dad something for the business?
12
A I would agree.
13
Q Okay, and that you did in fact have
14 conversations with your dad about the amount over the
15 years and that he said words to the effect that the
16 amount would have something to do with how much he and
17 your mom would need to live on; right?
18
A No, it never was related to how much they
19 would need to live on. It was related to they don't need
20 much to live on and he proposed the amounts. I never
21 proposed the amounts.
22
Q Okay, but did you disagree with it?
23
A I thought it was fair at the time.
24
Q Okay, but the point of what I was trying
25 to get at, and rm not trying to twist the words around
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1 to something that they're not, I'm just trying to get
2 that in the big picture of things that one, you
3 understood at all times that you were going to pay
4 something for it when it was transferred to you; right?
5
A Again, John, I fett at the time when I
6 left Berg my efforts and my time was worth something ••
7
Q I got that, but you ••
8
A •• but at the end of the day when he
9 retired that if they needed some money to live on, Mom
10 and him, I didn't have a problem with that at the time.
11
Q Well, it wasn't an "if," tha~s my point.
12 You said that you never understood you were going to get
13 it for free.
14
A That's correct.
15
Q And you also said that you were going to
16 pay them something at the end when it was transferred.
17
A I had no problem with that.
18
Q But thars what I'm telling you, that was
19 your understanding?
20
A It was my father's statement to me and I
21 had not a problem with his statement. I never proposed
22 it. He proposed it, I did not disagree with it.
23
Q Lers put it this way: At no point during
24 the time frames you ever talked about the transfer of the
25 business to you or this agreement that serves as the

Q Okay; so the agreement that you are ••

1

2 that you have filed this lawsuit against your mom and dad
3 which has this oral agreement as its primary basis is not
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

an agreement that you're claiming your mom or dad said or
agreed that they would give you this business for free;
is that fair?
A Okay, our agreement was if you leave and
come and do this, I will do this. 1Q Drew, you keep ••
A Can I finish? I left. I did exactly what
I said I would do all the way to the very last day that I
said I would do it when the transfer of the ownership
went to Bill Buckner. I held up my end of the bargain.
I did what I said I would do. I did more than I said I
would do and he never did one thing on his side that he
agreed to do when I started there, so I mean, if we're
trying to focus on the word "free," I don't know how to
answer that.
Q I'm trying to focus on getting an answer
to my question which hasn't been answered yet. You have
a lawsuit here against your mom and dad.
A Right.
Q You're claiming you had an oral agreement
with them; right?
A That's why I left Lanny Berg, yes.

15

13
1 basis of this lawsuit did your dad ever say to you you'll

2 get it for free; is that fair to say?
3
A His statement was this place will be
4 yours.
5
Q But he never said ••
6
A He never said the word "free."
7
Q He never indicated to you in any way that
8 the bUSiness would be given to you for free, did he?
9
A It would be •• if you use that whole
to sentence and dropped off the word IIfree," that would be
J more accurate. It will be yours. Tha~s the agreement
2 we had.
3
Q The record is not going to do this well.
; Is it correct to say that your dad never said to you that
you would get this business for free; is that right? Is
that correct?
A Okay, repeat it for me.
Q Is it correct that your dad never said to
you that you would be given this business for free?
A He said when I retire, this business will
be yours.
Q Ifs a yes or no question. Did he ever
say to you that he would give you ••
A I don't remember him saying that exactly,
no.
14
I

31,2009

1
Q You're claiming you had an oral agreement
2 with them? Yes?
3
A Yes.
4
Q I'm asking you now if that oral agreement,
5 the substance of it was that they would give you the
6 business for free? Yes or no?
7
A I cannot remember him saying the word
8 "free, II but I do remember him saying the rest of the
9 sentence, I'll give you the business.
10
Q Okay, I've heard you say that,like, seven
11 or eight times.
12
A And I've agreed that I have not heard him
13 say the word 'Yree. II
14
Q Okay, fine; so you agree with me at least
15 that the agreement that you're suing on the basiS of in
16 this lawsuit is not an agreement that you would get this
17 business for free; right?
18
A The word "free" I don~ ever remember
19 being talked about. I'm not trying to be difficult. I
20 don't remember him saying it's for free. He said for
21 you, for your kids, for that, but he never maybe tattooed
22 it with the word "free" at the end.
23
Q Well, you know, the reason I had these
24 deposition excerpts read by you is because it's you
25 repeatedly saying that you never thought you would get
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1 the business for free. You knew that you would have to
2 pay something for it.
3
A I did not have a problem with that and his
4 proposal··
5
Q No, hold on.
6
A Okay.
7
Q So my point of this is, does that
8 testimony still represent the truth; that is, that you
9 understood that under this agreement you were going to
10 pay something for the business when it was transferred?
11
A The business •• my understanding was if I
12 fulfilled my end of the bargain that the business would
13 pay them acheck from 3 to 5,000 was his proposed number,
14 that it wasn't free, I guess, is the answer you're
15 looking for.
16
Q Yeah, I just ••
17
A I lived it. I know how it was, but...
18
Q Well, I didn't.
19
A I know and I'm trying to get ••
20
Q And you have alawsuit thafs claiming as
21 the primary thing we're talking about here is an oral
22 agreement.
23
A An agreement.
24
Q What I've been trying to get now for quite
25 some time is I want to know exactly what the terms of
17

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

actually working there through the time it was sold, I
understand that you did have a number of conversations
with your dad wherein the subject of the amount that
would be paid by the business through you was discussed.
A Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of
us.
Q And the thrust of those conversations was
him telling you that it had to do with the fact that they
didn't need that much to live on, but it was amounts that
they would be using to live on?
A I would agree.
Q And that while there had never been a
specific agreement between you and your mom and dad as
whether ~ would be 3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere in
between, that was the general range?
A I agree.
Q Okay; so then I am understanding that the
agreement that is at the heart of this lawsuit is that in
exchange for you going to do what you did, he would, that
is your parents would, in exchange have the business
transferred to you and you would in tum pay them through
the business astream of income somewhere in the range of
3 to 5,000 amonth?
A I would agree with that.
Q Okay, that's the agreement we're talking
19

1 about?
1 that agreement are and so thafs why I'm asking a lot
2
A Okay.
2 more questions about it and so specifically, today I'm
3
3 dealing w~h the prior deposition and with this
Q Correct?
4
A Uh-huh.
4 affidavit, that's where I'm going with all this.
5
A Okay.
5
Q Yes?
A Yes.
6
Q And so what I'm reading in the deposition
6
Q Okay, that's the agreement that you're
7
7 is you previously telling me quite a number of times that
8 testifying is what's at issue in this lawsuit?
8 at the time the bUSiness was going to be taken over by
A Yes.
9
9 you that there was going -- that through you that
Q Okay. Now, I read •• can you use this
10 business would pay some kind of money to your mom and dad 10
11 deposition so I don't have to hover over your shoulder?
11 under the agreement.
12
MR. WIlKINSON: Sure.
A I would agree with that.
12
MR.
JANIS: Just one more point on this
Q
Okay,
and
that
throughout
the
time
frames
13
13
14
one.
Let
me
ask
you to tum to page 87, line 18 to 19.
14 we're talking about here, which I guess boil down to kind
15 Actually, read just 14 to 21. You'll see where I
15 of '96 through 2004 or '5 or whatever -.
16 highlighted that part there.
A '6.
16
Q _. 2006, I mean, it sold in January of
17
MR. WIlKINSON: Starting with "when"?
17
18
MR. JANIS: Yeah.
18 2006; right?
19
THE WITNESS: Okay.
A Uh-huh.
19
20
Q BY MR. JANIS: The one thing I had there
20
Q Yes?
21 that I was thinking of is the last part which I think
A I believe that is right.
21
22 you're quoting your dad. Yeah, it is, him saying that
Q We'll just call it early 2006.
22
23 all I, "l" referring to Ron Thomas, want; right?
A Okay.
23
Q And throughout that time frame from when
24
A What line are you on?
24
25 you first started talking about going to work there,
25
Q Three - well, 16.
18
20
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A That all I want is a modest check out of

2 the place when your mom and I retire.
Q The "!,I in that sentence is Ron Thomas?
3
4

A Uh-huh.

5
Q Right?
A Yes.
6
Q And Ron then going on to tell you words to
7
8 the effect of it donlt take me much to live, that I, Ron
9 Thomas, don1t have to have a lot to live on, but I do

10 want something out of the business; right?
A Uh-huh.
11
Q Is that ayes?
12
A Yes, I read that.
13
Q I mean, that's you telling me what your
14
15 dad had told you?
16
A And I believe he used the word Ifwe once
17 in awhile, but at the time, I, we, my mom and dad, all
18 and the same.
Q Sure, and the only point that I was trying
19
20 to get at, Drew, is in these conversations which you had
21 over the years with your dad wherein there was a
22 discussion about how much you would pay your mom and dad
23 after the business was transferred that he was telling
24 you that he wants something out of the business?
A Yes.
25
ll

1
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moved on to my generation and then when I went on to
retirement, my kids' generation and on and on is what he
talked about.
Q And the only point I was getting at is -well, acouple of points, I guess. One, it was talked
about whatever number of times you just said; in other
words, anumber of times over the years; correct?
A Yes.
Q And secondly, it sounds like the
conversation went Similarly each time.
A Basically.
Q And so this notion that the agreement here
is such that you agreed with your mom and dad that in
exchange for your work and doing what you were doing that
they would transfer the business to you and you in turn
would pay them somewhere between 3 and $5,000, that was
the substance of this conversation that took place once
or twice ayear for almost 10 years?
A Correct.
Q All right, and did that include
conversations that took place, in other words, is that
conversations that took place before you actually went to
work for Thomas Motors or what turned out to be Thomas
Motors? I mean, I know it was Johannesen to start off
with.

23

21

1

1
A rd have to think. I don't remember prior
2 to me leaving Berg that specific conversation happening,
3 but I can't say that it didn't. I do remember it at the

Q And basically you were saying in effect,

2 okay, I agree with that?
3
A It was reasonable, yes, I agreed with
4 that.
Q But there was just never aparticular
5
6 agreement reached on whether it would be 3,000, 5,000 or
7 some particular number in between?
A Correct.
8
Q All right. Now, the next thing I wanted
9
r.O to ask you about this -- before I do that, it sounds like
1 you had a number of conversations wherein this discussion
2 about how much you would pay when the business
3 transferred to you and it turned out to be something in
~ the range of 3 to $5,000 that there were a number of
those conversations, not just one of those.
A Correct.
Q Can you give me an estimate of how many
times you had a conversation along those lines?
A Throughout the years, at least once or
twice ayear, you know, so as many as 16, as few as 10.
Q But it was always the same content it
sounds like.
A In that conversation, it was the same
content, that when he retired that him and Mom would like
:0 have a check or something from the business when it

22
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Q Back to the affidavit which is Exhibit 8,
paragraph 18, I just have some specific questions now
about acouple of things in the affidavit. Paragraph 18
makes reference to the fact that Thomas Motors was out of
trust, if you will, for $300,000 somewhere in 2000, the
year 2000. Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Do you have aknowledge of how that
300,000 was taken care of? There was adebt, basically,
to Wells Fargo for the line of credit for $300,000.
A Right we were out of trust by that
much.
Q And do you have amemory of how the 300-how Wells Fargo was paid off?
A We struggled -. we worked through _. Rob
Wilde and I worked together through a gal named Vicky
Perkins with Wells Fargo for a period of time and I don't
exactly remember exactly how much time, but Rob, myself
and even Dad, I think, was involved alittle bit in
having another bank come in and take out the Wells Fargo
flooring line and pay everything current.
24
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1
Q So it was KeyBank that paid off Wells
2 Fargo?
3
A I believe that's right.
4
Q And your dad you understood was signing
5 off for the personal guarantee with KeyBank for the line
6 of credit?
7
A I would say that's correct.
8
Q So you understood, then, that your -- I'm
9 not actually sure if it's your mom and dad or just your
dad, but at least your dad started off the financing
relationship with KeyBank 300,000 in the hole?
A Possibly.
13
Q I mean, this thing, 300,000.
14
A That makes sense. Well, I'd have to look
15 back on the paperwork, maybe get with Rob and find out
16 for sure, review it and see how much, if any, was paid
17 down while we tried to operate through the transference
18 of Wells Fargo to KeyBank.
19
Q But at the very least, the lion's share of
the 300,000 was paid off by KeyBank?
A I would say that's correct.
Q And one of the reasons I ask about that is
if you look at the management contract which is Exhibit
4, if you turn to page 2of it, section 5 it's called, do
you see it, working capital?

A Uh-huh.
Q It talks about the shareholders. That
3 would be defined as Ron _. your mom and dad would loan to
4 the corporation up to $300,000. Now, this is in the same
5 time frame that your 300,000 -- that Thomas Motors, I
6 mean, is $300,000 out of trust and this agreement which
7 is being made at the same time is talking about Ron and
8 Elaine lending 300,000 to the corporation. Did you
9 understand that was for the purpose of dealing with this
10 out-of-trust issue?
11
A I did not.
12
Q What was this for, then?
13
A Working capital, as I understood it.
14
Q And so did this agreement at all deal with
15 this 300,000 out-of-trust·issue?
16
A Not to my knowledge, no, it was
17 separate.
18
Q Kind of look at subsection "a" there. It
19 says the 300,000 is •• its number one purpose is to
20 "bringing corporation into compliance with its flooring
21 line of credit with the bank."
22
A That could be, but again, this agreement
23 never came to fruition. I never had a way to make it
24 enacted.
25
Q Well, one thing that was enacted under
1

2

26
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r--------------1 this management contract is the amount that it talked
2 about as your compensation. You were paid that amount
3 thereafter?
4
A My salary?
5
Q Right.
6
A Yes.
7
Q So at least that part of the management
8 contract was continuing, ongoing, agreed to and followed
9 up with?
10
A I believe that was in the same time frame,
11 but by the time that carl Harder was no longer with us
12 and this never came back to me in any way, shape or form
13 as far as copies and _.
14
Q All I'm asking about is one of the things
15 this management contract says is what your salary is
16 going to be from that date forward?
17
A Yes.
18
Q And that was in fact your salary from that
19 date forward?
20
A I believe that's right.
21
Q And there was also in fact acommitment by
22 your mom and dad to get the $300,000 that was -- the
23 corporation was brought into compliance with its flooring
24 line of credit with the bank at that point with the new
25 lending arrangements with KeyBank; right?
27

1
A I don't understand your question.
2
Q The new financial arrangement was made
3 with KeyBank to arrange for a line of credit which in
4 fact satisfied the 300,000 that was out of trust with
5 Wells Fargo?
6
A I believe, if I remember correctly, when
7 KeyBank came into play and take Wells Fargo out that
8 that, yes, was all covered. Now, again, I dont know how
9 much we worked through exactly dollar amount-wise, but it

10 was taken care of.
11
Q It was your mother and father who were the
12 persons that were personally responsible for that

13 out-of-trust amount, whatever it was, at the time KeyBank
took over?
A Yes.
Q And my point there, of course, is no one
else was personally responsible for that money?
A Not to my knowledge.
Q Paragraph 19 of this affidavit, the first
sentence, are you with me?
A Yes.
Q Basically, I'm looking at the part where
it says "finandal difficulties, which had been caused by
24 Ron's spending habits," do you see that?
25
A Yes.
28
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Q What spending habits are you making
reference to there?
A There would be more details with my
brothers' depositions and other folks that will be coming
through, but the difficulties I seen that I had was there
was a lot of money, exorbitant amount of money, going out
for rent which I believe was used to support -Q I'm sorry, I wasn't listening as well as I
should have. Could you say that again? I apologize.
A The money that Ron was taking as rent
money out of the business he was supporting other
businesses with, so that was -- I mean, it was avery -it was 15 grand amonth. It was avery difficult number
to work with, so the difficulties we sustained was that
cash flow could have sure helped us and not sustained to
buy shop and other things.
Q Do you know of any money being taken out
of the Thomas Motors business by Ron or Elaine Thomas
other than that which was used to pay rent?
A Not to my -- I'd have to find out. I'd
have to look into that. Not at this meeting I wouldn't
be able to say.
Q To tell you the truth, I've asked a few
people this and not one person has identified acent
being taken out by them other than the rent and I'm just
29

wondering if you have any reason to disagree at all,
whether it's amatter of Rob Wilde telling you or your
brothers telling you or you saw something, I don't know,
whatever.
A I do have reasons to believe.
Q Okay, hit me with it.
A Well, I'd have to talk to afew people and
get something thafs more than just my word saying I
think I know. I can try to provide that for you.
to
Q I don't understand. Do you personally
1 know that Ron or Elaine Thomas took anything out of the
2 Thomas -- anything financial out of the Thomas Motors
3 business, any money out of the Thomas Motors business
l other than the amounts that were taken out for rent, that
, were paid for rent?
A There were checks cut other than rent.
There was one for 70,000. I mean, Jan Rowers would be
the one probably that could really define that for you.
Q Would Rob Wilde be somebody that would
know something about that? He was maintaining the
company books at the time.
A Possibly, but Jan and Penny were actually
day to day at the dealership and they were the ones
seeing the checks from upstairs go through Shirley and
~on and checks other than rent would be the ones they
30

1 would know.
2
Q But Rob at that point was doing monthly
3 financials, wasn't he?
4
A He was doing the financials on the
5 information provided by Ron and Shirley to my
6 knowledge.
7
Q What was the 70,000 check for, to your
8 knowledge, or at least whether you've heard it through
9 the grapevine or otherwise?
10
A No; John, I don't know exactly. I just
11 know it was acheck that never came back into the
12 dealership checking per Jan.
13
Q When was it?
14
A I'd have to -- I don't know. I don't
15 remember, but I remember it was done.
16
Q You don't have any idea what year it was?
17 .Was it close to the end?
18
A No, no, it was probably, I would guess,
19 '03ish, '04ish, right in that area.
20
Q You understand in that time frame your dad
21 was also and your mom were also writing checks going into
22 Thomas Motors' business?
23
A Uh-huh.
24
Q You've seen those checks?
25
A Uh-huh.
31
1
Q Yes?
2
A Yes.
3
Q Were you aware of those at the time they
4 were being done?
5
A Maybe not all of them, but I was aware of
6 some.
7
(Exhibit No. 9 was marked for
8 identification by the Notary Public.)
9
Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whafs been
10 marked as Exhibit No. 9- it might be alittle confusing
11 here. The green sticker represents the actual exhibit
12 number.
13
A Right.
14
Q I mean, you can see the Exhibit Eon the
15 bottom, it was for a prior affidavit, so we're talking
16 about Exhibit No. 9for your deposition. Do you
17 recognize those as copies of checks that were made out to
18 Thomas Motors that were from your dad's rental, your mom
19 and dad's rental, account?
20
A I believe that would be correct. It looks
21 right.
22
Q And are these the checks you were just
23 talking about that you were aware of that your mom and
24 dad were writing into Thomas Motors, in other words,
25 providing money to Thomas Motors from their own personal
32
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I sources?
2
A I don't recognize all of them, but there's
3 acouple or three I do recognize.
4
Q Tell me which ones. Uke the 75,000-5 page 2 is February of '04,75,000, is that one?
6
A I don't remember, no, thafs in '04.
7
Q I went to that one first because the first
8 page is kind of hard to read, but I can tell you it's
9 March-A -- 28th.
Q Yeah, for 25,000. I have the originals
somewhere, but anyhow, that's why I went to page 2.
Which ones do you recognize?
A It's been awhile, but I think I remember
seeing the 10,000 and maybe one of the 30's, but the rest
I don't remember.
17
Q Well, what did you understand .- whatever
18 checks you do recognize, you at least understood back
19 then factually that your mom and dad were contributing
20 monies into Thomas Motors as opposed to taking it out?
21
A As well as spending and taking out, yes,
new tools, new equipment.
Q There's where I'm going. What do you
understand was the purpose of these checks, the monies
they were putting in out of their personal accounts?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

A Well, I would imagine -- it's my
understanding it was money to operate the _. working
capital.
Q Did you understand, also, as you'll see if
you tum to page, the cleaner copies, page 3, for
exam~e, June '04, it says in the memo section "Company
Loan"?
A Uh-huh.
Q Next one does the same; next one does the
same; next one does the same. The rest of them basically
do, that they're essentially boiling down to Ron and
Elaine lending the Thomas Motors business money for
working capital purposes?
A Okay, I understand.
Q I mean, is that right?
A That sounds right.
Q And did you have any diSCUSSions with your
mom and dad back then about what was going on in that
regard?
A Not that I can specifically remember,
no.
Q Okay; so before I leave this subject, this
spending habits reference in your affidavit, I guess I'm
still not sure what you're talking about there.
A Well, as far as the dealership side that I
34
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seen and, again, there's all kind of facets, but, I mean,
new hoists, new tools, knew machinery, new·- I mean,
just it was aspend, spend. I mean, we needed to rein it
in a little bit and it just seemed like the more harder
we worked to try to get ahead the more he would spend.
Q Well, I'm just lOOking through the checks,
it looks he writing quite a bit of money into the
business as well.
A Putting it back in, yeah.
Q So when you're talking about spending
habits here in paragraph 19 of Exhibit 8, you're talking
about him causing new equipment, business-related things,
being purchased; is that the idea?
A To my knowledge, yes..
Q Let me ask this kind of big picture
question: The agreement that serves as the baSis for
this lawsuit, that you're claiming in this lawsuit, okay,
let's say that actually came to fruition, it happened.
At the time the business would be transferred to you,
lefs just call that March of '06 time frame, tell me in
your mind based on that agreement who on each side of the
agreement, that is, you and your mom and dad, who would
do what, who would pay what, who would get what?
A What Ron told me was when he denied he was
selling the dealership ••
35

1
Q No, forget the actual what happened. I
2 just want to know your understanding of the agreement.
3
A Okay.
4
Q Who was going to get what, who was going
5 to do what, who was going pay what?
6
A The way he described it was that when he
7 retired that him and Mom would take asmall check, not
8 much, but everything would come over to the dealership,
9 the checkbook. I believe even Aunt Shirley was going to
10 actually be moving in with us which I had no problem with
11 because that's his direct connection to the bUSinesses,
12 so we would be in control of the spending, how the money
13 was spent, where it was going, that type of thing.
14
Q So you understood that if the agreement
15 materialized that they would be getting this small check?
16 That's the 3 to $5,000 thing we talked about before?
17
A Uh-huh.
18
Q Correct?
19
A Yes.
20
Q And what about the debt of the business
21 that would exist? It has to have debt at some point that
22 the transfer is made.
23
A My dad told me he would stay in the saddle
24 through the transition until we could get everything
25 transferred into my name and move on.
36
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Q I don't understand what -- well, it
doesn't matter if I understand it, what do you understand
that to mean?
A I understood that he would still be a
guarantor while I seeked financial possibilities to
actually move them complete~ out, but that he said that
he would stay _. his words were I'll stay in the saddle
with you until we can get that done, everything will be
fine.
Q So that would leave open, you know1 kind
of a bunch of possibilities, then, as one, how long.
A Huge possibilities.
Q Right?
A Yes.
Q Kind of infinite almost in fact; right?
A Well, hopeful~, get something done so
they can enjoy their retirement.
Q So number one that would be left open is
how long he would have to "stay in the saddle"; right?
A Correct.
Q I mean, that could be ashort period of
time, it could be along period of time?
A Correct.
Q But there had been no specific agreement
as to, like, cutting it off at some

31,2009

1 lawsuit that at the time of transfer, your dad's

2 obligation would actual~ be ongoing for awhile to serve
3 as financial backing while you dea~ with this question
4 of obtaining finanCing yourself?
5
A I would agree with that.
6
Q And, again, how long that would take place
7 is just uncertain?
8
A Uncertain I would agree with.
9
Q And there were several things or several
10 avenues that you could pursue in the way of obtaining
11 some kind of financing that would cut off your dad's
12 ongoing responsibility to stay in the saddle; right?
13
A I agree.
14
Q One of which would be getting a partner?
15
A Possible.
16
Q And you already had some people in your
17 head. Had you talked to those guys about this?
18
A We never had got that far, John.
19
Q Okay, but at least in your head you had
20 some thoughts as to who might be partners; right?
21
A Correct.
22
Q And when you said Lanny Berg, by the waYI
23 did you say junior or senior or both?
24
A I didn't say either one. I would have
25 talked to both.

39
A Not that I remember, no.
Q So basical~ indefintte and a period of
3 time that would have to be dealt wtth down the road?
4
A I would agree.
S
Q The other thing that you talked about is
6 that him staying in the saddle would be to provide some
7 financial backing while you were trying to obtain your
8 own personal financing?
9
A Right, whether it be a partner or
o whatever, yes.
1
Q And rve heard you make reference to that
~ before and as I prepared for this depo, I'm reminded you
I testified about this eanier, too, that the prospect
existed that you would have a partner in this business.
I mean, did you have somebody real~ in mind?
A Roy Long was one, Ontario Auto Brokers.
lanny Berg, I was going to propose something with him,
but I think if the word would have got out, Don Ovttt
would have probably been apoSSibility, but we never got
to that point.
MR. JANIS: Off the record.
(Off the record discussion.)
Q BY MR. JANIS: But in any event, the point
'las that you understood under this agreement that you had
vith your dad that again serves as the basis for this
38
1
2

1

Q Okay, but then, of course, what

2 arrangement you would have to have with any such partner,
3 that, too, was up in the air and subject to future
4 negotiation; right?
5
A I would agree.
6

Q Another altemative that would exist at

7 the time of transfer and, again, which would dictate when
8 your dad would be relieved of any ongoing obligation

9 under the agreement to stay on board with some financing

10 assistance is for you to obtain a line of credit without
11 a partner?

12
A That would be a possibility, probab~ not
13 as Iike~.

14
Q Well, thafs the question I was having in
15 my head. Did you have in your mind at some point which
16 would be the like~ avenue you would pursue?
17
A Uke~ with a partner, Dad being a partner
18 out of the gate and then transfer to another.
19
Q So in order for the transfer to become
20 complete and for the time for your dad's performance to
21 end, it would have to be subject to you working out a
22 deal with one of these partner types?
23
A I would agree.
24
Q And even then, whenever that would take
25 ~ace, there would have to be some discussion, if you
40
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1 will, because even then the
would still have
2 some debt and some receivables outstanding; right?
3
A I would agree with that, yeah.
4
Q I mean, that would always be true. Just
5 pick out adate at random and there's going to be some
6 debt and there's going to be some receivables due;
7 right?
8
A I would agree.
9
Q And it is, of course, conceivable that at
10 the time that transfer took place, in other words, when
11 you found a partner to help you finance the operation and
12 so your dad doesn't have to be involved any more, that
13 the debt at that point could be substantial.
14
A Possible.
15
Q And so you1d have to work out who would be
16 responsible for that debt or do you think you had worked
17 that out already?
18
A We'd have to work that out.
Q And had you had any discussions about this
money that I was talking about that were contributed by
your mom and dad for working capital purposes and several
of the checks indicated they were intended as being loans
whether that would be part of the debt that would be paid
back to them?
A Never had that conversation.

1
Q So how that part would be treated would
2 still be subject to future discussion?
3
A Correct.
4
Q Then, of course, another part of the debt
5 that would exist at the time of any particular transfer
6 would be whatever the existing line of credit is or,
7 excuse me, what the balance is with the line of credit
8 with the lending instttution that your dad had; right?
9
A I didn't understand the question.
10
Q Yeah, because it was a bad question is
11 why. I was stumbling through it for sure, but all I was
12 trying to get at is that at any particular point another
13 debt tha~s going to exist for the business is the line
14 of credit with the bank and whatever the balance is?
15
A Correct.
16
Q And we know, for example, because I think
17 your affidavit says, that at the time it was sold to
18 Buckner the debt to the bank was approximate~ $200,000.
r19
that sound consistent with your memory?
20
A It sounds consistent.
21
Q I could proba~ find it in this affidavit
22 if you make me look for it. I'm not finding it in the
23 affidavit right away, so let's move on and talk about the
24 second affidavit.

25
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1
(Exhibit No. 10 was marked for
2 identification by the Notary Public.)
3
Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whats marked
4 as Deposition Exhibit No. 10, that's asecond affidavit
5 you filed in this case; is that right?
6
A Yes.
7
Q I found it. I'm going back to Exhibit No.
8 8, paragraph No. 24, its on page 10.
9
A Uh-huh.
10
Q You're talking about -- see the very last
11 sentence there, last two lines?
12
A Uh-huh.
13
Q By the time he sold Thomas Motors in 2006,
14 Thomas Motors owed more than $200,000 on the flooring
15 line issued by KeyBank?
16
A I believe that's correct.
17
Q So I assume that you said that in an
18 affidavit that was filed in August of 2007 that at the
19 time you would have put that you would have been certain
20 of those facts?
21
A I believe that's correct.
22
Q Let's go back to this now Exhibit 10.
23 This is the affidavit you submitted in April of 2008. Do
24 you see the date on page 3 there?
25
A Uh-huh.

43

Q Let me ask you to tum to paragraph 5 at
page 2. This has to do with this land issue and I know
you've attended afew hearings and you've heard about
this land issue and as I understand what you're saying in
this affidavit is that you understood that part and
parcel of the agreement you had with your mom and dad
about the bUSiness being transferred to you was not just
the business and whatever assets the business owned, but
9 the land on which it was situated?
10
A Correct.
11
Q And when you say the land on which it was
12 situated - I actual~ said those words. You said "the
13 real property that Thomas Motors was on," what does that
14 mean?
15
A The way I understood it was the complete
16 amount of land that the dealership sat on on that side of
17 the street, that the money that we were paying to rent
18 was paying on the complete property. At one time my dad
19 told me he was making double payments on all of the
20 property so when we did expand, we had more room. We
21 were going to face it to the west.
22
Q Hopeful~, I don't have to drag the
23 agreements out here. Would that track with the
24 commerdallease written agreement and what parcels were
25 being discussed in those documents? Do you see what I'm
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·1 saying?
2
A The way my dad talked about it was, again,
3 he was making double payments on the whole property
4 and·S
Q I don't know what you mean the whole
6 property.
7
A Everything that was encompassed on the
8 south side of the highway that we owned, all the parcels.
9
Q That we owned?
10
A That our family owned or Ron Thomas and
11 Elaine Thomas owned.
12
Q So it's my understanding that all they
13 owned out there on the same side where Thomas Motors is
14 located is neighborhoodish of eight acres; does that
15 sound about right?
16
A Roughly.
17
Q Maybe it was nine.
18
A I think it was seven.
19
Q Oh, maybe it was seven point something.
20
A I believe that's right.
21
Q But that Thomas Motors was effectively
22 using only a part of it.
23
A We were using apart of it, yes,
24 correct.
25
Q So when you're talking about the land

1 way put in off of the highway legally so we could use
2 that as an approach way to the new frontage of the
3 dealership when we expanded. Tha~s why that new
4 entranceway was put in by my dad.
5
Q So from your perspective, then, the
6 agreement about getting the business was basically
7 inextricably interwoven with the land?
8
A Yes, correct.
9
Q Otherwise stated, the agreement that you
10 had·· in other words, the agreement tha~s at issue in
11 this case, your understanding of the agreement you had
12 with your mom and dad that the business would be
13 transferred to you at or about retirement at or about 63
14 based on the terms we've been talking about all morning
15 was a packaged deal, bUSiness and land?
16
A The way I understood it through the years,
17 yes. He never had aconversation where he ever said
18 anything about separating the two, it was all one piece
19 for expansion in the future for my generation, for my
20 kids' generation, tha~s why we needed the land.
21
Q And I take it from your standpoint it's
22 kind of like with one comes the other; right?
23
A The way I understood it. I mean, John, we
24 walked the property, drove the property talking about the
25 new ideas and how we were going to do it.
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being part of the deal that was going to be transferred
to you, are you talking the part that Thomas Motors was
using or the entire seven point something acres?
A The entire seven point was what Ron, what
my dad, told me. For the expansion, he talked about a
little Kellogg. He talked about a huge growth and we
would need that property to remodel and change the face
of the dealership which he had me working on somewhat
with ideas.
o
Q And so your understanding of the agreement
1 of having the business always contemplated the business
? would be located where it actually was located, not
l moving it anywhere?
A Correct, the building, right.
Q And so as I understand what you're telling
me, then, your understanding of the agreement is that the
land was simply part and parcel of the whole deal?
A It was and part of the reasoning if this
helps was when we had enough inventory which we were
cramped, the north side of the building, between it and
Highway 16, was really small. The east side of the
building was very small. Because of the street, we
:ouldn't expand that way, so the only thing that made
ense was we would take the west side of the building and
lake that the face and that's why he had the new approach
I
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1
Q So it was never adeal in your mind that
2 the business was separate or divisible from the land?
3
A Correct, not the way I understood it with
4 all of the conversations we had. You couldn't have had
5 it separated for the plans that he had. You wouldn't
6 have had any room.
7
Q So as far as the agreement as far as
8 you're concerned, the two are indivisible?
9
A Yes, I would agree.
10
Q You know from the agreements that are
11 marked as Exhibits 4,5 and .- no, excuse me, 3, 4and 5
12 to your first deposition, actually particularly Exhibit
13 5, there is in the sale of the business assets, there's a
14 certain price. We're talking about the written contracts
15 that were prepared in or around August and September of
16 2000, okay?
17
A Yes.
18
Q That as drafted by Carl Harder and as
19 signed by you at one point that the sale of the business
20 assets had one price and the other part of the deal was
21 to lease the land with an eventual purchase price.
22
A Correct, which would all be together.
23
Q But I mean, there were two separate
24 written agreements with two different prices, in other
25 words.
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A Okay, I understand.
Q I mean! thafs true, isn't it?
A I believe thafs right.
Q I mean, we can just look at it and see the
commercial lease has lease terms and the option at the
end amount. The rent term is on page 2of 10,000 amonth
for parcel one. Do you see where I'm at?
A Uh-huh.
Q You know! you can see this. I'm not
trying to be specifIC, just that it had aspecified rent
payment and then an eventual purchase amount~ right?
A Agreed.
Q And then the sale of bUSiness assets had
an entirely different purchase price for what the assets
would cost or be valued at?
A Agreed.
Q Okay. Now, so when we're talking about
the amount that you agreed to pay your mom and dad of
this uncertain somewhere 3and $5,000 a month, is that
part of the land, too, or do you pay separate for the
land as was done in the written contract?
A I would say the 3to 5would be aseparate
check from the business, not from the land.
Q You lost me there. I understand that
you're saying, in fact these written contracts

1 contemplate, that you could assign the obligations to a
2 corporate entity that you prepare so that if the business
3 had ultimately been transferred to you, Drew Thomas, you
4 may have been turned it into something called Drew Thomas
5 Motors or something like that.
A Black canyon Dodge was the name I
6
7 preferred.
Q Okay; so you were planning on creating a
8
9 business entity to serve as the actual owner of the
10 business?
A I would agree.
11
Q
And that if the payments were going to be
12
13 made pursuant to the agreement to your mom and dad of
14 this somewhere between 3and $5,000 amonth, it would
15 actually be made by that business entity, albeit you
16 would be the one authorizing the payments?
17
A I would agree.
18
Q Okay; so now what I'm trying to get at
19 here is would the land based on your understanding of the
20 agreement reached with your mom and dad, would that be
21 something dea~ with separately and apart from the
22 business paying 3to $5,000 for the transfer of the
23 business?
A I would agree.
24
Q It would be something different?
25
50
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A The payment or, say, call it a retirement
payment?
Q No, no. Would you pay separately for the
land is the easier way to ask it?
A Would I pay separately to -Q Have the right to either rent the land or
purchase the land other than this 3to $5/000 amonth
you'd pay your mom and dad?
A I would agree.
Q That you would pay something else?
A I would agree.
Q But you just hadn't worked out how much
you would pay? I mean, you had this commercial lease
agreement, but it's your view that this commercial lease
agreement has no force and effect?
A It never came to fruition at all.
Q Okay; so ~'s your view the commercial
lease agreement has no force and effect; right?
A Correct.
Q All right; so you otherwise believe that
there would be an amount that you would pay for either
the renting or purchase of the property, the real
property, aside from the 3to $5/000 amonth you would
pay your mom and dad for the business?
A Okay, I get you. We never diSCUssed
51

1 whether that would be involved together and separated out
2 or if it would be together. We never discussed that
3 part.
4
Q So that was to be another part that would
5 be negotiated at the time of transfer?
A According to my dad, yeah.
6
7
Q And according to you?
A Yeah, would have had to have been talked
8
9 about sooner or later.
Q Would you have at least expected _. well,
10
11 strike that. You tell me, what would you have expected
12 to have happen relatiVe to the real property? Would you
13 have to pay separate for it something?
14
A I would imagine.
15
MR. JANIS: can I have just acouple of
16 minutes?
17
(Recess.)
18
Q BY MR. JANIS: Okay, lefs wrap this up
19 here. Drew, let me just say this as we wrap this up and
20 the reason we are here again is at least I thought there
21 was some apparent confUSion on what is it that represents
22 the terms of this agreement and whether there was a
23 change from what was the deposition to the affidavits or
24 whatever and again, I'm not being accusatory here, rm
25 just saying thafs what led to this. That's all I'm
52
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saying.
A But I'm still a little confused on the
question about this against what I agreed to do with my
dad. It's like they're intertwined, but this doesn't
even come into what I agreed to with him, so that's where
I was confused.
Q The record is going to be bad on what
you're saying herel Drew, and let me tell you what I am
understanding because I think I know what you're saying.
When you're saying "this," you're talking about the
written contracts that you signed in September of 2000,
you're saying they have nothing to do with this?
A That dealt separately with the land. What
I'm saying is when I agreed to come over from Berg to my
dad and this never came to fruition, this never
happened _.
Q The written contract?
A .- the written contract never happened, he
said when I retire, the business is yours which included
the land so we could expand and Mom and him would take a
modest check out for retirement. Thafs all it was, and
so he goes get back to work, dig in, you're worrying too
much, I've got this taken care of.
Q But I thought before the break you were
telling me besides this modest retirement that they'd be
53

1 "paid" that for the land part you would have expected to
2 have to pay something else, either in the form of a lease
3 or an actual purchase price or something besides the
4 modest-·
5
A Not according to Ron, no, that was not our
6 agreement. In this it dealt with it separately, but this
7 he never pushed through. This was never done and, again,
8 I was told why would you want to buy something I'm giving
9 to you, you're worrying too much, get back to work, so I
.0 did and from this point on to the end of the sale, that's
1 exactly what I did.
2
Q And this, again, probably illustrates Why
3 we're having this deposition because now I'm confused
~ again, but let me try to put this in what I believe you
. are telling me in my words, but what you are telling me
and you correct me if I'm wrong, how is that? I'm
understanding that the agreement that you're claiming
that is the basis of this lawsuit had certain terms,
conditions, if you will, that would have happened had it
gone to fruition. Are you with me so far?
.
A Are we talking about this [indicating]?
Q No, I'm talking about the agreement that
you're claiming in this lawsuit. Let's dose the book on
this for the moment.
A Okay.
54
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1
Q I'm going to stand while I think this out.
2 Okay, you're claiming in this lawsuit that you had an
3 oral agreement with your mother and father that had
4 certain terms or conditions. Am I right so far?
A Such as if you 5
Q Just that it has certain terms and
6
7 conditions.
A Okay.
8
Q We're going to get to what they are in a
9
10 minute.
A Okay, I agree.
11
12
Q So far you're with me?
A So far I'm with you.
13
14
Q All right, because before I leave this
15 deposition, what I want to understand is exactly what
16 those terms and conditions are, and here's what I
17 understand you've told me today or clarified again for me
18 today that at the time had this deal actually occurred,
19 materialized, happened _.
20
A Upon his retirement
21
Q -- upon his retirement at or about 63
22 years old and the transfer of the business took place,
23 one of the conditions that would have happened is that
24 you would pay your mom and dad some stream of monthly
25 income between 3 and $5,000.
55
A Correct.

1

2
Q Another condition that would have happened
3 is your dad would have stayed in the saddle, as you put
4 it or that he put it, that is to say, he would have
5 continued his involvement in the buSiness largely for his
6 financing reasons while you sought financing elsewhere,
7 financing options elsewhere.
8
A Agreed.
9
Q And so acondition of the agreement that
10
11
12
13
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serves as the basis of this lawsuit is that Ron Thomas
would have had to stay connected with the business
insofar as afinancial commitment?
A Correct.
Q And then in the undetermined future, from
that point you would be able to obtain some kind of
finandng option which would then relieve him of the
obligation to continue staying in the saddle, that is,
staying connected with the business financially?
A For the flooring line.
Q But he'd be out of the business

a~ogether?

A Right.
Q Other than receiving 3to $5,000 a
month?
A Right.
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Q And that it is impossible to tell at this
point that had the business been transferred to you how
long it would have taken you to obtain this alternative
financing?
A Correct. It could have been short, it
could have been medium, it could have been long.
Q In fact, there were various options and
it's impossible to predict which of those would have
happened, too?
A Correct.
Q So there really is no telling when Ron
under the agreement that serves as the basis of this
lawsuit that Ron Thomas and by connection Elaine Thomas
would be completely out of the financial commitment
picture; right?
A I didn't understand.
Q Sure. Based on what we just talked about
that one of the conditions of the agreement would be that
while you are paying them through your bUSiness the 3 to
$5,000 a month, Ron and by connection Elaine are
continuing their financial commitment to the business to
serve as financial backing; right?
A Until such time, correct.
Q Right; so based on what was actually going
to happen in your mind as the conditions of this
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A Correct.
Q And another condition that I can think of
that I don~ think we talked about actually so far is
that in order for you to continue with the business,
whether under the name you told me about before or some
other name, you would have to be, you, Drew, would have
to bel approved as an authorized franchise owner by Dodge
Chrysler.
A Or have a partner that could bel but yesl
you would have to be authorized.
Q And if that couldn't happen, the deal
couldn't happen; correct?
A Correct.
Q And so that, too, was a condition of the
agreement that was left to be dealt with after the
transfer took place?
A During the transfer and afterl yes.
Q During the transfer process, it would have
to be dea~ with?
A You would have to discuss it.
Q And one of the possibilities is it may
have been the case that you personally would not have
been solely approved to be afranchise owner by Dodge
Chrysler, that it would have required you to be involved
with somebody else?
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1 agreement, it is impossible to tell how long it would

have taken for them to be completely relieved of any
obligations for financial backing associated with the
business because you don't know how long it would have
taken you to get your alternative financing; right?
6
A Correct.
7
Q Okay. All right, and another thing that
8 is basically acondition of the agreement would be that
9 there would have to be some diSCUSSion between you and
10 your dad and by connection your mother as to what would
11 happen with the debt that the business had as of the time
12 he would have been completely relieved of his financial
13 backing obligation; right?
14
A The way he stated that on the debt, we
15 would work out of the debt, whether you reduce inventory,
16 whatever you do to reduce some debt.
17
Q But at the time of transfer, as we talked
18 about before, there's got to be some debt.
19
A Correct, I would agree.
20
Q And so the question as to who was going to
21 pay what part of the debt was still open?
22
A Was not discussed, correct.
23
Q And so that was left as acondition of the
24 deal that would have to be met one way or the other, but
25 it was left for future negotiation?
58
2
3
4
5

1

1
A Possibly, but not impossible either.
2 You'd have to walk into that water to find out at the
3 time.
4
Q Exactly, and thafs precisely what I'm
5 understanding is the bottom line is we don't know, we'd
6 have to try it before you figure out what actually
7 happened in that regard.
8
A And like Dad said, he would stay with me
9 through that transition until we could get that
10 accomplished.
11
Q But there's no guarantee it could be
12 accomplished. Ifs just an open question is the bottom
13 line.
14
A No guarantee it couldn't, but you could
15 look at it -16
Q Either way?
17
A Either way.
18
Q That's my point is ifs acondition of the
19 agreement that would have to be dea~ with one way or the
20 other and there is no ability to predict what would have
21 happened either way on that particular point.
22
A Well, we both could predict, but truly,
23 the outcome we couldn't say.
24
Q Okay. Now, what rve tried to do after
25 the break is kind of review with you what I have
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1 understood you to testify would have been the terms of

2 the agreement, would have been the conditions in order to
3 make the agreement complete, who would have had to do
4 what, who would have had to pay what, and in your mind,
5 are there any other conditions, terms of the agreement
6 that we have not discussed that would have had to have
7 been dealt with at the time of transfer?
A No.
8
MR. JANIS: Okay, that's all the questions
9
10 I have, then.
11
MR. WIlKINSON: Thanks.
12
(The Deposition concluded at 2:50 p.m.)
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

(Signature requested.)
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COUNTY OF CANYON
5
I, CONSTANCE S. BUCY, a Notary Public in and for

6

the State of Idaho, do hereby certify:
That prior to being examined, the witness named
9

in the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to

10

testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

11

truth;

12
13

That said depOSition was taken down by me in
shorthand at the time and place therein named and

14

thereafter reduced to computerized transcription under my

15

direction and supervision, and I hereby certify the

16

foregoing deposition is a full,

17

transcript of my shorthand notes so taken;

18
19

I fUrther certify that I have no interest in the

event of the action.

20
21

true and correct

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my
name this 1st day of April, 2009.
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21
22
23

23

24
25

24
25

Notary Public in and for the State of
Idaho, residing in Wilder, Idaho.
My commission expires 8-25-12. CSR ~lB7
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3

STATE OF _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :
COUNTY

~,.

_______,

ss.

5

6

I, R. DREW THOMAS, being first duly sworn

on my oath, depose and say:

That I am the witness named in the
9

foregoing deposition taken the 31st day of March, 2009,

10

ccn~isting

11

have read the said deposition and know the contents

of pages numbered 1 to 61J inclusive; that I

12

thereof; that the questions contained therein were

13

propounded to me; that the answers to said questions were

14

given by me, and that the answers as contained therein

15

(or as corrected by me on the change sheet) are true and

16

correct.

17

18
S~gnature

19
70
21

Subscribed and sworn to before me th1S
_ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ , 2009, at _ _ _ _ , Idaho.

22
23

24

Notary PUbl~c for Idaho
Residing at
, Idaho.
Comnuss1on Exp1res _ _ _ __

My
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HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
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Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald 13iorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

'" '" * '" '"
R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)

Case No . CV 2006-492

)

vs.

) DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON
) SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC" an Idaho Corporation,

)
)

Defendants.

)
)
)

)

)

'" '" * '" '"
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INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff's response to the defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment
largely boils down to avoiding the applicable facts and law which serves as the basis of the Motion
to begin with. This includes the plaintiff ignoring his own clear and unequivocal sworn testimony,
as well as the basic principles of contract law that apply to such testimony. This does not amount
to a serious opposi tion to the Motion, and certainly does not raise a genuine issue of triable fact here.
The questions presented on this Summary Judgment Motion involve the application of pure legal
principles to undisputed fact, and it is frankly clearer than ever at this point that summary judgment
is warranted.
THE HARBAUGH CASE IS IRRELEVANT HERE

The plaintiff inexplicably begins its response to the defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment with a discussion of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Harbaugh v.Myron Harbaugh
"10(01',

Inc, 100 Idaho 295,597 Pld 18 (1979). In Harbaugh, the two plaintiffs claimed they had

an agreement with their father that in addition to their salary, they would receive a credit of 25% and
30% respectively ofthe net profits of the business, which would be used toward the purchase of the
business, After the father died, their stepmother "denied that such a contract existed." Harbaugh.
100 Idaho al 298 That was the basic dispute, and the Supreme COUlt properly recognized they could

not as a matter of law say no contract was entered into between appellants and their deceased father.
Harbaugh, 100 Idaho al 298 The case was accordingly remanded. Id The bottom line is the
Harbaugh case deals with a question of whether there was enough evidence to give rise to a triable

issue of fact over whether a contract was ever made to begin with. It was not a dispute over the
specific terms of an agreement, or whether it was legally enforceable, but a question about whether
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the contract was agreed to or not.
That has absolutely nothing to do with the issues presented in this case. The defense
frankly thought this was quite obvious. But, if it needs to be said, the defendants would offer the
following - they are not arguing on this motion that this Court should rule as a matter of law there
as no actual agreement of any kind reached between these parties. For all pwposes connected with
this Motion, and based on the standards applicable to summary judgment motions, the defendants
are assuming the plaintiff's claim that there was an agreement reached is true and accurate.
What is being argued here, however, is that the agreement the plaintiff'is claiming
was reached with the defendants is legally unenforceable as a matter of very clear Idaho law, for a
number of reasons. All of this is based on accepting the plaintiffs allegations as true. Even
accepting the plaintiff's claim as to what agreement was reached with the defendants, it is basically
undisputed at this point that there were material and essential tenus of the agreement that were never
agreed upon between the parties, according to the plaintiff himself. In addition, there is a legally
unenforceable part of the contract based on the application of the Statute of Frauds that is entirely
"indivisible" from the remaining part of the contract, again according to the plaintiff himself, thus
rendering the agreement unenfolceable under Idaho law for that reason as well.

In short, the Harbaugh case has nothing to do with the arguments being made on this
Motion.

THE PRICE ISSUE
On this issue about whether price was

01

was not a term of the claimed oral

agreement, the plaintiff either misses or ignores the basic point made by the defense. The plaintiff
actually argues the situation today is the same as it was when the Court ruled on the first Motion for
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3
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Summary Judgment some 16 months ago. This ignores the plaintiff's more recent deposition
testimony given just weeks ago that served as the basis of this part of the defendants' Second Motion
for Summary Judgment.
In fact, as the defendants stated in their opening submittals, one of the basic reasons
to take the continued deposition of the plaintiff was the confusion caused by this price issue and
whether or not the plaintiff was claiming that price was or was not a term of the subject oral
agreement. The primary point made by the defense on this particular issue is that the plaintiff's most
recent deposition undeniably indicated that the price was in fact a term of the agreement, but that no
specific amount had been agreed upon. To this end, the defense provided the Court in its brief with
numerous excerpts of the plaintiff's most recent deposition that clearly established this now
undisputed fact. Examples of how clear this was established by the p!aintifr s own testimony are as
follows:
- The plaintiff openly acknowledges that at no point did the defendant Ron Thomas
ever indicate, infer, suggest or agree that the plaintiff would !!Q1 have to pay some form of
compensation for getting the business at and/or after the transfer. That never happened, ever, The
plaintiff is thus not claiming the defendants ever agreed the plaintiff could or would get the business
without paying some price - some form of additional compensation. See Drew Thomas depo, pp
13-15

- On the contrary, literalJy every single time the matter was addressed, before or after
agreement was reached, the plaintiff openly acknowledges and agrees the defendant Ron Thomas
consistently and without exception indicated that he needed to get something financial out of the
business in order for him and his wife to live on during their retirement years. The plaintiff's
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testimony on this subject could hardly be clearer:
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

And throughout that time frame from when you first starteg
talking about going to work there, actually working there
through the time it was sold, I understand that you did have a
number ofconversations with your dad wherein the subject of
the amount that would be paid by the business through you
was discussed.
Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of us.
And the thrust of those conversations was him telling you that
it had to do with the fact that they didn't need that much to
live on, but it was amounts that they would be using to live
on?
'
I would agree.
And that while there had never been a specific agreement
between you and your mom and dad as to whether it would be
3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere in between. that was the general
range?
1 agree.

Depo ojDrew Thomas /aken March 3], 2009 at p 18, II. 24-2.5; p 19, l. 1-16(emphasis added) The
plaintiff thus openly acknowledges in his sworn testimony that throughout the time frames that
matter here, specifically inel uding before the time he actually reached agreement with his father, that
his father had proposed terms they both discussed that involved the payment of monies from the
business to the mom and dad for them to Jive on, once the business would be transferred. This was
the "thrust" of literally every discussion between the parties on what was being "proposed" by the
defendants at any point..

It was, in other words, always the discussion that some form of

compensation would be paid by the plaintiff at and/or after the time of transfer.
The plaintiff then acknowledges that part of the "exchange" involved in the
"agreement that is at the heart of this lawsuit" is this term which required him to pay some form of
monthly retirement income to his parents after the business was transferred" Again, this is taken
directly from his sworn deposition testimony:

DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

OOl06G

Q.

A.

***

Okay; so then I am understanding that the agreement that is at
the heart of this lawsuit is that in exchange for you going to
do what you did, he would, that is your parents would. in
exchange have the business transferred to you and you would
in tum pay them through the business a stream of income
somewhere in the range of 3 to 5,000 a month?
I would agree with that.

Q.

Okay, that's the agreement that you're testifYing is what's at
issue in this lawsuit?

A.

.Y.§.

Depo olDrew Thomas taken March 31. 2009. at p 19, ll, 17-2.5, P. 20, ll. 1-9 (emphasis added).
As if that were not clear enough, the plaintiffended the deposition by acknowledging
that his having to arrange for the business to pay his mother and father a monthly stream of income
for them to live on during retirement years, was a "term and condition" of the agreement at issue in
this lawsui t:
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

All right, because before I leave this deposition, what I want
to understand is exactly what those term~ and conditions are,
and here's what I understand you 've told me today or clarified
again for me today that at the time had this deal actually
occurred, materialized. happened - Upon his retirement.
- - upon his retirement at or about 63 years old and the
transfer of the business took place, one of the conditions is
that you would pay your mom and dad some stream of
monthly income between 3 and $5.000.
Con'ect

Dre'w Thomas depo taken A1arch 31, 2009, alp 55, II 14-25, p. 56, 11 (emphasis added)
All of the above are direct quotes from the plaintiff's clear and unequivocal sworn
testimony in his continued deposition, and which were quoted verbatim by the defense in their brief
initially supporting the instant Motion. Yet, the plaintiffdoes not address any of these excerpts from
his testimony where he clearly admitted beyond any question at all that part of the agreement that's
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at issue in this lawsuit required him to pay a stream of income to his mother and father in some
amount between $3,000 and $5,000
Based upon the plaintiff's own testimony, it is simply undeniable at this point there
was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding this alleged oral agreement on the
necessary, essential, and material terms. It is of course one of the most fundamental principles of
contract law that in order to have a legally enforceable agreement, the evidence must clearly establish
the parties had a "meeting of the minds" on all of the pertinent and material terms:
To be enforceable, the contract must embody a distinct understanding
of the parties, showing a meeting of the minds as to a1l necessary
terms of the contract
Dursteler v, Dursteler. 108 Idaho 230. 697 P 2d 1244 (Ct, App, 1985), Heritage Excavation. Inc
\I,

Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40,105 P. 3d 700 (2005).' Potts Canst, Co, v. North Kootenai Water Disl . 141

Idaho 678, 116 P3d 8 (2005), Bany v Pacific West Canst, inc,. 140 Idaho 827, 103 P 3d 440
(2004) The proof necessary to establish the requisite meeting of the minds is equally well settled

Idaho law:
Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence that the parties had
a mutual understanding ofaU of the terms oftheir agreement. and that
they mutually assented to be bound by each of those terms.
Thomas v Schmelzer, 1J8 Idaho 353, 356796 P 2d 1026(1990)(emphasis added). In this case it is

absolutely undisputed at this point that, according to the plaintiff himself, the parties did not have
a "mutual understanding" as to the terms under which the business would be transfened to him, and
one of the un-negotiated terms is the most fundamental term to every contract - the price. Price is
always a material and essential term to a contract.
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Price or compensation is an essential ingredient of ~ contract for
the transfer of property, or rights therein, or for the rendering of
services.

I7A AmJur 2d, Contracts § 195 (emphasi.y added). The plaintiff must produce some kind of
evidence establishing a meeting of the minds on this essential term, meaning evidence establishing
a mutual understanding of the price term and a mutual assent by both parties to that amount. As
pointedly stated by the Idaho Supreme Court:
To be enforceable by a coun, a contract must provide for a definite
price or for a means of determining the price.

Garnto v Clan/on. 97 Idaho 696,699,551 P2d 1332 (l976)(emphasisadded) It is also noted with
some significance that the Garmo court references how it is a Court function to determine the
enforceability of the contract, and whether the agreement provided for a definite price or not.
The plaintiff then has the clear burden of establishing the parties to the alleged
agreement both understood what they were agreeing to on the subject of what compensation needed
to be paid for the business at the time oftransfer, and that they "mutually assented" to that term. It
is beyond dispute in this case that the plaintiff can not possibly meet this burden, and there is no
issue of fact about it. His own testimony establishes that Ron Thomas never "assented" to transfer
the business without some additional compensation. On the contrary, the plaintiff acknowledges that
at all times, including the discussion leading to the agreement itself, the defendant always indicated
some form of compensation would be required at or after the transfer took place, and that the
plaintiff"agreed with that" Drew Thomas depo taken March 31, 2009, alp 22, II. 3-4 The bottom
line is the parties never reached the point of "mutually assenting" to exactly how much that
additional compensation would be.
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In summary, it is undisputed at this point, established by the plaintiff's own
testimony, that the agreement that serves as the basis of this lawsuit required the plaintiff to pay
compensation to this mother and father after the business was transferred to him. That was, in his
words, part of "terms ofthe agreement" that is at issue in this lawsuit, that he specifically "agreed
with that" and that this represented one of the "terms and conditions" of this alleged oral agreement..
It is equally undisputed that the parties did not negotiate the specific price term other than discussing
it being somewhere between monthly payments of $3,000 to $5,000. It is simply beyond any
reasonable debate at this point that this agreement is unenforceable as a matter oflaw for this reason.

THE BUSINESS DEBTS ISSUE
Besides the lack of a price issue referenced above, the defense also argues on this
Motion that there were a substantial number of other material and essential terms that had not yet
been negotiated according to the plaintiff, which also and further renders this alleged oral agreement
legally unenforceable under Idaho law. One of these other terms is the fact that the business would
have substantial debt at the time ofthe transfer, and the parties had not yet, according to the plaintiff,
negotiated who would be responsible for that debt.
In his response brief, the plaintiff inexplicably claims that it was a term already
included as part of the agreement being alleged by the plaintiffhere. In fact, plaintiff's counsel goes
to the length of claiming this is "clearly" the case: "Transferring the business would clearly include
its assets and liabilities." Plaintiff's Brie/at p. 8 (emphasis added). The plaintiff is thus arguing that
it either was or should have been "clearly" understood by the parties under the terms of the alleged
agreement how the business debt would have been handled at the time ofthe transfer of the business.
That is a very interesting argument to be made by plaintiff's attorney to the Court, since the plaintiff
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himself testified to the exact opposite thing just several weeks ago.
In fact, the plaintiff was point blank asked whether or not he felt this question of how
the business debt would be handled at the time of transfer was something that had been worked out
already, as part of the alleged agreement, or something that would have to be worked out in the
future. Contrary to what plaintiff's counsel asserts on this subject in response to this Motion, the
plaintiff himself clearly testified it was something that had not yet been worked out, but would have
to be in the future:
Q.

A.

And so you'd have to work out who would be responsible for
that [businessJ debt or do you think you had worked that out
already?
We'd have to work that out.

Depo ofDrew Thomas taken March 31, 2009. at p. 41, II. 15-18 (emphasis added). Later on in the
same deposition, the plaintiff himself again made this point clear that there had never been any
agreement reached on how the business debt issue would be handled at the time of transfer, but it
was "a condition of the deal. . , left to future negotiation":

Q.

A

Q.
A.

Q..
A

Okay. All right. And another thing that is basically B
condition of the agreement would be that there would have to
be some discussion between you and your dad and by
connection your mother as to what would happen with the
debt that the business had as of the time he would have been
completely relieved of his financial backing obligations;
right?
The way he stated that on the debt, we would work out of the
debt, whether you reduce inventory, whether you do to reduce
some debt.
But at the time of transfer, as we talked about before, there's
got to be some debt.
Correct, I would agree.
And so the question as to who Was going to pay what part of
the debt was still open?
Was not discussed, correct
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Q..
A

And so that was left as a condition. as a condition of the deal
that would have to be met one way or the other, but it was left
for future negotiation?
Correct.

Depo of Drew Thomas taken March 31.2009, at p 58, It 7-2.5; p. 59. I J(emphasis added} It is
thus entirely disingenuous for anyone to argue this question of how the business debt would be
handled at the time of transfer was "cleatlf' something that was already dealt with. according to the
plaintiff. As the quoted testimony above undeniably indicates, the plaintiff himself testifies to the
exact opposite thing, and does so several times.
Moreover, the plainti:f:r s testimony further establishes that this question of how the
business debt would be handled was a "condition" that would "have to" be dealt with one way or
the other, but that it was left for future negotiation. Id That only makes sense, of course, since this
business debt issue involves a huge financial consideration in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
In other words, the plainti:f:r s own testimony establishes this was a material and essential term of the
agreement that was left open for future negotiation.

Leaving material terms unsettled and

unprovided for is by definition a legally unenforceable contract:
In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct
understanding common to both parties. The minds of the parties must
meet as to all of its terms, and, jf any portion of the proposed terms
ill unsettled and unprovided fot there is no contract.

C H Leavell and Co v Grafe and Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 511. 414 P2d 873
(1 966)(emphasis added). See also, e g Matheson v Harris. 96 Idaho 759. 536 P ld 754 (1975)("A

contract does not exist

if any portion of the proposed terms is unsettled" Id at 760)

This is

basically an expression of the general rule that there must be a meeting of the minds on all material
terms in order to constitute a legally enforceable contract, as well as an expression of the more
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specific rule that "an agreement to agree" does not constitute a legally enforceable agreement:
Generally, an agreement to agree is unenforceable as its terms are so
indefinite that it fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable
obligation, No enforceable contract comes into being when parties
leave a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere
agreement to agree.

Maroun v Wyreless Systems, Inc, 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P3d 974 (2005)

See also, e.g"

Dursleler v Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230. 697 P2d /244 (1985) ("ljterms necessary to a contract are
left for (uture negotiation, the contract cannot be enforced .. Id).
The application of these clear and fundamental principles of contract law in Idaho to
this debt issue alone is sufficient all by itselfto render this agreement as legally unenforceable based
on the undisputed facts.

As quoted earlier, the plaintiffs own testimony establishes that a

"condition" of the agreement involving the transfer of the business to him from his parents that
would "have to" be dealt with one way or the other, was something that had not yet been dealt with,
but was instead "left for future negotiation," Idaho law thus clearly dictates this is an unenforceable
contract as a matter oflaw beyond any question for this singular reason alone.

OTHER MATERIAL TERMS NOT AGREED TO
The plaintiff also fails to address all the various other terms that were argued by the
defendants as being material and essential terms that were also unsettled, thus rendering the alleged
agreement unenforceable for those reasons as well. For example, the defense pointed out that the
plaintiff claims that under this agreement with his father when the time for transfer came, he was
going to need to secure a partner to assist in financing the business. In the meantime, while he was
busy trying to locate such a partner, and reach some kind of agreement with that partner, his father
would have to "stay in the saddle" by continuing to provide financing for the business, The plaintiff
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also openly acknowledges that part of the agreement would have required him to become an
approved franchise owner by the Dodge/Chrysler Corporation, and it is very much an open question
as to whether he could have in fact so qualified. If he had not so qualified, there would be no deal,
again according to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also acknowledged the clear uncertainties involved
with aU this and the fact that under these incredible amount of uncertainties, there is and was never
any set time that this Court or anyone else can determine as to when the defendants' time for
performance would end.
Q.

A.
Q.

A
Q.

A
Q.

Okay, but then, of course, what arrangement you would have
to have with any such partner. that. too was up in the air and
subject to future negotiation; right?
1 would agree.
Another alternative that would exist at the time of transfer
and, again, which would dictate when your dad would be
relieved of any ongoing obligation under the agreement to
stay on board with some financing assistance is for you to
obtain a line of credit without a partner?
That would be a possibility, probably not as likely.
Well, that's the question I was having in my head. Did you
have in your mind at some point which would be the likely
avenue you would pursue?
Likely with a partner, dad being a partner out of the gate and
then transferred to another.
SO in order for the transfer to become complete and for the
time for your dad's performance to end. it would have to be
subject to you working out a deal with one of these partner
~?

A.
Q.

A.

"''''*

Q.
A.

I would agree.
And even then, whenever that would take place, there would
have to be some discussion, if you will, because even then the
business would still have some debt and some receivables
outstanding; right?
I would agree with that, yeah.
And so you'd have to work out who would be responsible for
that debt or do you think you had worked that out already?
We'd have to work that out.
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Q.

A.
Q.

A

And had you had any discussions about this money that I was
talking about were contributed by your mom and dad for
working capital purposes and several of the checks indicated
they were intended as being loans whether that would be part
of the debt and that would be paid back to them?
Never had that conversation.
SO how that pad would be treated would still be subject to
future discussion?
Correct.

Drew Thomas depo taken March 31, 2009,

al pp.

40-42 (emphasis added) This testimony likewise

dictates that the alleged agreement is legally unenforceable, because it too establishes there were
material terms that were not yet agreed, and according to the plaintiff there was no agreement from
which it can be determined when performance was complete. Idaho law on this subject is also clear:
An agreement must be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms
and requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be
performed and when performance is complete.

Bharektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 892, 155 P.3d 691 (2007) The
defense argued these same points in the original moving submittals and the plaintiff offers no
response at all to this.

The bottom line is the alleged oral agreement is filled with future

uncertainties all over the place, leaving many obviously "essential" terms for future agreement,
which again is the definition of an unenforceable agreement as a matter of law.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS - INDIVISIBLE ISSUE
The defendants next argue on this Motion that according to the plaintiff, the land part
of the oral agreement he alleges to have reached with the defendants was "indivisible" from any
other part of the deal, which thus renders the entirety ofthe agreement legally unenforceable as well.
In response, the plaintiff rather incredibly states that: "The evidence establishes that
the oral contract was for the transfer of a business, Thomas Motors, not a contract for the transfer
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of real property." Plaintiff's Brief at p lOIn fact, the plaintiff says this same thing again on the
very next page. This is a rather remarkable thing to be claiming at this stage of the proceeding, since
the only actual "evidence" on this subject is provided by the plaintiff himself, and, once again, the
plaintiff has repeatedly testified to the exact opposite thing.
In fact, this point was not onJy addressed repeatedly in the recent deposition by the
plaintiff, the plaintiff has been alleging he understood the agreement he reached with his father
involved both the transfer of the business and the transfer of real property for quite some time. Over
a year ago, the plaintiff submitted an Affidavit to this Court wherein he attested:
The business, as I understand it, included the real property that
Thomas Motors was on.

Affidavit of Drew Thomas in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants 11401[011 for Partial
SummaJJ' Judgment, at p. 2

~

5, dated April 24, 2008 The only other "evidence" on this subject

was the deposition testimony by the plaintiffhimself, again given just several weeks ago, in which
he again confirmed that his understanding is now, and always has been, that the oral contract he
claims to have reached with the defendants and is the subject of this lawsuit always involved not
just a transfer of a business entity, but also the transfer of real property on which the business was
located.
The defense has already provided the Court with the deposition itself, as well as
quoted at length from that deposition on this exact point in the first brief submitted in support of
this Motion, specificaJIy at page 26 of that brief Rather than just repeating the lengthy quote from
the deposition here, the defense would instead just summarize the specific ways in which the
plaintiffunequivocally acknowledged he always understood the agreement in question involved the
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transfer of business and land together as one indivisible package together:
He understood that both the land and the business were simply "part and
parcel of the whole deal."
He understood that the business part of the deal was "inextricably
interwoven with the land!'
He understood that the agreement that he is claiming to be at issue in this
case that he claims to have had with the defendants was "a package deal"
involving both "business and land."
He specifically acknowledges that the deal that he claims to have had with
the defendants was "never" a deal that in his mind could mean that "the
business was separate or divisible from the land" - he never understood that
to be the case.
Based on all the conversations he had surrounding the agreement at issue in
this lawsuit in his mind you could not possibly "separate" the business from
the land parts of the deal based upon "the plans that he had . "
As far as he is concerned, the land and the business parts of the agreement
were "indivisible."

Depo oj Drew Thomas laken March 31, 2009, pp. 46-48 The Affidavit of the plaintiff filed over
a year ago that is quoted above, and the above-referenced sworn deposition testimony by the
plaintiffjust several weeks ago, represent the only "evidence" there is on the subject of whether the
agreement in question here involves both the land and the business assets. There simply is no other
evidence in this case on this subject, other than that provided by the plaintiff himself, all of which
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has him adamantly claiming under oath that he always understood the land part of this deal was
indivisible from the business part of this deal. It is thus completely inexplicable for the response
for this Motion to indicate on behalf of the plaintiff • twice - that the "evidence" in this case
somehow establishes the oral contract at issue only involves the transfer of a business, and not any
land. The actual and only evidence on this subject is precisely and directly contrary.
Along these same lines, the response briefindicates: "There is no evidence submitted
in the record that indicates that it was the parties' intention that the Plaintiff take whole or none."

Plaintiff's Brief al pp. 10-11. This once again needs to be compared with the actual testimony of
the plaintiff, which obviously stands in stark contrast:
Q.
A.

Q.

A

So it was never a deal in your mind that the business was
separate or divisible from the land?
Correct, not the way I understood it with all the
conversations we had. You couldn't have had it separated
for the plans that we had. You wouldn't have had any room.
SO as fru as the agreement as far as you're concerned, the
two are indivisible?
Yes, I would agree.

Depo of Drew Thomas taken March 31. 2009, at p. 48, II. 1-9 The plaintiff himself thus openly
testifies in his words that the way he understood it, and based on all the conversations he had, you
could not have separated the business part ofthe deal from the land part of the deal. They were part
and parcel of the same deal, "inextricably interwoven" with each other, and indivisible from each
other, all according to the plaintiff himself. Again, this represents the only "evidence" there is on
this subject, thus reflecting exactly what the plaintiff claims were the "intentions of the parties" on
this particular point.
Under Idaho law, it does not matter if it appears in the abstract that one prul of an
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agreement could theoretically be considered "severable" from another part of the agreement that
is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The onty thing that matters, as the Idaho Appellate
Courts have said repeatedly and without exception is "the intentions of the parties":
A contract may be in its nature and by its terms be severable and yet
rendered entire by the intention of the parties.

Boesiger v DeModena, 881daho 337,347,399 P,2d 635 (1965) (emphasis added). The question
of whether a contract is indivisible or severable depends totally and entirely upon the intentions of
the parties. See, e g, Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417,529 P.2d 1289 (1974),' Coppedge v Leiser.

7J Idaho 248,229 P 2d 977 (1951),' Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506201
P ld 976 (1948) If it is the intentions of the parties that both parts of an alleged agreement are
"indivisible" from each other, and one part of the deal is unenforceable as a matter of law, such as
for reasons covered by the Idaho Statute of Frauds, the entire agreement is legally unenforceable.
There is simply no escaping the fact that the plaintiff's testimony establishes beyond any doubt
whatsoever that the intent of the agreement he is alleging as the basis for this lawsuit was to include
both land and a business together as one deal, and that both parts of the alleged agreement were
"indivisible" from each other. Since the land part of the deal has already been ruled unenforceable
due to the Idaho Statute ofFrauds, the entire agreement is absolutely and undeniably unenforceable
for this reason as well.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully request that the Court enter
summary judgment on the remaining clam in this case.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
By:__~~~~~_______

By __~____________~~~~
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, S!Jite 200, P.O, Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 30th day of April, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addIessed to the
following:
William A. MOITOW
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
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H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
I09N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
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[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

)

R. DREW TIIOMAS t

)

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS,
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,

CV..2006-492

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

INTRODUCTION

In this action. Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged breach by Defendants, his parents,
of an oral contract to transfer an automobile dealership, on a date certain or to be determined, in
consideration of Plaintiff undertaking to manage operation of that dealership in the interim
period.
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In addition to denying the material allegations of the complaint, Defendants assert a
number of defenses including two defenses based upon the existence of a 'Written agreement
between the parties that superseded any oral agreement between the parties.
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in part on
the basis that the alleged contract was not sufficiently definite to be enforceable and that Plaintiff
was barred from adducing evidence of the contract by the statute offrauds. The court filed an

order on November 26, 2007 denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect
to Plaintiff s Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Claims (Counts I & II of the Complaint).
In denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the breach of
contract claim, the court found:
That the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition
the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff leaving his
employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to building
Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Th.omas Motors upon the retirement of
Ronald Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary
judgment dismissing the claim for breach of that contract. Order on MSJ, pp. 9~10.
to

Defendants then moved for partial summary judgment dismissing "any claim by the
plaintiff that his alleged oral agreement with the defendants includes any real property or land."
By Order filed May 19,2008, the court granted Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. The court found that Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence for the trier of fact
to conclude either: (1) that the alleged agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors included
real property or (2) that the parties had entered into a separate enforceable agreement for the
transfer of any real property. In making this determination, the court found that the Plaintiff's
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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evidence established) at most, a subjective expectation on his part that the alleged agreement for
the transfer of Thomas Motors included real. property.

Defendants then conducted a further or continued deposition of Plaintiff on or about
March 31,2009.

DEFENDANTS' PRESENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants now move for partial summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's remaining
claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing asserting
that, based upon Plaintiffs own testimony at the Match 31, 2009 continued deposition, he
cannot establish the requisites for a valid, enforceable contract for the transfer of Thomas
Motors. This Second Motion for Summary Judgment; filed April 6, 2009, came before the
Court for hearing on May 7, 2009. Plaintiff was represented by Mr. William Morrow and
Defendants were represented by Mr. John Janis. The Court heard the arguments of counsel and
reserved ruling pending further review and consideration of the file and record in this matter.

I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings. depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c), The
burden of proving the absence of material facts is on the moving party, P.o. Ventures, Inc. v.

Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233~ 237 (2007). The court must construe all
disputed facts liberally and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.. 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991). The court is limited to
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detcrmiuing: (1) whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact and, ifno issue of material
fact exists, (2) whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lawrence v.

Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 750 (Ct. App. 1993).
When the moving party supports a motion for summary judgment with competent
admissible evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere alJegations or denials
contained in that party's pleadings in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact
for trial, but must set forth specific facts, in admissible form. I.R.C.P.56(e). The moving party
is therefore entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an el.ement essential to that party's case upon which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial. P.o. Ventures, 144 Idaho at 237.

D. Defendants' Motion
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claims must be dismissed because, based upon Plaintiff's own evidence,
the alleged agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors is not sufficiently defmite as to the
purchase price Plainti.ff was to pay for the business, how the existing business debt and
receivables of Thomas Motors would be handled upon transfer of the business, and Plaintiff's
qualification by Dodge/Chrysler Corporation as an authorized franchise owner. Defendants also
claim that, in light ofPJaintifi"'s deposition testimony, the sale of the real. property upon which
Thomas Motors was located was an indispensable part of the alleged agreement and) therefore,
the lack of any memorandum memorializing the agreement renders it unenforceable pursuant to
the statute of frauds.
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A. Applicable Law

A contract is a promise or set of promises the performance of which the law recognizes
as a duty. Atwoodv. Western Construction, Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 238 (Ct. App. 1996). A
promise is a. manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made
as to justify the person to whom it is made in understanding that a commitment has been made.
Id
In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds. Barry v.

Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831 (2004). A meeting of the minds is
evidenced by a manifestation of the parties' intent to contract, which takes the fonn of an offer
and acceptance. Id The meeting of the minds must occur on all teons material to the contract.
ld Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the tenns

of the agreement and the assent of both parties. Pott$ Construction Co. v. North Kootenai Water
District, 141 Idaho 678, 681 (2005). In a dispute involving contract fonnation. the plaintiff

must prove a distinct and common understanding between the parties. P. O. Ventures. 144 Idaho
at 238.
The material tenns of the contract must be sufficiently definite and certain in order for
the contract to be enforceable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National
Banlc, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 173 (l991). If a. contract is so vague and indefinite that the intent of

the parties cannot be ascertained, it is unenforceable. Barnes v. Huck. 97 Idaho 173, 178
(1975). To be enforceable, a contract for the transfer of property or rights therein. must provide
for a deftnite price or a means by which a court may determine the price objectiveJy without any
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new expression by the parties. Garmo v. Clanton, 97 Idaho 696, 699 (1976) (quoting 1 Corbin
on Contracts, §§ 97, 98); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 195.
As a general rule, the question of whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to
form an express agreement is for the trier of fact. R.D. Bischoffv. Quong-Watkins Properties,
113 Idaho 826. 828 (Ct. App. 1987). The trier of fact's inquiry into an alleged oral agreement is
three-fold: First, detennining whether an agreement exists; second, interpreting the terms of the
agreement; and third, construing the agreement for its intended legal effect Id
B. Absence of Price Term

1. Prior Evidence
In its November 2007 Order denying Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiir s
breach of contract claims, this court found:
That the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff leaving
his employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to building
Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Thom.as Motors upon the retirement of
Ronald Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary
judgment dismiSSing the claim for breach of that contract. Order on MSJ, pp. 9-10.
Based upon this ftnding; the court concluded that Defendants had not established that the
parties had set any additional "price" for transfer of the dealership so as to render the alleged
agreement too indefinite to be enforceable or that such a price was a material or essential term
for such a contract to be enforceable. As the court noted in its May 2008 Order, Plaintiff also
stated in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' first motion for summary
judgment:
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While I felt jt would be fair and wanted to ensl..lte that Ron and my mother received some
retirement income from the business, I need to clarify that my receiving the business was
not contingent upon my paying them retirement income.
2. Present Evidence

As noted previously, Defendants base their present motion on Plaintiff's testimony at his

continued deposition on March 31, 2009. Specifically, Defendants rely on Plaintiffs testimony
to establish: (1) that Plaintiff was to pay a monetary price for Thomas Motors in addition to his
agreeing to go to work for the dealership as part of the alleged agreement; (2) the monetary
compensation was a material part oftbe contract; and (3) the parties never reached a meeting of
the minds on the monetary price Plaintiff was to pay for the transfer of Thomas Motors.
B.

Monetary Price

Plaintiff's March 31, 2009 testimony indicates that Defendants' offer to transfer Thomas
Motors and Plaintiff's acceptance ofthst offer involved a monetary price in addition to
Plaintiff's agreement to leave Lanny Berg Chevrolet and run Thomas Motors:
Q.
Now, going over these affidavits is largely the reason we're here and I
want to ask you some followwup questions here. In the first deposition, which I can
show you where I'm talking about if you like, you testified to me or you testified, not to
me, several times that you never understood that you were going to get the Thomas
Motors business for free, that you always understood that you were going to pay
something for it. Do you remember testifying to that effect?
A.
Yes.

*"' ....

.It all comes back to we had an agreement that if I left Lanny Berg
Chevrolet, came to Emmett, ran the store until he retired that it would be mine to take on
to the next generation and, if so, to the next generation. When you say "free," I
expected, as I stated, that they should - I had no problem with them having something of
a retirement check out of it and it would have been healthy for all of us. but it comes
back to one simple thing for me: If I leave Lanny Berg, go to Emmett and work the
dealership, at the end of the day, which was around 63, he always said that it would be
mine to take for my lifetime and then my kids' lifetime.
A.

****
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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A.
I was going to - my labor and my time was a lot of what J figured was
paying for the dealership. At the end when Dad got tired or wanted to retire or him and
Mom wanted to travel that they would receive a small check. He always said I don't
need much to live on. between 3 and 5,000, so I would take that as my labor and my
time through the eight years probably in my opinion paid for the m~jority of the
dealership, but I never wanted to have them not have anything or be involved: If they
were still involved, that would have been great, too.
",tII ...

*

Q.
So it would be also true today as you said June of '07 that you always
understood that regardless of how much it was going to be, you were going to pay your
mom and dad something for the business?
A.
I would agree.

Again, John, I felt at the time when I left Berg my efforts and my time
was worth something Q.
I got that, but you A.
- but at the end of the day when he retired that if they needed some
money to live on, Mom and him, I didn't have a problem with that at the time.
Q.
Well, it wasn't an "if," that's my point. You said that you never
understood you were going to get it for free.
A.
That's correct.
Q.
And you also said that you were going to pay them something at the end
when it was transferred.
A.
I had no problem with that.
Q.
But that's what I'm telling you, that was your understanding?
A.
It was my father~s statement to me and I had Ilot a problem with his
statement. I never proposed it. He proposed it, I did not disagree with it.
A.

(Tr., pp. 9-13).
Viewing this, and the remainder of Plaintiff s March 31, 2009 testimony in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, leads to only two possible con.clusions. The first alternative is th.at the
offer by Ronald O. Thomas to transfer Thomas Motors, which Plaintiff accepted, included
payment of a monetary price in addition to Plaintiff agreeing to manage Thomas Motors. The
second alternative is that the alleged offer by Ro.nald O. Thomas, or Plaintiff's understanding of
the offer, was too indefinite for the court or the trier of fact to determine whether or not it
included a price term. If the second alternative is true, there is no basis upon which a reasonable

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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trier of fact could determine that a valid, enforceable contract was fanned on the basis of the
alleged offer.
b. Materiality of Price Term

If. viewing the above testimony in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff.. the court
presumes that Ronald O. Thomas made a defInite offer which jncluded Plaintiff's payment of a
monetary price for Thomas Motors, in addition to his services, Plaintiff's testimony also
establishes that the monetary price was material:
Q.
And throughout that time frame from when you first started talking about
going to work there, actually working there through the time it was sold, I understand
that you did have a number of conversations with your dad wherein the subject of the
amount that would be paid by the business through you was discussed.
A.
Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of us.
Q.
And the thrust of those conversations was him telling you that it had to do
with the fact that they didn't need much to live on, but it was amounts that they would be
using to live on?
A.
I would agree.

"'' '*' '

Q.
Okay; so then I am understanding that the agreement that is at the heart of
this lawsuit is that in exchange for you going to do what you did, he would, that is your
parents would, in exchange have the business transferred to you and yOll would in turn
pay them through the business a stream of income somewhere in the range of 3 to 5,000
a month?
A.
I would agree with that.

"'

...

Q.
The one thing I had there that I was thinking of is the last part which I
think you're quoting your dad. Yeah, it is, him saying that all I. "r' referring to Ron
Thomas, want; right?
A.
What Hne are you on?
Q.
Th.ree - well, 16.
A.
That all I want is a modest check out of the place when your mom and I
retire.
Q.
The "I" in that sentence is Ron Thomas?
A.
Ub-huh.
Q.
Right?
A.
Yes.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Q.
And Ron then going on to tell you words to the effect of it don't take me
much to live, that I, Ron Thomas, don't have to have a lot to live on, but 1 do want
something out of the business; right?
A.
Uh-huh.
Q.
Is that a yes?
A.
Yes, I read that.
Q.
I mean, that's you telling me what your dad had told you?
A.
And I believe he used the word "we" once in a while, but at the time, I,
we, my mom and dad, all and the same.
Q.
Sure, and the only point that I was trying to get at, Drew, is in these
conversations which you had over the years with your dad wherein there was a
discussion about how much you would pay your mom and dad after the business was
transferred that he was telling you that he wants something out of the business?
A.
Q.

A.

Yes

And basically you were saying in effect, okay, I agree with that?
It was reasonable, yes, I agreed with. that.

(Tr., pp. 18-22).
t.':.

Failure to Agree on Price

Finally, Plaintiff's March 31, 2009 testimony establishes that the parties failed to agree
on the monetary amount he was to pay for the transfer of Thomas Motors at the time he
accepted Defendants; offer by leaving Lanny Berg and going to work at Thomas Motors, or at
any subsequent time:
Q.
And that while there had never been a specific agreement between you
and your mom and dad as to whether it would be 3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere in
between, that was the general range?
A.
I agree.
Q.
But there was just never a particular agreement reached on whether it
would be 3,000,5,000 or some particular number in between?
A
Correct.

** ••

Q.
And so this notion that the agreement here is such that you agreed with
your mom and dad that in exchange for your work and doing what you were doing that
they would transfer the business to you and you in turn would pay them somewhere
betwcen 3 and 5,000 that was the substance of this conversation that took place once or
twice a year for almost 10 years?
ORDER ON DEFENDAJ."ITS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Correct.

(Tr., pp. 19-23).
Based upon the foregoing, and viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
Defendants have established by evidence in admissible fonn that: (1) a material part of the
alleged agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors was that Plaintiff would pay a monetary
price to Defendants for the business; and (2) the parties n.ever reached an agreement on the
amount of that price and did not agree on an objective means for the determination of the price.
Plaintiff failed to adduce any admissible evidence on this motion contradicting Defendants'
evidence. Therefore, the court finds that Defendants have made a prima facie showing that
Plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to support a finding by a reasonable mind that the parties
entered into a valid, enforceable contract for the transfer of Thomas Motors. Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in
Defendant's favor. l
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims
for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

ORDER
TIIEREFORE, Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing
Plaintiff's remaining claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is GRANTED.
f In light of this determination, the court declines to addres$ the other grounds raised by Defendants in support of
their summary judgment motion. However. it is important to note that Plaintiff's March 31, 2009 deposition
testimony, when viewed in its entirety, Jeads the court to the conclusion that, at the time Plaintiff left his
employment with Lanny 'Berg to work at Thomas Motors, the parties, at most, had an agreement to agree with
respect to the transfer of Thomas Motors from Defendants to Plaintiff at the time Defendant Ronald Thomas retired
from Thomas Motors. That agreement to agree also appears to have been devoid of any agreement on a number of
very important tenns. See Maroun v. Wireless SystemJ. Inc., 141 Idaho 604,614 (2005).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
I~r'

Dated this &-day of May, 2009.

Juneal C. Kerrick
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following, either by U.S. Mail~ first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:
William Morrow
Morrow & Fischer
5680 East Franklin Road. Suite 220
Namp~ Idaho 83687
John J. Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd.
537 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

Dated this

_,f-/-looI!5----day of May, 2009.
SHELLY GANNON
___----...clerk of the Court
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

MAl 2 8

537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200

p.o. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
TeJephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927

H. Ronald f3jorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE 8TATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

"'*"'''''''
R DREW THOMAS.

)
)

)

Plaintiff.

Case No. CV 2006-491

)
vs.

)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation,

)

.>

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' VERIFIED
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS

)
)
)
)
)
)

'" "' ... '" ...
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2009

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

JOHN 1. JANIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a pattner in the law firm of Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and the primary

attorney in my firm responsible for representing the defendants in the above-entitled matter,
2.

This Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs is based upon my

personal knowledge and is also verified by the books and records of my law fiml kept in the above
matter in the normal and ordinary course of its business.
3.

Costs The following represents actual costs incurred by the defendants which

related to the defense of this action:

A.

IRCP S4(d)(1)(C) Costs as a matter of right:
- Filing fee - IRe P. 54(d)(l )(C)(l):

$ 58.00

- Cost of Reporting/transcIibing depositions
taken by defense - I R CP 54(d)(J)(C)(9)
1. Drew Thomas Volume I Videographer

$860.30
553.85

2. Drew Thomas Volume II
(Reporter only)

$386.50

- Costs of copy of depositions taken by plaintiff
IRe P 54(d)(1)(C)(JO)
1. Elaine Thomas
2. Ron Thomas
3. Shirley Youngstrom

TOTAL

$22016
$468.79
$341.06

$2,888.66

DEFENDANTS' VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF A TIORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - 2
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B.

Discretionary Costs:

The defendants also request that the following costs be awarded as discretionary costs
under IRe P 54(d)(l)(D)
- Expert witness costs:

l. James Warr, CPA
2.. Hooper, Cornell Accounting firm Dennis Reinstein, Peter Butler
3. John Moulton - Banking Expert

$

120.00

$14,663.75
$ 1,075.00

TOTAL

$15,858.75

GRAND TOTAL

$18,747.41

In further support of this request to be awarded these expert witness costs as
discretionary costs, the defendants submit each of said costs were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred by the defense in this lawsuit, and should in the interests of justice be assessed
against the plaintiff In further explanation of these three experts, and the role they played, the
following is offered:
- Mr. James Wan was the accountant for the defendants Ron and Elaine Thomas during
some of the Thomas Motors years, and afterward. He was retained to write a report about his opinion
concerning the value of the Thomas Motors business at the time it was sold, based upon his own
personal knowledge and experience. He wrote a letter for that purpose which was shared with
plaintiffs counsel
- The accounting firm of Hooper. CornelI, specifically experts Dennis Reinstein and
Peter Butler, were hired for the forensic/litigation purpose of addressing expert opinions on the value
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of the Thomas Motors business at the time it was sold. At the time these business valuation experts
were hired, the defendants were anticipating the possibility of trial, and that the trial at that point would
have included the damages aspect.

In other words, they were hired long before the case was

bifurcated. The costs associated with having these experts to become fully knowledgeable on the
subject of this valuation of the Thomas Motors business was very time intensive and required review
by such experts of extensive documentation. as well as review of deposition testimony. They also
prepared reports for purposes connected with the expert disclosures required by the Court's Scheduling
Order.
- Mr. John Moulton is an expert in the banking industry from California, who was
originally retained to address the subject of what requirements would have been imposed upon Drew
Thomas if he were to actual1y take over a new car dealership, such as the Dodge/Chrysler franchise
dealership that had previously been owned by the defendants. He was retained to address questions
like how much of a line of credit could the plaintiff have obtained from a reputable lending institution,
if any, and various other financial requirements that would have to have been met by the plaintiff in
order to successfully transition taking over such a new car dealership.
Given the claims that were being made by the plaintiff in this case, all of these experts
were costs of an "exceptional" nature not normally attendant to contract litigation, but which were
reasonably and necessariJy required to defend plaintiffs claims in this particular case. As such, the
defendants submit that the interest of justice would be subserved by having such discretionary costs
be as::essed against the plaintiff.
Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto are a page from our firm's cost transaction list
identifYing each of the costs referenced above, along with copies of the actual bills received for each
DEFENDANTS' VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - 4
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of the costs claimed above,
4.

Attorney Fees Attached as Exhibit "B" hereto is the more detailed fee

transaction list and statement, generated by my law firm in the regular and ordinary course of business.
This document details billing entries made by lawyers in the firm who performed services on a
particular case, and each such entry indicates a description ofthe work done, the pertinent time entry,
the applicable hourly rate, and the corresponding costs, along with the running totals. Exhibit "B"
hereto is a transaction list for work performed by my law firm in defense of this case and tracks with
bills that were scnt to the clients through this case,

su~ject

to the redactions referenced below. The

hourly rate charged by my law firm to the defendants throughout this case for my services or t hat of
other attorneys in my office are the rates normally and usually charged by my firm for such services.
I understand and believe these hourly rates are consistent with such rates charged in Boise for attorneys
with commensurate levels of experience .
On the original of Exhibit "B" hereto, I have redacted a number of entries by other
lawyers in the firm, to serve the purpose of trying to be conservative in the amount of reasonable
attorney's fees being requested in defense of this case. I have, for example, redacted all of the entries
of my long-time partner Charlie Hepworth who knew the case and knew the defendants, both very
well. Charlie and I often confer with each other over issues and strategies and we did so in this case
on many occasions. We view this as very valuable and clients are billed for such services, as was done
here. We have agreed to redact his time entries to this request for attorney fees since his entries would
mostly relate to things I was already doing.
The detailed time and billing entries listed on Exhibit "B" hereto reflect actual time
spent by the lawyers in my law firm in defense of this case, and were incorporated into bills sent by
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my law finn for such services to the defendants. All such bills were either actually paid by said
defendant or are in the process of being billed and paid. In other words, the attorney's fees reflected
in Exhibit "B" are actual amounts which have been billed to the defendants by my law firm for
professional services rendered on this case, and are paid in full aheady, or will be in the future 1
believe all the professional services reflected in Exhibit "B" were reasonably and necessarily incurred
in the defense of this lawsuit
An additional page is added to Exhibit "B" which identifies the amounts paid the
WestLaw Research Group for computerized legal research purposes in the total amount of $66020.
LR.C.P. 54(e}(3)(K) indicates this is recoverable as attorney fees rather than costs. As reflected in
Exhibit "B" the total amount of attorney's fees being requested is $115,749.20
5.

Total Attorney's Fees/Costs,

Total Costs requested is $18,747.41; total

Attorney's Fees requested is $115,749.20 for a total of$134,496.61-

.p...

Dated this

JJ:... day of May, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

~l

SUBSCRlBED and SWORN to before me thisd,L day of May, 2009.

~~.hG",-l\ d-xJ-~/;Y/
NOTARY PlJ~LIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: b!9-;:Ci.-G
My Commission Expires: hi: f

I I' ?--...-
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DA TED this

1 ~+'day of May, 2009

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorneys for Defendants

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this2!.th day of May, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
foHowing:
William A. Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

[ x] u.s. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ J E-mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[ x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ I E-mail
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Detail Cost Transaction File List

DaCe: 05l20l2009

Pal/e: 1

Hepworlh. Janis & Brody ChId

ellllrll

Tcoda 155 VIdeo""
62023000

Talal

rOf Teode

Tnt".

!?!!!
0711812007

12 A

Billable

1511

Teodo 169 Deposition
62023000
62023000
62023000
62023.000
62023000

1211312008
0111112007
0711812007
09i08JZ007
0510712009

1
12
12
12
12

A
A
A
A
P

169
f69
169
169
169

Tead. 173 Export Wlin.,s
07110/2008
62023000
62023000
DtIl4/2009
DI12OI2009
82023000
0211312009
62023000
0411312009
62023000

12 A
12 A

173
173

12 A

173

12 A
12 A

113
173

Tol:.1 ror Tcodo 114

06I29l2OO8
06/3012008

7A
7 A

Oeposlllon 01 Elaine Thoma· Aasae/ated Reporting· #45471
Oepaslllon of Ron Thol1llls • Aa!lOClaled FlepOl1lng • #46475
Oeposltlon of O(ew Thomas • Analad Repol1Sng - #45513
Oeposlllon of Shirley Youngstrom· Associated Reporting· 1#46754
Oepoallon 01 O!ew ThoI1llIs • Constance But:y - 1#49945

Elpett WItness· WIlson, Hartis. CPAs. #46455
export WftRbSS- TASA Group - iU1I453
Elport WftRbss·liocperCom8ll. PLLC· #49501

Expltl Wllna.s • Hoeper Camell • iU9824
expettWKnesa- HooperComatl. PI.. I.e -#49876

Billable

ARCH
'43

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

ARCH

15.858>75 Expert Wine..
52.00 Filing Fee· Gem County Clerk· iU613
600 Filing Fee • Gem County Clerk· f4615

IT4
114

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

2.27681 Obposlllon
120,00
1.01500
5.156,25
6.342 50
1.16500

alilabta

Tot•• for Tcoda 173

ARCH

5s3l6 VIdeo

220 16
46879
1150 30
341 06
388 50

BIllable

ToCol for Teodo 169

Tcodo 174 FllIng Foo
52023000
62023000

55385 Vldao· John GlaM Han Co • #46522 (Cepo 01 Drew Thomas)

155

5iOO

ARCH

ARCH

FilIng Fa
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John Glenn Hall Company

00014198

Litigation Technology

Invoice

PO Box 2683
Boise ID 83701·2683
(208) 345-4120 voice • (208) 345-5629 fax • www.J9hco.com
Federal Tax 10: 92-6007976 • Form W-9 at www.jghco.com/formW9.pdf

-

""'A'C!=tTH.I,;:'-

( ..~!.~'

6126/07

•.

/..

John J. Janis
Hepworth Lezamiz & Janis CHTD
PO Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

Customer Fax
208-342-2927

Taxable

-Descl!iption

1.00 First hour video deposition of Ronald Drew Thomas (06/26101)
3.70 Additional hours video deposition of Thomas
1 - DVD copy set of the video deposition of Thomas

$175.00
$277.50
$70.00

X

X
X

Thank you for letting me serve you!
For customers oulside of Idaho Ihis document may arrive by US Mall and by fax Please report emors and omis Ions right away Thanks

Sale; Janis, John J. t Case: Thomas vs. Thomas; Witness:
Ronald Drew Thomas; Vldeographer: Ron Attard.
Ship Via: Delivered by John
Your Order I: Thomas
My shipping address: 1017 N 23rd St • Boise lD 83702

Freight:
Sales Tax:
Total Amount:
Amount Applied:

Invoice
00014198

$0.00
$31.35
$553.85
$000

Balance Due. Please Pay This Amount >11..-_ _
$_5_5_3_8_8_5--'
1\ t

_

"Your Personal Court Reporter"

1618 W. Jefferson, Boise, Idaho 8~702
(208) 3434004 • (800) 588-3370 • Fax (208) 343-4002
email: info@associatedreportinginc.com/Fed ID #82-0436903

BllLTOc

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Hohnhorst
537 West BanDock
Post Office Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

DESCIUPTION

AMOUNT

Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et 31.
Case No: CV 2006-492
Date Taken: 1211/06
Location: Boise, Idaho
DepoDent: ElaiDe K. Thomas
Reporter: Pamela J. Leaton,CSR #200, RPR
ReportiDg services reDdered in the above-entitled matter:
Transcript - Copy
Exhibits

194.00T
13.70T

State Sales Tax

12.46

We Appreciate Your Businessl

TOTAL

PLEASE I?EFERENCE THIS INVOICE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK

ITERMS ARE NFl' 30 • LATE CHARGES WIll BE ASSESSED ON AU. PAST DUE ACCOUNTS I

\3~

- 0..0 -d - oJ2>

$220.16

I\SSOC'I \'1'''-1)
~FP()R1T\(;. l".C.

-

INVOICE

iA4

DATE

"Your Personal Court Reporter"

7/5/2007

1618 w. Jefferson, Boise. Idaho 8~02
(208) 343-4004 • (800) 588--3370 • Fax (208) 343-4002
email: iDfo@assOciatedrepo~c.com/Fed 10 182·D436903

INVOICEti
2700589

BUTO,

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Bohnhorst
537 West Bannock
Post Office Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

DESCR1Pl10N

AMOUNT

Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et al.
Case No: CV 2006-492
Date Taken: 6/20/07
Location: Boise, Idaho
Deponent: Ronald O. Thomas
Reporter: Pame)~ J. Leaton,CSR #200, RPR
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter:
432.00T
to.25T

Transcript - Copy
Exhibits

26.54

State Sales Tax

We Appreciate Your Businessl

TOTAL

$468.79
AS+H;PSP,

PLEA,SE REFERENCE TIDS,lNYOlCE NUMBER ON YOUR GEJi1CK
:ERMS ARE NEr 30 • LATE CHARGES'WlU BE ASSFSsED ON AU PAST DlIEAOO>UNTS

I

(J OIOS ~

l'~SS()C I,, ','J':I)

I{LI'ORTJ~( ;. I\C.

..

INVOICE

II

DATE

"Your Persqnai Court Reporter"

7/9/2007

1618 W. Jdferson, Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 3434004 • (SOD) 588-3370 • Fax (208) 343-4002
email: in.fo@assOciatedrepo~c.com/Fed ID '82·0436903

INVOICE 1/

2700595

BllLTOI

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis
537 West Bannock
Post Office Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

DESCRlPl10N

AMOUNT

Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et aJ.
Case No: CV 2006-492
Date Taken: 6/26/07
Location: Nampa, Idaho
Deponent: R Drew Thomas
Reporter: Amy E. Menlove, CSR No. 685, RPR, eRR
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter:
105.00
728.00
27.30
0.00

Appearance
Transcript - Original
Exhibits
State Sales Tax

riFri ri eSSEseG3

We Appreciat.e Your Businessl
;~~~ - 'Ot.D d. -0 :f~
PLEt4,SE REFERENCE TlHS. .llVVOlCE NUMBER ON YOUR cliECK

TOTAL

$860.30
Ese;:::!

OOl lGlJ

INVOICE

;;g

DATE

''Your Personal Court Reporter"
1618 w. Jefferson, Boise, Idaho 8~702

812712007

INVOICE #

2700797

(208) 343-4004 • (SOO) 588-3370 • Fax (208) 343-4002
email;info@assdciated.reportin~c..com/Fed ID #82-0436903

BllLTO:

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis
537 West Bannock
Post Office Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNf

Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et aJ.
Case No: CV 2006-492
Date Taken: 8117/07
Location: Emmett, Idaho
Deponent: Shirley Youngstrom
Reporter: Pamela J. Leaton,CSR #200, RPR
Reporting services rendered in the above-entided matter:
306.00T
15.7ST

Transcript - Copy
Exhibits

19.31

State Sales Tax

,
~. ~We Appreciate Your Businessl

3>
PLEA,SE REFERENCE THIS,lNYOlCE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK

~

TOTAL

O(p-d- ~ Dto

RMS ARE NET 30 - I.A:r.E CHARGES WIll. BE ASSESSED ON AU. PAST DUE ACCOUNm

I

$341.06

..
OOllOi

CSB REPORTING
CONSTANCE S. BUCY, CSR
23876 APPLEWOOD WAY
WILDER, IDAHO 83676
337-4807
890-519B

DATE: 04/02/09

HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
ATTN: JOHN J. JANIS, ESQ.
POST OFFICE BOX 2582
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2582
CAPTION:
CASE NO.:
LOCATION:
DATE TAKEN:

DREW THOMAS v. RONALD & ELAINE THOMAS, et al.
CV 2006-492
NAMPA, IDAHO
03/31/09

I N V 0 I C I N GIN FOR MAT ION

CHARGE

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

0+1 OF DEPOSITION OF R. DREW

THOMAS 2-DAY EXPEDITE (63 PAGES)

$315.00

COpy OF EXHIBITS (26 PAGES)

$

HALF-DAY APPEARANCE FEE

$ 65.00

P LEA S ERE MIT

- - -

TOTAL DUE:

6.50

$386.50

THANK YOU

TAX IO NO.

00110:::'

I

WILSOl'i, HARRIS

&COIllI'I'lIW

CERTifIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

.HEPWORTH, lWAJ;!
&JANiS\

1602 W Franklin Street· Boise. Idaho 83702

JUL U72tlOO

(206) 344-1355

Statement

I

Date

I

6/3012008

9OI$I,1D

Bill To

Balance Due Upon Receipt
Amount Due

John Janis
POBox2582
Boise, ID 83701

Amount Enc.

$120.00

PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH PAYMENT

Amount

Description

Date

1213112007
06/3012008

Balance

0.00
120.00

Balance forward
120.00

INV#68107.

D~~

~~

\~

Current

1·30 Days Past Due

120.00

0.00

31-60 Days Past

Due

61·90 Days Past
Due

Over 90 Days Past
Due

Amount Due

0.00

0.00

0.00

$120.00

You can make payments online. see our website at www.wilsonharris.com.
and click on the credit card images
11/2% per month finance charge which Is an annual rate of 18% will be added to past due accounts.
\,

I

~ - ()It,. 02·0.:L~

WILSON, HARRIS

&COMPANY

001100

P.02/02

rl

If

I, TRSR ) Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys • .ASAmed • TAScons~lting
,....
\ ,

GIH)IJ~ .

~

Headquarters: 1166 OeKaJb Pike· BlUe BeIl.PA 19422·1853 • 610-275-8212· 800-523-2319· Fax: 800-119-8212
explm@tasanet.c:om • www.wanet.com • United Kingdom: 080()..89.. 1292
Please make parmenl to ne TASA Group. lac. and rerum with one copy to the abovo addrus.

Invoice Date:

To:

Jan·14-2009

John Janis, Esq.
Hepworth. Lezamlz & Janis
P.O. Box 2582
Boise. ID 83701

Phone:
Fax:
Fed.I.DoI:

R. Draw Thomas v. [ Ron & Elaine Thomas 1

N:

Tenna:

Payable Upoll Preseatado.

(208)343·1510
(208)342-2P27
23-1569'731

Expert: John H Moulton
.---===0__

PLEASE WRITE THIS NUMlIER ON YOUR CHECK

Description

"·***··***·_·*****.*·*·"·"·"*·*****··*.·ADVANCE INVOICE··*··**..•......,.·······..·**······..·····*·_****
Initial reView.......... This is an estimate only-· ...... •
3.00 Hour(s)

300,00

Subtotal for Profe88lonal Servlc:es

900.00
900.00

115.00

AdministrWve charge
Total Amount DUe (USO)

1,075.00

DEPENDINO UPON THE TIME &: COST EXPENDED. WE WILL BILL ADDITIONALLY.

JSR
Page 1 of1

.

CooilsDmt wUh the Expcn's apc=e.. wilfI TASA, IAJ filnhcr swy;c.e, of !hi Expc:n bereIa nllDCd. on !hit DlIII)' 0ItIc:r maIht. II1IISt bI\ Jtq1IeSfed IIuoush TAM
WE AP.. RICIATI YOOR 8tlS1NE$S. PL£AB! CALL "'AGAIN THE N£XTnME YOU NEED AN EXPERT.
TOT~

•

v

.1

P.92

00110<,

Hooper Cornell, P.LLC.
250 Bobwhite Court Suite 300
Boise, 10 83706
Phone: (208) 344-2527 FAX: (208) 342-0030

Hepworth lezamiz - Thomas

Hepworth, Janis &Brody

JAN 19 2009

Invoice Date:

Boise.
JO
December 31,2008

Invoice Number:

00139456

Client Number:

63330001

c/o John J. Janis, Esq.
PO. Box 2582
Boise. 10 83701-2582

For professional services rendered for the period ending December 31.2008

Assistance with analysis of dispute, including value of Thomas
Motors. Inc. as detailed on the accompanying schedule

$5,15625

Total

$5,156.25

Beginning Balance
Current Activity:
Billings
Net Due

$000
5,156.25
$5,156.25

OOli00

Page 2
DetaD Descrll2tion
Stall
Date

Invoice Description

Hours

Amount

11/25/08

Dennis Reinstein

Meet wllh John Janis to discuss requirements of analysis on
Thomas Motors

050

$12750

11/25/08

Peter Buller

Reviewed documents Analyzed new and used car
industry

150

36000

11/25108

Dennis Reinstein

Meel with John .Janis to discuss requirements of analysis on
Thomas Motors

050

000

11/26/08

Peter Buller

Downloaded private !ransaclion databases RevIewed
valuation guidance for car dealerships

200

48000

12/02/08

Peter Butler

Reviewed legal documents

050

12000

12/02/08

Karen Ginnet!

Summary of tax returns 1997·2006

300

45000

12/03/08

Peter Buller

Analyzed data Created charts Calculated ralios

200

48000

12/04/08

Peter Butler

Reviewed industry Informallon Compared results to RMA
data

225

54000

12/05/08

Peler Buller

Asset approach Research Markel approach

350

84000

12/0B/08

Susan Bloom

150

11250

12I08I08

PelerButler

Market approach usIng Pralts Slats and BizComps

175

42000

12109/08

Peter Butler

Asset approach, markel approach and income approach.
Reconcillallon of values Conversation with allorney

325

78000

12/28/08

DennIs Reinstein

Preliminary review of valuation analysis developed by Peter
Buller

175

44625

2400

$5,156.25

Services
Total

5,156.25

Summary by Employee
Employee
Dennis Reinstein
Dennis Reinstein - No Charge
Karen Ginnett
Peter Butler
Susan Bloom

Hours

Amount

225
050
300

$57375

1675
1.50

TotaJ

2400

000
45000
4.02000
112.50
$5,156 25

Payments received aHer December 31. 2008 do not appear on this invoice

00110G

Hooper Cornell, P.LL.C.
250 Bobwhite Court Suite 300
Boise, 10 83706
Phone: (208) 344·2527 FAX: (208) 342·0030

Hepworth, Janis & Brody

FEB 11 2009
Boise, 10

Hepworth Lezamiz - Thomas

Invoice Date:

January 31, 2009

Invoice Number:

00139758

Client Number:

63330001

c/o John J. Janis, Esq
PO Box 2582
Boise, 10 83701-2582

For professional services rendered for the period ending January 31, 2009

Assistance with analysis of dispute, including value of Thomas
Motors, Inc as detailed on the accompanying schedule

$8,34250

Total

$8,342.50

Beginning Balance
Current Activity:
Billings
Payments

$5,15625

Net Due

$8.342.50

OIL

8,34250
(5,156.25)

Page 2
Delail Descri~lion
Stall
Date

Invoice Description

Hours

Amount
$42750

1105/09

Peler Butler

Mealing with Dennis Reinslein to go over preliminary
opinions Teleconference with allorney

150

1105/09

Dennis Reinste!n

Review fllas. Including income lax returns and valuation
analysis Place calls 10 John Janis & James Warr

325

1/09/09

Karen Ginnelt

Mealing with Dennis 10 discuss issues related to case

050

1/09/09

Dennis Reinstein

Conference with James Warr and follow up with ·John .Janis
Obtain documents from James office and discuss review of
those documents during my absence wilh Karen Ginnetl

275

81125

1.24000

1/12109

Karen Ginnet!

Review/copy/analyze information provided by James Warr

800

1/13/09

Karen Ginnet!

Anancial summaries to separale Thomas Motors

150

23250

1/14/09

Karen Glnnelt

Financial analysis 10 summarize and separate financial
activily of entitles

225

34875

1/15/09

Karen Ginnett

Review analysis with Dennis

075

11625

1/15/09

Dennis Reinslein

Meet with Karen 10 discuss documents provided by James
Watr Go Ihrough selected doucments and sOO oul
operations by enlily Work on updales 10 value analysis

675

1.99125

1/15/09

Dennis Relnslein

Meet with Karen to discuss documenls provided by James
Warr Go through selected doucments and sort oul
operalions by enlily Work on updates to value analysis

200

000

1/16109

Dennis Reinstein

Review vallous documents Conduct call with Ron Thomas
Develop expert repor1 Review report wi1h John Janis &
finalize

725

2,138 75

36.50

$8.34250

Services

Total

8,342.50

Summary by Employee

Employee

Hours

Amount

Dennis Reinstein
Dennis Reinstein· No charge
Karen Glnnett
Peter Butler

2000
200
1300
1.50
3650

$5.90000
000
2.01500
427.50
$8,34250

Total

Payments received alter January 31. 2009 do nol appear on Ihis invoice

001100

Hooper Cornell, P.l.LC.
250 Bobwhite Court Suite 300
Boise, ID 83706
Phone: (208) 344-2527 FAX: (208) 342-0030

Hepworth Lezamiz - Thomas

Invoice Date:

February 28. 2009

Invoice Number:

00140231

Client Number:

63330001

c/o John J Janis, Esq
POBox 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

For professional services rendered for the period ending February 28. 2009

Assist with the analysis of dispute as detailed on the
accompanying schedule

$1,16500

Total

$1.165.00

Beginning Balance
Current Activity:
Billings
Payments

$8.34250

Net Due

$1,165.00

1,16500
(8.342.50)

()OllOS

Page 2
Delail Description
Dale
Stall

Invoice Description

Hours

Amount

2110/09

Peter Butler

Reviewed opposing experfs report Research
Conversation wilh Dennis Reinstein Conversation with
allorney Wrote outline 01 affidavit

150

$42750

2110/09

Dennis Reinstein

Review 01 report of Christensen & call 10 ,John Janis

075

22125

2/11/09

Dennis Reinslein

Review report of Carl Chrislensen and develop response
Iherelo

1 75

51625

400

$1.16500

Services

1.165.00

Totat

Summary by Employee
Employee
Dennis Reinstein
Peter Buller

Total

Payments received aller February 28, 2009 do nol appear on this invoice

Hours

Amount

250
1.50
400

$73750
427.50
$1.16500

OOlllG

,
I.

EXHIBIT-B..

00111--

Page: ,

Detail Fee Transaction Flle Uet
HepworI/I. Janls & Brody. CIIId.

H......
to BIll

AttoI'ney 11 JOHlf J. JANIS
04IIIJ21l1l&
62023000

12 A

22500

100

62023000

04112J21l1l&

12 A

22500

400

62023000

04I17J2006

12 A

22500

100

62023.000
62023.000

0510812006
O5Ill112OO6

12 A
12 A

22500
225.00

050

nii'A

ARCH

dot:uments

180

62023000

05l1lll2OO6

12 A

22500

100

62023000

061221200II

12 A

22500

100

62023000
62023000

0812312008
0612812006

12 A
12 A

225.00
22500

020
6.00

62023000

08I27J2006

12 A

225.00

650

62023000

O6I2f112OO1S

12 A

22500

350

62023.1lOO
62023000

0612912008
0712412008

12 A
12 A

225.00
22500

450
150

62023000

0112612006

12 A

22500

300

62023000

0713112008

12 A

225.00

100

62023000

08/1412006

12 A

221500

150

62023000

0811512006

12 A

221500

250

22500

150

62023000

081'612001

12 A

62023000

08l3III2008

12 A

22500

200

62023000
62023000

081311200II
100000/2OOll

12 A
12 A

22500
22500

080
0.50

62023000

11(1312008

12 A

22500

050

62023000
62023000

111211.20011
11r.1012OO11

12 A
12 A

22500
225.00

200
100

62023000

1210112006

12 A

225.00

500

62023000

1210812008

12 A

22500

5.00

---_.

225 00 Canr.,. wi1I1 Charll& Hepworth: nMew agreemenls and file

..

_--_.

.-

900 00 RIIVIIIW /lie: attend meaUng wi1I1 Charlie Hepwor1h. Ron BjOlkmart.
ami Ron and ElaIne Thomas; draft response 10 damamlleller: Q)fl(er
willi Challle HepWOl1h; hllaphone call wIIh Ron B/orfanan.
22500 Telep/Qle call willi Bal Motrow; I.lephone cal with Ron B)odtman;
telephone
willi Ron Thcrnas: prepare ItlIler w\lll enclosures 10
BlIMomIw
112.50 Conierwl!h JOhn Kluksdal: draftlatler \0 I<alhletln ElIott
40500 Telephone calls wIIh Bill MomIW. Ron B/orfcman. Ron Thom... and
Kal/1leen EIIIoIl: confer wllh CluIIIIe Hepworth.
225 00 Te/epl1ooe call wIIh Ron BJottman: telephone call wlih Rob WIde:
telephone call wlih J<alhleen I!JlIoIt
225 00 Telephone calls wIIh Ron 8jorlcman; review camp\8Inl and tlalmS
made; confer with Charlie Hepwo/1h
45.00 Telephone catl wIIh Ron Thoma
1.350.00 ldeel wIIh MI: and Mrs. Thomas; re1llew file documenIs; telephone
calli WIIh Ron Bjarltman; WOIk on al1SMt
1.462 SO Work on _ 1 0 complaint lalephone
wIIh Ron BJatltm8n:
legal fII4.IIIIIdI t8 sla\ll\e frauds; WOIII on motion For summaty
judgment.
187 50 ConIInue wolfe en answer 10 complaint and mollon for ~m.,
judQmenl
1.012 50 Work on _ 1 0 QltIIjlIaIrII; work on brIeI III summaty judgmenl
33750 T...,one cab wilt Shillay Young5l/Uln; waIfC on ~
resp_s
67500 Prepare for and attend meallng with Mr. and MtI. Thomas;
teIaphone o::aII wIIh Ron Bfollcman; conllnue WQtk 011 discovery
response.
22500 Ra1IIew d1scovety fIIsponsn and produc:ad dDGUnltlflb from plalnll/t;
conler willi John IQJksdei re WIIge hIIIocy or plalnll/f
337 50 RtWiItW lellet from dala".. counsel; WQtk an dlSCOVIIIY responses;
confer will! John Kluksdel; /IIVIIIW lie
562 50 Telephone
willi Ron Thomas: conllnue work on discovery
responses; draft 'eller 10 Ron Bjarlumln.
337 50 R.l'Iseand Ilnalm dllI1:tWaty respome.: ~
willi ROIl
BjcI1cman: IaIep/Ia(Ie C8II will! ShIdey 'f0lJn9$ll0lll: draft
10
pfalnllfl'scounsel
450 00 Re1IIew dtItaIed dIIIcovery leller from COU/lllel; begin draIIlrtg
response: conf.r w\lll John Kluklldal
180 00 F1na1Ize rasp_ 10 pfelnUI'. _ I I t8 discovery Issues
112 50 relep/lamr c:aIII ,. daposlllon III:heduI1ng ,. SIndy MIll: ,l<Change
e-mab willi pllllnllft'l _ltII
112 50 eonfer will! John KlUk8d1~ IeIep\1on8 tails wIIh Ron and elaine
ThomP.
450 00 MellI willi elaine Thoma. ,. dapoelllon preperel/111
225.00 Rtview IllllIatfaIs In ptapMlllon for EIa/na 'TlIotnal's deposlllon:
telephone caft with Ron Briniunan
I. 12S 00 Meal will Elelne TIlomas; a/land daposlllon of Saine Thomas:
conf., with Charltt Hepwct1h end John I<Iukldal; re-rewew

ca.

or

caa.

caa

caa

~

1eIl.,

'.125-00 Meet will Ela/na Thomas: conl.renee. wilt delanse counsel: aIIend

-_._.- -- . _.. --- ._-- ------.----

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
ARCH
AACH
ARCH
ARCH

O()1112
WDctn.,".,y d5f2ii.1QQi iD~D ..-

HapwoI1h. JIIl1Ia & Brady. Chid

CUolII

AHomo\, 12 JOiiii J -IAHIS

62023 000

page:'J.

Detail Fee Transaction File List

Dale: 0512012009
TAn_

H

~

AI4'!:

Ho_

!:!!

.'!!.!!

~

~

!!.!!!

depolllllon 01 t.II1I Thomas; lela~ cd willi Ron 8jo1kman:
relifaw file materials In follow·uplo depO"<ftlon: conler wllh Charlie

0211612007

12 A

22600

030

62023000

0&10612007

12 A

22500

400

62023 000

06J2Di2007

12 A

22500

200

62023000

0612112001

12 A

22500

100

62023000

0612512001

12 A

22500

S50

62023000

D612612OO7

12 A

225,00

B.DO

62023000

0612112007

12 A

22500

150

62023000

0710212001

12 A

225.00

300

62023000

OTI06I2IlO1

12 A

22500

300

62023000

07l0lII2007

12 A

22500

300

62023000
62023000

0711012001
07lf112OO7

12 A
12 A

22500
22500

7.00
600

62023.000

0711212007

12 A

22500

600

62023000

0111312007

12 A

22500

700

62023000

07/1612007

12 A

22500

450

62023000

0711712007

12 A

22500

500

82023000

0711812007

12 A

22500

600

62023000

0711912007

12 A

22500

650

62023000

0712512007

t2 A.

22500

100

22600

500

12 A

62023000

D8IIl8I2OD7

62023000

0811312007

12 A

22500

400

62023000

0811412007

12 A

22500

8.00

62023000

08I1512DD7

12 A

22500

liDO

62023000

08111112007

12 A

22600

800

62023000

0811712001

12 A

22500

650

82023000

08/2012007

12 A

22500

400

62023000
62023000

0812112007
0911012007

12 A
12 A

22500

200

22500

100

HepwD<lh
117 50 Review c:orrespondance frOIl'l plalntlll.· counsel; conler wIIh John
K1uksdal.
900 00 Revlaw Elllln. Thomes· depoalllon: meet willi Ron and Elaine
Thomas re Ran Thoma,' deposJIlon
450 00 Meal willi Ron and Elaine Thomas: confer wIIh .jaM K1uksdal;
coni_ncaa willi plainl1li's counsel
22500 Telephone cal wi'" Ron Thomas; conler willi John KklI<sdai re Drew
Thomas daposllion
1.462 50 R8'IIew enIInt ilia; prepare lor daposlllon 01 Drew ThorneS; conler
with ctIaIIIe Hepworth and John Klulcsdal; draft outline /or
deposlllon.
1,800.00 Travel to Ni!IIIIp8; lake dapOllllon 01 plalnUlf: relum travel; conIer
willi CharlIe Hepworlh and John KlUksdai I. dapotl1lon: lelephone
can willi Ron Thoma; .
337 50 Talaphone cal wIlh Ron II/01kman te plaln\lII'a daposillolr. \alaphone
calls wJIII Roo and Eleln. Thomas: prellmlnlll)' lesearch lor
SIII1\lIIIIt}' )lJdgmenl Il'1011011.
61500 Review Ron Thoma. deposlllon lor summary jUdgmenl purposes;
conIer willi John KIukadaI
&75 00 Begll\ teIIIewIng plainl1li's deposlUon for lummery judgmenl
putpDHS; final revi_ 01 deposJllons 01 Ron and Elatne ThomeS;
leI~ cell willi Roo B/OIIcman
675 00 ConIlnue ravtewtnv deposJ!lon and
documenls for summary
Judgment purposes; legal I&SUrdl em SUmmlll)' Judgment inues;
begin dralllng BUmIl'llll)' judgmenJ briaI
1.575 00 WDIk on summary judgmanl motion
1,350 00 Conllnue wocldng 011 brief In support 01 moIIon lor IUlllmlll)'
judgmenl
'.350 00 Legal reeaJCh allaw IIbrIIIy re quasi-conl1llCl. and lraud Issues;
conrer with John Klukldal r. stelUla or frauds lcsueS; conllnue wolk
on briaf In support of moDon for summery Judgmenl; leI~ cals
With Ron Thomes; telephon. call willi Ron BJCfItmon
1.575 DO TravellD EmmeIt: mael willi Ron and Elaine Thomas as well al
Shllfey VOUIlgaltorn; relum tnwal; conllnue wocldng 011 brief and
suppoIIIng documents far summal)/ judgmenl motion
1.01250 ConIlnueWllfk on sIImmat)' /IIdgmenI moQon and supportlng
dOtIJIII8fIts
1.12500 CorItInIJe WOI\Ilng on brfel and suppOl1lng dOcumenlS fot sumrnaoy
/udgmanl mOllon; begtn dralllng affidavit of Ron Thomas; rew....
documenlS prevlously !>foWled by Shirley Youngslrom: !lIlaphonl
calls wilh Sblriey Youngstrom; lerephone calls wIIh Ron Thomas:
confer willi John KklI<sdal
1.350,00 ConIlnue f8YIewIng dDCUmanI bor•• previously proyIdeII by ShIrley
Youngstrom; conllnua WOfkIng on sumtn8l)llUd9mani brief and
suppotlfng doeumenls; Ielephone call wilh Ron Thomas nt meetlng;
_all Ron 8Jot1cman willi drall 01 proposed briaf.
1.462 50 FInalIze allldavil 01 Ron Thome.; e-mail drallio Ron 8jotkrMn; meet
wIIh Ron and EleIne Thomes: ntvlew all new doc:umenls provided by
Ron and ShIIIey; finalize bIlelln support 01 moIlon lor aummlll)'
~ lelephone cell Willi Ron BjoIIcmen 18 summary judgment
submlllela: a~ for hearing; draft mollon and nola 01 helllin!l
22500 Telophone call wIIb SI*Iey YounglllrDm; confer willi John KluksdaI;
lelephone call willi plalnIlII's counsel
1.125 00 Prapere lor meeting willi sttIrIay Youngstrom; lravel 10 EmcneU; meat
willi ShIrt.y YoungsItom: telephane calli wllIl Ron Thomas;
lalephone calls willi Ron 8jo1kman
!1IlO 00 BegIn reviewing .. pleadings fles by p\aInIIII on mollon lor SUf'llf!lllly
Judgment: conrer wilh ·John Kluklldal
1.BOO 00 Continue reY\eWIng plafntlfr. brie' opposing mOllon for SUII'II1IIIIy
judgment and all allklevlls In support; review moDon for artenslon;
work on reply brI"'; legal research: lelephone colis willi Ron and
ElaIne Thoma: telephone cell wIIh Ron BJorkmlln: conler With John
Klukedal
1.1100 00 Work an Iep\y briaf: legal res••II:h: maeI wllh Roo and Elalne
Tnomel; draft second allklavil 01 Ron Thome.: teYlew doc_Is;
lelephone call wiIh Ron BJorkman; lelaphone cal willi ShIrley
Youngstrom.
1,/100 00 Work 011 reply IlrIeI re summery Judgment: meal with Ron end Ellilne
ThDm8a 18 allldavll; review file do_nil; con/or willi Charlie
Iiepwor1b and John KklI<sdai re summel)/ judgmentllaues
1.462 50 FInalize reply brfel on moIIon lor summary judgmenl; begll\ WOfk on
briaf opposing tnoIIon far .",.nslon: lelephQnl cds willi Ron
Bjortanllll
900.00 FlnaIze moDon 10 strik. allidmt 01 Orew Thomas: nna'ZlI
opposing moIIon for extension 0I11rn11; ..mati aU Slings to plainllII'.
counsel: lelaphona calls wl/fl Ron BjorkmIIII: eltCllange ..mala With
Ron r. new 1lIIngI: draft l8\lar 10 .Judge
450 00 RevIaw Shlfley YOtInIPtrom deposlilon
225 DO Review plalnlllfs moIIon 10 sttlte second allkMl 01 Ron Thomas and
bdef In SIIppoIt; con(er willi ·John KlukJdaI

I'.
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Palll: 05l20l200II

Hepworth, ,Janis & Brody, ChId

r"",.
Da.a
Allomoy 12
J, JANIS
62023 000
09f1l12oo1

~

ell...

JOHN

12 A

225,00

600

62023000

0911212007

12 A

225,00

400

62023000

1lIII13/2007

12 A

225,00

200

62023000

1lIII1412007

12

A

22500

100

82023000
62023000
62023 000

0911112007
0912012007
09127/2007

12 A
12 A

22500
225,00
22500

050
050

62023000

09/2812007

12 A

22500

550

62023000

1010112007

12 A

22500

500

62023000

1010212007

12 A

225,00

2.00

62023000

1010312001

12 A

22500

350

62023000

10104/2001

12 A

22500

650

62023000

10105l2DD1

12 A

22500

400

62023 000

10l09I2001

12 A

225,00

400

62023000

10/1012007

12 A

22500

800

62023000

1011112007

12 A

22500

800

62023000
62023000

10122/2001
1110512007

12 A
12 A

22500
225,00

030
080

62023000

11106/2007

12A

22500

300

62023.1)00

1112!II2OO7

12 A

22500

100

62023,000

12/D312OO7

12 A

22500

400

62023000

1210412007

12 A

22500

200

62023 DOO

0310412008

12 A

22500

100

62023000

03lD8/2008

12 A

22500

600

62023000

0310712008

12 A

22500

550

62023000

03l10120D8

12 A

22500

600

62023000

0311112008

12 A

22500

600

12 A

450

1,360 00 R81iIaw new submission by plaintiff on summmy judgmenl: research
addIlIonaf legal 8\llIlodty offered by plalnlllf; work on brief In
apposlllon 10 rnallon 10 slrtke; review case law prOYkfed by John
Klukcdel; addIIIonllllegal rllJ8llrc:h
9<JO.00 Work on brief appolllng mellon to slrilte affIdvll; conler wlllt ChatIle
Hepwor1ll end Jllhn Klubdal; telephone calls willi Bill Mcnew;
lellIJIhane ClIII wilh Judge's cIetk; draft stipulation
450,00 Alland maallll\J In Court re heallrlg dala: draft leller; IIxc:hange
e·1l\IIIIs with plalnllll'l counsel
'
22500 Ralliew nllYl subpOenas bY plalnUlra counsel; leleph_ call with
Ron 1IJOIk1ll8n; Ielep/Ione cell wIlh CoUl1's clork
112 50 Telephone cal wIlh Mark BOIII8$; telephone call IIIllh CoUl1
112 50 R8\IIaw laHar report from pIIIlnIlII's counsal Ie original agreemenl,
1,01250 Travalto MerIdian; meet willi Matle BOitles al his olliee; lelum \ravel:
Ielephone cell wlih Ron Sjoflcman: leview IlIIWIy-liled lenowed
moIIOIIto compel deltvery 01 ortglnal agreemenle and Ilflel and
allldllVllt In aupport.
1,237.50 Work on raply memorandum to lenewed moDon 10 compel: con/er
willi Cllat'e HepWOltl\ !SlId John KluksdDl
1,125 00 ConIlnue WIllI! on reply brief 10 renewed mollon to compel; confer
wlih John KIukIdaI: axc:henge .maDs with Ron Blorlunan; prepare
Ieller ID Judge KertIclI:
45000 Work OIl reply brief to renewed mellon 10 compel; excllanga a-malic
wIlh Ron Bjorkman
787 50 Review second supplernanlal btlat by plalnllll opposing motion lor
summary JudgrnenI; nrsearch procedural rules 18 summery
JudgmlJnI; c:onIar with John K1uksdal; lagal resealc:h on cases clIad
In pIaInIIft's naw brtor
1462 50 Conllnue work on lind frnallze brief opposing renewed mollon to
compel lUlIng: I . .1aw e-mall eocc:hanges wllh ,Judge's law clerk Ie
8s1 and onI8f 01 mDllons 10 b. haald
900 00 Telephone call wIIh Ron 1!joIIunan; review and 0f!J8n1%e at maIIon
pIUdIngt r. heatlngs naxt YIIIek; conlar with John K1uksda~ ,evlew
nlsean:ll on accountanl privilege Issue: lelephone caD willi
ac:cmmtanI Ken Reagan re prIvIIel/lllssues wlllt Mr Wade; rDIIIIIYI
resean:lll8 cpedlcUy 01 land dellGripllon Issues
goo 00 R8\IIaw and analya pllllnDIh naw ntply brief on mellon to sItb
second allldllVlI 01 de/anden! and renewed molkln to c:ompaI; rmaw
record ra iIlIIse filings and new briefs; c:onf&rwilh Chatlie HepWOr1b
and ,John KIulcadaI Ie Ialellllngs: begin preparing for summa/y
judgment hearing.
t .800 00 Review ell briars Ind pleadings /tom bolh pal'\les 10 Plepare for
he8l1ngc on all pending mallen, Iomorrow; confer wlllt Ch.t1.
Hepwor1II end John Kluksdal; dratl outline 01 OIal argument on all
moIlona.
1,800 00 Travel 10 Caldwell: aUend hearings on mollons, Includfng OUt molien
lor summary Judgrnenl; relUm lra ....l; Ielephona cab wllh Ron
BJorkrun: lefaphone call wilt! ROil Thomas: confer willi Chatlle
Hepwor1b and ,John Kluksdal
67 50 RelIIaw new dl;COY8/y raqueslc
180,00 Review new dlscavmy reque$ls form plain ""; conler wlih John
l<luUdlll
675 00 Review leiter from pIaInIIlh counsel; dreII responsive ..,let;
~ call and 1IXCh8ll\J8 ..mads IIIlth Ron B/orlcmlIn; lelephone
call with Ron Thoma.; telephone caR wIIh ShlrlllY Youngsltom,
225 00 Review CaIIII's decision on mollon for summary jUdgmani and to
sIrIke
900 00 Confer wIlh Chade Hepworth and John Kluksdal .. lagallssuet!
lelaphana cars and eIIdlange a·malls Wilh Ron Bjarkrnen; Ielephone
call wIlh Ron and Elaine Tham..; legal research .. aqullable
eslappDl: IaIephone
willi 8an Clull
450 00 R8\IIaw dDcumenIs IlUbpoenaed from Key Bank: lelephone can and
exchange .malls willi Ron !ljorkman; confer wlill CharSe Hepwor1ll
Ie motion tor _ I ) ' judgment; review leoal,.search on equllable
estoppel delense
225 00 Telephone call willi OIlMll WIlkinson; conler wllh John Kluudel;
tevI&W lie documents
1,350 00 Telephone calls wiIh plainl1li's counsel; !egal res8tlrc:h Ie ell conIract
Iflllll: rll'lltw SUIMI8I)' judgmerl! briefs and CDlIIflr priat decision;
draft/Iller agtllllmen\ re original conll'llcls; lelep/lone calli willi Ron
SJortcmar>; lelepllOna call wlih Ron and Elaine Thomas
1,237 50 Telspl10ne cars Ind IIlII:henge ..mah wIIh pllllntllI'a COtJ/'ISaI; review
revised ptDPOIad lell8, 8gJo8111eniltorn plalnU,,: telephone cars and
exchange .",... wIIh Ron 8)oIf<man; wotlt on t.- summary
ludgl1lllnt moIIon; confer wIlh Charlie Hepworlh and John KIIlkSda~
telephone call wIIIt Ban CIuII
1.350 00 Rav/aw proposed laller ag_ment .. original conlracls; lefephana
caR wIIh expert Or Aglnsky .. !nII dallng Issue.; Inlemeltesearch on
Ink deIIng; llllephone ca. willi Ron Bjorkman; exchange e-mlllls willi
plainl1li's c:ounset .. leller agreemenl and c:haIn of CUSlody Issues;
WOIlt on pstllallummary judgtnenl ra land I.eue; conl.r wIIh ·John
K1u1tlldal
1.350.00 ElcI;/Iange ..malls wHh plalnlllfl counsel: legal resestc:h a"aw

ca.
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library: wotk on b!lel supporting mallon lor pallIal summary

62023000

03l12l200ll

12 A

225.00

" 00

62023000

0311312008

12 A

22500

350
100

62023000

0311412008

12 A

22500

620231lOO

0312012006

12 A

22500

080

62023000

0411412008

12 A

22500

0.40

62023 000

0412312008

12 A

22500

150

62023000

0412412008

12 A

22500

400

62023000

0412512008

12 A

22500

450

62023.000

0412512008

12 A

22500

450

62023.000

05I071200ll

12 A

225.00

3.00

82023000

0510812008

12 A

22500

4 00

62023000
62023000

0511312008
05/1412008

12 A
12 A

22500
22500

030
050

62023000

0512212008

12 A

225 DO

200

62023000

0512712008

12 A

225.00

080

62023000

0512312008

12 A

22500

150

62023000

0710712008

12 A

22500

200

62023000

0712912008

12 A

22500

1.00

62023.000

D713012008

12 A

22500

200

62023000
62023000

06120/2008
0910812008

12 A
12 A

22500
22500

030
080

62023000
!l2023ooo

0912912008
0913012008

12 A
12 A

22500
22500

080
100

62023000

1012312008

12 A

225«1

2.00

jUdgment.
90000 Telephone calls wtIh Ron Thomas: work on brill suppOr1ing moUon
lor summary judgment; legal reaearch Ie equitable e.toppet defense:
lel.phone ca•• with Ron Bjorkman
787 50 FlnafII:e brier In suppol1 of mellon lor partial summery Judgment:
lelaphene calls ami exchange a-malls wllh Ron BJolknum
22500 FlnaIZII moUon lor parllal summery Judgment documents; prepare
leUer 10 JuClge Kerrick
18000 Telephone calls and exchange ,-malls with plalnUlrs counset dlall
liflpulallon fe he.ring.
90 00 Telephone call wlih plalnlllrs counsel: conference wtIh ·JOIIn Kluksdal
and Ron BjorIcman Ie status
337 50 Telephone cal wIIh Ron 8jotftman; confer wllh John I<hlksdal:
tetsphene cal wIIh Ron and Elaine Thomas; draft lellar 10 plalnll/l's
counsel re original conlracls.
90000 RevIew plain,,",. brill and affidavits appalling mollon lor pallial
summary Judllmenl: talephone ca'ls and exchange e-mal. with Ron
BJotkmlln; lalilaw legal raseatch provIded by Ron B)or!unan: lll'tIIaw
prior IIlmmery Judgmenl mes; conIlit' wIIh John I<tuksdal
1.012 50 Legal ,"arch on equllebla estoppel; WOfk on teply bllel r. moHon
for pelflalllt/lllln8ty judgmem: telephOllIl cd wIIh Ron BIOIlunan
1.012 50 Work on reply brill r. moOon lor partial summery Judgment;
lelephona calIS and "xchange e-mail. with Ron BJotkman; confer
with JOlIn I<Iuksdal re summary judgment
675 00 Ralilaw briefs and prepara for dIscovary 011 mallon lor panlal
summary judgmenl; confer wIIh Jdm Kluksda/lo pr"parll 0I'III
argument: draft ouutn. lor argumenl
900 00 Flna8za preparallon for hearing; travet 10 Caldwell; a!land heamg 01'1
moIIon for parilallltlmmary judgmal1l: relurn !ravel: confet with
Charlie Hepworth and JoIm l<Juksdal; lelephone calls wlih Ron
B/OIIcmen and Ron Thomas re heating
67 50 Telephone call with Ron Bjotkman.
112 50 Talephone call wlih Ron Bjorkman: Ielephone caR Wlih plalnllft's
COUll'" WIlIdnson.
450.00 Telephone calls wllh Ron Bjorkman: tetaphone c:ab wllh Ron
Tllomas; dnioft new dIscovery requesla: review plalnftrrl dlaco1l8ry
files: dniollleller 10 plalntlrr, couMaI
180 00 Telephone call wIIh JiiIIlIas Warr: 8l<Change a-malls with Ron

BJorkman-

33750 Review COUIfs lrlal orders: telephone cal with plalnUlh counsel;
lalephone celwIIh Ron Thomas: axctlanga a-malts Wilh aU counsel.
450 00 Ralilaw IlnalsUpulallon and ScheduUng order; t8\1iaw all documents
provided by Ron Thomes til whe1e aI salas proceeds wen/Isllles
225 00 Rllvlaw dlsCOY8lY ftl8II; conler wilh John l<Juksdlll; lalaphena can Wllh
Ron Sjorkman ra mollon 10 compllllssllllS
450 00 DreII and IlnaIlZll mollon 10 compel and allldavtlln SlIppotI:
lelephone call \ViI/1 Ron ThDllllPl
6750 Telep/lona call with Dennis WIlkinson
180 00 Review discovery responses: conler wllhlohn Kluksdal ami Char.a
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Hepworth.

/80.00 ExdIanga _DIIs willi Ron S/orkman
225 00 RevIew rasearch provkIed by Ron Bjorkman: confer wIIh .John
1<JuksdaI: review motion 10 c:ornpeillos
450.00 Revlew dIecovary and motion m8ll; begin draft 01 renewed moUon 10
compel; telephone call wllh Ron Bjorkman: confer w.1h .John

ARCH
ARCH
ARCH

I</UksdII
62023000

10/2412006

12 A

22500

150

337 50 F1naIIza re~ moUon 10 compel and aIIIda'illln suppoll. including

62023000

/111712008

12 A

22500

0.80

62023.000

1 tlt812OO8

12 A

22500

200

180 00 ExcIIange o-malls Wlih plelnllfl'll counsal re mollon 10 compel status;
telephone cal wIIh Ron BJolkman
450 00 Tetep/Iona call with Oennls Wllkeraoll: conler wIIh John KMsdal;
lalephons cab with Ron BjoII!man; letepllona calls with ROil and
Elaine Thomas la slatus and value 01 bUslnau Issue: review mao
including check regls1ars and closing slalemen/ me
337 50 RellleW new dlsc:overy lesponsa; conler wllh Chat •• Hepworth and
John l<IuksdaI; taItIphona ean wIth Ron Bjorkman
58251 Confer with Chattla Hepwol1h and ·John I<luIcsdal: draIll10llca 01
vacating hearing; review scheduling order. lelephOne calls Ie
retU1lng VIllous experts. including banker and aa:ounlanl
675 00 Prep_ for maallng with _nlanl experts ami allend meeting al
!heft oftlce; lelephone calls with Ron Thomas and Ron BJorkmlll\;
loIlow up til e-matI 8lIchangaa 10 experts; review previously filed
wllness elldavlls.
90 00 Telephone call wIIh Ron BjOlklnen ta benk loreclosure
1.575 00 Prepare lot meellngs. lncIudfng reviewing ilia documents: /ravet 10
Emmell; meet wllh Ron and Elaine Thomas and Shkfay
Younglllrom; masl wIIh Rob WIlda al coo(;ounsel's oillte: meal and
telephone caR wIIh Ron Bjorkman
112 50 Conler Wlth·1ohn Kluksdel and Chatlle Hepworth; lelepI10ns caD will!
Ron BjorJunan.
1.01250 Relilaw Rob Wilda lormer oflldavns: begin WOlk on proposed Rob
Wilde alnda""; taItIphona ca's wIIh various banking peopla 10 try 10

IIlIhIbIIs

.-;s;:;-

62023«10

11120/2008

12 A

22500

150

62023.000

1112112008

12 A

22500

250

82023000

1112412008

12 A

22500

3.00

62023000
62023000

I2ID5I2008
1211012008

12 A
12 A

225.00
22500

040
700

62023000

1211112008

12 A

22500

050

82023 000

12112/2008

12 A

22500

450
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62023000

12115J2D08

12 A

22500

4.50

62023·000

1211812008

12 A

225.00

250

62023000

1211712008

12 A

22500

130
1.80

62023000

12119/20(18

12 A

22500

62023000

0110512009

12 A

250.00

050

62023.000
62023.000

01106/2009
01107/2009

12 A
12 A

25000
250.00

0.30
600

62023.(1)0

0110612009

12 A

25000

080

62023.000

011l3I2DD9

12 A

25000

100
2.00

62023000

01114/2009

12 A

25000

62023000

0111512009

12 A

25000

150

62023000

0111612000

12 A

25000

300

82023000

0111912009

12 A

25000

300

62023000

01I20I2009

12 A

25000

200

62023000

0112612009

12 A

25000

100

62023000

0112612009

12 A

25000

250

62023000

0211012009

12 A

25000

400

s & 8rody. Chid.
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~
IlIId an elCpeli on lending Issues; Ielephone calls WIth vadous
sourcas 10 locale lranchlse approval expel!
1.0 12 50 Telephone ca. with .Iames Watr: review lInanelal stalemenls 101
TItoInal MoIor1;
e-mals with expell wllnesa Pater BuUer.
ckaft and revise proposed aIIldaYit of Rob Wltde; lalaphone calls and
exd1anga .-malls with Ron Bjorkman.
562 SO RtlvIIlW bank sal. documents r. payollio Key Sank; el«:hange
a·mlllls with Ron 8jorknutn and Peler BUilon; lelephone cal wIIh
elCpell on l"rlInchlses: revIew Idaho's deblOl siaM••
292 SO Talephone call with Ron Thomas; lelephone call with Dawna Meckel;
el<Changlt e·mIIlIs with axp811 Pater BUlIon
40500 Telephone cal wllh MIke Spence "' aeNlce on exp8ll: lelephone call
and exchange ...malls wIlb Ron Bjorkman: lelephone call with Ron
Thomas fe InrormallonJdacuments r8CGlved I,om CluysJer re
CSIIMSR.
125.00 Telephone can and e.u:hange e-malls with Ron 8jo11<man ra slalUs 01
eRldavlt and axpell dlsclosum.
7500 Telephone calls wIIh bank. . ra posslbltt expelf WIll1esSIlS
1.50000 Teleph_ eels and exc:llllnge e-malls wIIh exp811 Dennis ReInstein;
lelephone call fa expert Iranchlse/dealershlp Issues: research
Idaho's vehicle dealer slarutes; drall motion 10 compel and motion
lor proIeC\l'le order, lelephOl1ll call with James Wa"
200 00 Telephone cals with Ron Thomas and Ron BJlllkman rlt !efllemanl
slrategles: review a·maR from plalnl"rs COIInsel.
250.00 Telephona calls wllh vllrious banking expalla; Welk on 1/ltp811
wifn_ dIseIosute; lelephone calls with Ron Bjorkman
500 00 Telephone calls wIIh elCpelf Mr Moullon lrem CaIiIDmIa: fC'llew his
resuma~ IeIaphon8 caQ with Ron BJorkman; WDfIt on expell
dlsclasURI; lelephone cal with Oennls WUklnson te slatus and
selllemenl posslblUlles.
375.00 Telephone calls end exchange a·maIIs wilh exparf Dennis Relnllte/n;
I"ICIk 0II1llcp811 wines. dlsclosunt
750 00 Telephone calls with [)ennis ReJnsleln: review rapor1s end charlS
lram Mr Reinstein: dtall and 8naHze expalf witness disclosures;
send e-maDs 10 plalnlill's counsel and Ren BJorkman: confer with
Chatlltt Hepwor1II re t:35e Slralegies.
750 00 TelephOl1ll call with 8111 MOtraw and Dennis WilkInSon: lelephone call
with Ron BjOIkman; lelephone all wllh Ron Themas; conler with
John Klukad8l; review /alC relUrn Dies; lelephone cal with Dennie
Relllflle/n..
500 00 Telephone ca. with Ron BJotkman re slalus: lelephone call wllh
James Warr Ie IIIl< Ionns tequlred by ptalnUlrs counsel: conIe, with
Charlie Hepworth Dnd .John Kluklldal ra stalue
1.750 00 Review pleadings end disCOvery Illes 10 prepare lor hearing: draII
ollUlne IClf lIVumenl; Ilave/to Emmllll: maol with Ron Bjorkman te
heallng on mollens: a/lend heeling on otlr _owed molfcn to
compel and motion lor prDlllCllva order, lelaphone cal wUh Ron
Thomas ,. stalus and hearing; relurn lravel: tonier wIIh Charfllt
Hepwol1h end .Iohn Klultsda/ 'e resUlts of hearing; begin work on
menlOfandum of Ie.
62500 Telephona calls and exchange e-mels with Ron 8/Or1<1nan: work on
vorilled _
01 Ie.. and costs
t .000 00 RevIeW new dlsclMllY responses end expert wMnecs ,epalla and
dIscIosurea from ptalnIlII; Ielephone calla and exd\ange e-malls with
DIIIUIII Ralns/eln; letephone calls and
e·mans wllh Ron
B/arfandn; con" wIlh Charlie Hepworth and John Kluktldal: dmlt
nmawed motion lor pralecllw order
875 00 ConIIntIe drill of mollon lor proIedIve Dfdat and a/fldavlt In support
lelephone calls and ~ge ...ma'" WIIh Dennis ReiII$leln: review
and revise preposed expert allldavll; lelephOne calls end eJ«:IIange
.-maIls with Ron Bjorkman
1./25 00 Prepare flit hellling: lraIIello Emmell; mael WIIh Ron BJorkmlll1;
allllnd hearing: r.,lurn lrevet. lelephone calls wIlh Ron and Elelne
"TIIomae: confer with Chetna Hepworth Ie bIIumltIon Issue
2SO.00 Druft proposed order re sencUons and leller to Judge Kerrick; confllt
WlIh Charlie Hepworth ond John Kluksdal r. bllutcallon Issue.
32S 00 Draft motion 10 compel; dralletll1lo Judge Kerrick; telephone call
wIIh Ron BJorICman; lelephone
th accaunlanlllllpell Mr
Reinstein; conler wlh CharWe Hepwcr1h and John I<luIIada/
375 00 Review Buduler In rel\lrn and prlca a/locallons: ,!<Change a-mallt
with our ppM and pleIiIllII'c cO<Jnsel: Ielephone call with Ron
8jotkman
250 00 EJcchangI a-mala wIlb plaintiff. counsel; drall notices 0/ depos/lion
lor plaInlllf and brClhera: telephone call with Ron Bjorkmen
2SO.OO EKChange .·malIs; lelephone can wIIh Ron B)ortmen: confer with
Chorns Hepworlb and John KluIIsdaI
1./25.00 Rallfew plalnIJIf. Rr.t deposltion; prepare fClf second cleposillon;
confer willi Chertle HepWCrlh and John I<Iuksdal
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contlnuad daposlllcn of Drew Thomas: ton/erence. willt plalnl!lfs
counsel; rllUm l,av8l; conlerwlth CherIe Hepworlh and JOlIn
Klukada/; lelephOn. cal with Ron Bjorkmetl
7SO 00 Drall sllpulal/on tI heating on summai)' judgment; lelephone caII!t
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al1ll exchange e-malls wtIh Dennis WIIlIenon; begin resaaldl on
dMslbIHly Issue: exr:hsnge e-maDs with Ron BjoII<man
ReYltlw trDnscrlpl 01 now dopesillon 01 plalnlllf; lelephone cals wllh
Ron Bjorklnan t8 con/lnued deposftlon 01 Drew Thomas: begin work
on sec:ol1ll mOfton for summary judgment: legal research on
summaI}' judgmenllssues
Finalize mollon, brIef and affldavilln support 01 saccl1ll mOlIon for
summl!}' Judgmllnl; lelephone calls and elCCllanga ""malls with Ron
Bjorfmlan; c;on(ar wllh CharDe HepWOrth and John KI\IIIS!IaI
Rllllfew Colltl'a pretrial order; conlerenee WIll! Ron Bjolkman re
report due Mand.ly; begin work on pretrial slatemelll
Draft prelllal memorandum; Ielephone calls and exchange a·malls
wlIh Ron BjoIIunan: fIl(r:hsnge l!-I1Iafts with plalnllffs counsel
Rellla", pla/nlllfs brlel opposing second mellon lor summary
judgment: resellrch cases cited by plalntflln their btlaf; lelephone
caUs with Ron BJOrkman analyzing plalnlllts argumenls; r.'<Iew
second depesillon 01 pla/n1Jlf 10 prepare draft 01 reply bllal
ConI.. with Charlia Hepworth and ·Iohn Kluksdollo analyze
lUmmi!}' judgment Issue_
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wllh .John Kluklldal; sand draft by ..ma' 10 Ron BjoItunan
1.250 00 WOIk on reply btlelon our second mOfton fo, summary (udgmant:
confer with .John Klukldlll; lelephone c:alIa and exchange ""maDs
with Ron 9jcrkmsn; arrange for IrnmedIale filing 01 brief
125.00 Telephone cd with OeMIs WIIklnson re sanctions Issual and fltm
change; ..maft reply bllel on moIIon
500,00 Telephone call with Ron Bfarkman: begin dralllng out""e 01
lIflIUment for IhIs weak's heating D/I oUt mollon for summary
judgment; telephone cd with Bill Morrow
I.2SO.o0 Travel 10 Ca!dw.I: conIer with platnHIfs counsel while waiftng hK
heating; olland hearing on our second mollon for summary
Judgment; return lravello Boise; IelephDne caft with Ran Bjolkman rs
heating; conIer with CharH. Hepworth al1ll John Kluklldal
ISO 00 Telephone can with Ron Thomas Ie ,eport on hearfng; lelephone cd
with Ron Bjorkman
200 00 Coni.. wtIh Charlie Hepworth and ·John K1uksdal: draft leller 10 Btl
Monow t8 sancllons order
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52 SO Telephone call with SUSBn Olson al Hawley TroxeU ra Carl Harder;
lelephone cd with Kalhleen Elllall
192 SO Ravlew and revlsa rnoIlon lor summary judgment: confer wHh John
Janis; fesearch re parlIal performance
52 50 Relllaw end re'IIsD d!seovary responses 10 odd objective perspeclllle:
conIar with John Janis re discovery responses
52 SO Confer with John Janis ra molion and deposUlon; lelephone tall wilt!
James Vavrek; waft ..mal 10 Jamas Vavrak
52 SO Confer with John Janis ID mallon and deposlUon; telephone cal with
James VOvrltc; draft a·maN 10 ·James Vavrek
431 50 Prepar. for and alIand mollon 10 compel heetlng In Emmaft; coni.,
with John ·Jants '" hearing.
3500 Dralt conaspandenca 10 Vavrek
52 SO Draft lellar 10 Oennls WRklnson allar ,elllewing duces IlIcum nob
17 50 Telephone call with Oennls WIIItInson
1-242.50 Meet with Ron and ElaIne Thoma.: altend depoBlUon 01 Ron
Thomas; conIer with John Janis: telephona call wUh Ran Thomas;
draft subpoena 10 Rob WIlde; droll duces lecum nob hK Orew
21000 Conlar wllh ·John Janis; draU depOS11lon q\MIsUons
560 00 Rase8lCh elemenla and prerequisites 01 eSlabllshlng • gill; research
conllac;lI: conIer wllh John Jants Ie deposlUon: ,.saaldl bankruptcy
li/'mga hK Olew Thomas
87 50 Con/ar with ,John Jents ra deposition: lelephone cal with ,John JanIt
r. deposlllon
1750 Telephone cd willi Ron Thomas
81 SO BIgIn researching equlllIbl. esloppel and stalule oIl'Dllds
52 50 Research ca.. ,. equllabla estoppel and pert performance
28250 Review summaI}' JUdgmenl brief: Iolaphana cal with John .Janls;
review IIJe lor Olaw Thomoa' lax re/urns; dr.1I new secllon 01
summary Judgment brief
140.00 Relliew and,evIse summery Judgmonl memorandUm
140 00 Conlar with John Jonls; ,elllaw Oraw Thames' deposition
35 .00 Conf.r with John Janis re Shl,ley Youngstrom mlellog
21000 Relllaw lummI!}' judgment reeponsll and aflldevllll; cantsr with John
JanIs ID summary judgmelll response
490 00 Conler with John Janis: research re sham affldaylts; research ,.
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certainly requlremenl, lor lime 01 performance.
38500 Resallldl at slale 1Ib!llly re lime requirements In conlraclB; conler
will! John Janis re reply btlef
122 50 Confer with John ·Jants re reply brief; drafl cllallonaln reply brlDI
175.00 RlI1IIew reply and amda'lll; conler with ·John Janl.
17 50 Telephone cal wllh Bill MoIse
455 00 Ralllew!law doc:umenlB responsive '0 mollon for summary
judgment; rase"",,, re whether _
DI an asset cen IesUIy re value
or lhal allliat: confer will! John Janis ,e reply: review and revise
responsa to modon 10 slrlke.
10500 RIM"" and rellise final draft DI response to mollon 10 slrlle.; COI1Ier
willi John Jan".
52 50 Confer will! .John Janl. ra summary /udgmenllssues
367.50 Review lellar from Arnell; wailleller 10 Amell; ra\/lew naw
dOt:Ulllents. allldavlts. 56(F) response. lind motion 10 sIrlIIe
response; conle, WIth John Janll
74.00 Review and revise response 10 renewed molioniO compel; conl.r
will! John Janie
55 50 Analyze supplemental aulllDllll'
18500 Rase"",,, re real property descriptions; research accounl....,
ptlvRege
185 00 RevlllW new cIocumenls I1Ied by plalnUII; conI" WIth John Jenls
92 50 Confer will! ·John Janis fll summary Judgmenl heerlng
74 00 Re_rdl Ie gIII_lemanla: leIaptoone can with John ·Janls re gilt
3100 conrerwlll! John Janis f8 document producllOn
92 50 RII\IIIIW summary /udgmenl decltlon: conler will! John Janl.
74.00 Telephone call with Dennis Wlfldnson; confer wllh ·John ·Janls
74.00 Review IeUer agreement: confer WIIIl John Janis.
92 SO Con/er will! John Janla; ,esearth equitable esloppef
III 00 Re\/lew lesllng and BUIMI8IY judgment Issue.: review summary
Judgmerll amdevll and memorandum
129 SO Conler with John Janis 111 summary /Udgmenllscues; review and
revile summary ludgmerll reply brlel
, 11 00 ConIer will! John Janis 111 summary Judgment Issues and damages
1850 Talaphane message from MIke SIef8l1ic.
74.00 Review summary Judgmenl dec:lGlon: conler With John Janis
55 50 Confer will! John .Janis
55 50 Revlaw dlaco",,1Y responses
37 00 Confer will! John Janis re damages; rll\llllW and rev/se lener
92 50 CDnfer with John Janis re summary /Udgmenl and moIIon 10 CDlllpe\;
review reswch fe divisible perts 01 a daal
92..50 fllI\IIIIW rBRlWad mol/on to campltl: confer will! John Janis
55 50 Confer with John Janis re mollon 10 compal and damagel
14 00 Telephone calls with ·JuiUn Srnlth. polenUaI blinking ..pert
ROO Telephone ClIB WIIIl Jack N8YI!dzld. banlclng elIpar1; confer With John
Janlsre 5I1/1III.
123 00 Telephone
WIIIl KeRy Roberts from ZlDnr. review renewed
mo/Ion 10 compel: conle, wllh John ·Janls.
61 50 Relllew mDIIOn lor PfDItleliva order; confer wllh John Janis
41 00 Roviaw and revise molton lor prO/eell.. ordet
41 00 Conler with John Jants re bIItm:aIlon
82.00 Coneer wllh .John .JanIa I. legal Issue_
61 50 Ra\/lew 1\1IITIII111ty /udglllltnl brill (SUnd.",
205 00 RII1IIew and ,evlse mollon lor summery Judgment brief
102 50 Re\/lew and rll1lise summalY judgment reply
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, 10 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-41.36
Fax No. (208) 365-4 J96

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA IE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

**+**
R DREW THOMAS.
Plaintiff,

)
)

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)
VS.

) DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD
) OF ATTORNEY FEES

RONALD 0 THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and rHOMAS MOTORS,
INC.. an Idaho Corporation,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

.>

)
)

*****
DEFENDANTS' MfMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES - ]

O()112i

INTRODUCTION
All of the plaintiff s remaining claims in this case have been resolved in favor of the
defense with the Court's "Order on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment," which was
filed on May i8, 2009. The defendants have accordingly moved the Court for an order awarding
them their attorneys fees and costs incurred in the defense of this case, which Motion is accompanied
by a detailed Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees required by I.R.C.P. 54 and its
various subparts. The costs issues are quite straightforward and addressed in the defendants'
Verified Memorandum of Costs.
This Memorandum is intended to address the various legal standards and analysis
attendant to the attorneys fees issues.

ATTORNEYS FEES
A. Legal Standards re: Awarding Attorney Fees.

The legal bases for the defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees is IdallO
Code § 12-120(3) and/or 12-121. The latter of these carries the stricter standard or burden of pro of,
since it requires a showing that a case was "brought or pursued frivolously." While the defendants
believe that standard can be met here, it will not be addressed in this brief since Idaho Code § 12120(3) is entirely dispositive.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies to any civil action involving a "commercial
transaction" and provides that "the prevailing party shal1 be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." Idaho Code § 12-120(3)(emphasis added}.
The statute goes on to define the term "commercial transaction:"
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A WARD OF
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The term 'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all transactions
except transactions for personal or household services.

Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

It has often been repeated that this statute applies whenever the

"gravanlen" ofthe claims made by the plaintiff involved a commercial transaction. See eg , Brower

v EI DuPont De Nemours & Co, 1J7 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345, (1990). Kelly v. Silverwood
Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 903P 2d 1321 (1995), Dennett" Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 936P 2d219 (Ct.
App 1997) It is also very well settled that when a defendant successfully defends against the
attempted enforcement of an alleged contract, such a defendant is entitled to attorney fees even
though the Court has effectively ruled that no contract exists, or that such a contract is unenforceable
as a matter of law. See, e g, Lawrence

l'

Jones, 124 Idaho 748. 864 P.2d 194 (Ct App 1993),

Clement v Franklin Investment Group, LId, 689 F Supp 1575 (D Idaho 1988).
There are cases where there can be a legitimate debate about whether the "gravamen"
of a plaintiff's case involves a "commercial transaction" or not. See, e.g., Blimka v. lvfy Web

Wholesaler. LLC. 143 Idaho 723, 152 P 3d 594 (2007) City of McCalll' Susan E Buxton, Idaho
Supreme COliri Docket No. 34609 (2009 Opinion No 8, Jam/Oly 22, 2009). There is no such room
for debate here, however, as there is simply no doubt about the fact that everything about the
plaintiff's claims in this case arose out of an alleged commercial transaction. In fact, the only claim
left at this point, that was the subject of the Court's recent Decision, was a breach of oral contract
for the alleged sale or tr'ansfer of a commercial business to him. The plaintiff's claim here, in other
words, is the quintessential definition of a commercial transaction.. AU of the claims that were
previously dismissed in this case likewise arose out of that very same alleged commercial transaction
in which the defendants supposedly agreed to transfer the business to him in the future.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF
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The bottom line is there is no question about the fact that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is
squarely applicable here. The defendants are the prevailing party since all claims have now been
effectively dismissed as a matter oflaw, and the gravamen of all of the plaintiffs claims in this case
have involved an alleged commercial transaction. The defendants thus respectfully submit there is
no question that they are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defense of this
action.
B. Legal standards Ie: Ampunt of attorneys fees.
J R. CP 54(e)(3) is the rule governing the "amount ofattomeys fees" to be awarded

in any case. It provides a list offactors the trial courts "shall consider" in determining the amount
of attorneys fees to be awarded to a prevailing party.
Before addressing the factors listed in I R. C P. .54(e)(3), it is important to note that
the Idaho Appellate Courts have held that a trial court must make a record indicating that all of the
factors under the rule were considered, for proper appellate review. As stated by the Idaho Court of
Appeals, for example:
A detennination of the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded is
within the discretion of the district court. Absent a showing of abuse
of discretion the award will not be overturned.
However. the district court under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) is required to
consider several factors in determining the amount of such fees. OUf
review of the court's discretion in the award of attorneys' fees is
based upon the proper application of these factors. The district court
must, at a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court
considered these factors
BUilding Concepts, Lid v. Pickering. 114 Idaho 640, 645. 759 P 2d 931 (el. App J988) By the

same token, however, the Idaho Appellate Courts have made it equally clear that a District Court is
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not required to make specific findings regarding how it employed each or any of the Rule 54(e)(3)
factors in reaching the fees award amount.. See, e.g. Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. ]v!urphy, 122

Idaho 270. 833 P 2d 128 (0 App. 1992). Empire Fire & Marine Ins Co. v. North Pacific Ins Co,
127 Idaho 716, 905 P.2d 1025 (1995), Perkins v US Transformer W., 132 Idaho 427.974 P2d 73
(1999). Smith 11 Millon, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P 3d 367 (2004).
In summary, the appellate case law ofIdaho provides that while district courts do not
have to make a record of specific finding regarding each of the twelve factors listed in Rule 54(e)( 3),
the district court is required to make a record at least summarily indicating the court gave
consideration to all of the factors under the rule.
With regard to the twelve factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3} it would seem likely that in
any given case a number of the factors listed would have some direct applicability, while others will
have only some applicability, and yet others will have no applicability at all. That would certainly
be the case here as well. Nevertheless, and in any event, the defendants would offer the following
on each of the listed factors in J.RC.P. 54(e)(3):
A The time and labor reguired. This is one ofthe primary factors under the Rule,
which has direct applicability here. The attorneys fees requested are exactly commensurate with the
"time and labor required" in the defense of this case. This case is approximately 3 years old at this
point, and has been very time intensive. Thousands of documents have been exchanged in discovery,
lengthy depositions taken, and quite a number of experts have needed to get involved in the case.
In addition, there have been a number of hotly contested summary judgment motions, which has
generated voluminous briefing and affidavits being submitted to the Court In addition, besides the
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documents that have been exchanged in discovery which includes documents from various banking
institutions, there have also been numerous other documents that have been dealt with, to investigate
what relevance they mayor may not have. The defendants have a warehouse full of Thomas Motors
business documents generated throughout its approximate 9 year history. It is also worth mentioning
that the plaintiff introduced a subject area of forensic expertise that is extremely unique and
complicated That is, because the plaintiff was making rather unusual claims about when contract
documents were actually signed, the parties dealt with the subject of "ink. dating" and other similar
testing 011 documents, which the undersigned had frankly never even heard of until this case. The
bottom line is the time and labor required in this case was extreme.
B. The novelty and difficulty ohhe questions. There were many thorny legal issues
presented throughout the various summary judgment proceedings in this case, but the defendants
were not certain they would amount to "novel" or particularly "difficult" questions or not As
indicated above, they required significant amounts oflegal research and briefing, but it is not entirely
clear what is meant by the rules reference to presenting novel and/or difficult questions. As also
pointed out above, however, there was at least one novel subject raised in this case which involved
a subject of ink dating, a very specific and unusual area of forensic science.
C. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and

ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. The undersigned is also not certain how much
consideration should be given to this particular factor. The primary attorneys involved in the case
were experienced litigatols. and it is likely true that the issues involved in this case required some
level of experience in commercial litigation.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A WARD OF
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D. The prevailing charges for like work. As referenced in the affidavit of counsel,
the hourly charges for the defense of this case ale commensurate with the normal and usual rates
charged by the law firm representing the defendants for a number of years. These are also charges
that are commensurate with customary and usual rates charged by lawyers practicing in Boise, Idaho,
with commensurate levels of experience.
E. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. This was of course a fixed fee arrangement
to represent the defendants who had been sued in this lawsuit, based upon the applicable hourly rates,
as referenced above.
F. The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. The
defendants do not believe this is a factor worthy of much consideration here. There were no time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case generally.
G. The amount involved and the results obtained. The amounts involved in this case,
at least according to the plaintiff, was substantial. In fact, the plaintiff was making claims for
multiple millions of dollars in damages, according to him. The potential exposure to the defendants
was correspondingly extreme. The "results obtained" were completely favorable to the defense,
since all ofplaintifrs claims have now been dismissed as a matter oflaw

R The undesirability of the case. The defendants do not believe this is a factor that
has much applicability here. While this was a family-involved lawsuit where emotions ran high,
there is nothing particularly undesirable about the case. In fact, the defendants as individuals are
exceptionally nice people that, if anything, represented very desirable clients.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF
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1. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. The
defendants submit that this is likewise a factor that has little if any applicability here. Defense
counsel had not previously known the defendants individually, prior to this case.

J. Awards in similar cases. The defendants are not certain what consideration could
be given to this factor. Defense counsel is not aware of any attorney fee awards that have been given
in what could be fairly classified as a "similar" case. Defense counsel is aware of attorneys fees
being awarded in cases, where the fee awards are commensulate with the amounts that were actually
billed and paid by the client in defense of the case. That is what is in substance being requested here
and submitted as fair and appropriate.

K. Reasonable cost of automated legal research, This is a factor here as defense
counsel employed use of automated legal research, and billed the defendants such costs. The
defendants also paid fOI such costs. Specifically, defense counsel in dealing with the various
summary judgment motions, and legal issues presented. incurred a total of$660.20 of research with
the WestLaw Research Group.
L. Any othel factor which the court deems appropriate in a particular case. The
defendants are not aware of any "other" factor that would provide any significant contribution to the
attorneys fees considerations here, other than those addressed above.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the defendants respectfully request that the COUlt award them their
attorneys fees they actually incurred in defense of this lawsuit.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this).! day of May, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

H. Ronald ~jorkman
Attorneys for Defend

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 2l.th day of May, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
I N, Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[ xl u.s. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ J E-mail
[ x] U.s. Mail

[ J Hand Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ J E-mail
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John.1. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.o. Box 2582
Boise, ID 8370)~2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
TeJephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No (208) 365-4196

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

'" '" '" '" '"
R DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)

Case No CV 2006-492

)
vs.

RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR AWARD

)

OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

'" '" '" '" '"
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - )

0011 v

COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys, Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and pursuant to Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
and its various subparts, as well as Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3) and/or 120-121, respectfully
move this Honorable Court for an order awarding defendants all reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred in the defense of this action.
This Motion is otherwise based upon the pleadings and records on file with the Court
in this action, together with the Memorandum of Law in support ofthe Motion for Attorney's Fees
and the Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs by defense counsel, both filed
contemporaneously herewith"

~

Dated this23 day of May, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

-it....

Dated this

2.a day of May, 2009.
By

l~

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this.;? i.ts:dayofMay, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
I09N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[ xl U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
[ 1Overnight Mail
[ J Telecopy (Fax)
[ 1E-mail

[ xl u.s. MaH

[ 1Hand DeliveIed
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ I E-mail
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William A Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER., PLLC
332 N, Broadmore Way, Ste. 102
Nampa.,. Idaho 83687
Telephone:
(208) 47S-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISB No.
2451
wmorrow@mofrowfischer.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS~

Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAJNE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

--------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV. 2006-492
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)
)
)

)
)

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through the undersigned counsel of
record, the law firm of Morrow & Fischer, PLLC, and hereby submits his Motion for
Reconsideration of the COUT'fs May 18, 2009 Order on Defendants' Second Motion for

MonON FOR RECONSTDERATJON • 1

~

__

••

PAGE

MURROWDINIUS

............. v.&.,

05/05

Summary Judgment.
This motion is made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2) and is supported
by the affidavits and pleadings on file, together with the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration, which 'WiII be filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
7(b)(3){C).

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this ~ day of June, 2009.
MORROW &, FISCHER, PLLC
By:W. Q"

..

~

William A. Morrow
Attorneys for the P1aintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Ju..",

r hereby certify that on this _l_ day of~ 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:

John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & Brody
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise~ ID 83701-2582
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. {-lays
P,o. Box 188
Emmett~ ID 83617·0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail

Hand Delivery
f'acsimile No. 342-2927

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196

~1'h'Jw¥k
for MORROW & FISCHE ,PLLC

rmttr:\Clicnt~\T\Thom8.~. ~ Orcw 2197'\Thoma~ Mo(ors.lnc,0001.PlcadingsIMot tbr Rcconsidcrlltion,doc
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927

JUN 02 2009

H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH COURT'S ORDER

)
)
)
)
)

)

** ***
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH COURT'S ORDER - I

ORIGINAIOOl1

COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action. by and through their
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & Brody. and pursuant to Rule 37(b) and 37(e) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure hereby move this Honorable Court for an order of additional sanctions
against the plaintiff for complete failure to comply with the Court's Order of February 27, 2009,
requiring plaintiff to pay the amount of$5,259.50. The Court's Order of February 27,2009, gave
the plaintiff 9 weeks to make the payment ofthe sanction award of$5,259 .50, specifically, until May
I, 2009. No such payment has been made of any kind, however. despite a couple of phone call
reminders about this, as well as a letter to plaintiff s counsel, a true and correct copy of which is
attached as Exhibit "A". The plaintiff and'or his counsel are thus indisputably in contempt of this
Court's clear and unequivocal Order of February 27, 2009.
This Motion is accordingly based upon the records and pleadings on file with this
Court in this action, and is made for the reason that the plaintiff and/or plaintiffs counsel have
completely ignored and blatantly refused to comply with the Court's Order. Defendants thus
respectfully request that additional sanctions be awarded against the plaintiff specifically including
the sanction of outright dismissal of this case [See. IR.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C)]. This would and should
have the result of no other motions being heard or decided that relate to the legal or factual merits
of plaintiff's claims, such as the plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, and leave the only motion
for determination left in this case the Defendants' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs.
DA TED this 2nd day of June, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attomey of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 2nd day of June, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A. Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER
5680 E. Franklin Rd .. Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

l ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail
[ xl Telecopy (Fax)
E-mail

r]

'- ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail
[ xl Telecopy (Fax)
[ J E- '1
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(208) 343-/510
Fax: (208) 342-2927
537 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

'----------------~
WORTH, JANIS & BRODY,
LAW

TWIN FALLS OFFI.
(208) 734-75
Toll Free: (877) 343-75
Fax: (208) 734-41
133 Shoshone Street Nor
P.o. Box 3!
Twin Falls, ID 83303-03E

.. fD.

OFFICES

- ESTABLISHED

1952-

J. Charles Hepworth'
JohnJ.Janis
John W. Kluksdal

Robyn M. Brod
Benjamin J. Clul
JoelA. BecJ
John C. Hepworth, OfCounse

'Member CA Bar

May 15, 2009

VIA FACSIMILE - 475-2201
William A. Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC
5680 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Re:

Thomas v. Thomas
HJ&B File No.: 06-2-023

Dear Bill:
I am writing as another follow up to the Court's Sanctions Order in the abovereferenced matter. I have spoken to both you and Dennis Wilkinson about this, and that the Court's
Order required payment on May 1,2009. We are, of course, two weeks beyond that date at this
point, and I have heard nothing about when we can expect payment.
Please give me a call, or otherwise let me know when we can expect the compliance
with the Court's order. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

By __~~~~____~_____

JJJ/sf
pc: Ron Bjorkman

EXH1BITA
Reply to Boise office

()[li ,

1 1 2C09
William A. Morrow
Shelli D. Stewart
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC
332 North Broadmore Way, Suite 102
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:
(208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
ISB No.:

(208) 475-2201
2451,7459

wmorrow@morrowfischer.com
sSlewart@morrowfischer.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

)

R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV. 2006-492

va.

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN S{JPPORT OF
MOTTON TO DISALLOW COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS. INC., an
Tdaho Corporation,

)
)
)

Plaintiff.

Defendants.

)

--------------------------)
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas. by and through his attorneys of record,
the law finn of Mon-ow & Fischer, PLLC and hereby lodges this Memorandum. in Support of
}\;[Olion

to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees.

MEMORANDUM TN SUPPOR.T OF MOTION TO OTSAl..LOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - I

BACKGROUND
On May 7, 2009, Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment was heard and,
pending further review, the Court reserved its ruling. On May 18 l 2009, the Court entered its
Order on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment granting such motion. On May

28. 2009. Defendants med their Motion and Memorandum requesting attorney fees. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion should be denied in its entirety. Alternatively, the

Court should exerc1.se its discretion to reduce the attorney fees requested by Defendants.

ARGUMENT

A.

Defendants Are Not Entitled To Fees Punuant To Idaho Code § 12~120(3) Because
No Commercial Transaction Took Place.
Defendants request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and

12-121.1 Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides in pertinent part:
In any civil action to recover on an open account ... and in any commercia)
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shaH be
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and
collected as costs.
The term, ··commerc.iaI transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes.
Idaho courts use a two part test to determine whether attorney fees are proper under this
section: (1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the
commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought. Brooks v. Gigray

Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 78, 910 P.2d 744. 750 (1996). Indeed. "It has long been held that '[t]he
critical tcst is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the
commercia} transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party is
attempting to recover. '" Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. 136 Idaho
AIt hough Defendants provide Idaho Code § 12·121 as a basis for obtaining fees, they provide no leeal argument or
supporting such assertion as thoy believe fces will be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Accordingly,
Plaintiff will not refute a non-existent argument other than to state his disagreement that Dofendants arc entitled to
fees pursuant to idaho Code § 12.121.
I
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466, 471~ 36 PJd 218~ 223 (2001)l citing Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho
at 426~ 987 P .2d at 1041 (1999).
In this case, Defendants argue that although the Court determined there was no contract
between the parties, they are nevertheless entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
Plaintiff disagrees. Even if this case were based on a commercial transaction, which it is not,
Defendants are not entitled to fees because no transaction ever occurred. Although the Court of
Appeals in Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748. 752, 864 P.2d 194, 198 (Idaho App.,1993) found
that attorney fees may be warranted even where the underlying commercial transaction was void
or deemed unenforceable, such holding is limited to situations in which the transaction actually
occurred. As specifically stated by the Court of Appeals in Idaho Branch Inc. of Associated

General Contractors of America., Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No, 1, 123 Tdaho 237,

244~ 846

P,2d 239,246 (Idaho App .• 1993):
Our Supreme Court has ruled that "[a]ttomey's fees are not appropriate under I.C.
§ 12~ 120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and

constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover,". Moreover.
we have recently held that '(under the most expansive view of the statute [I.C. §
12-120(3) J a lawsuit still must seek resolution of a dispute arising from a
commercial transaction between the parties." In the case before us, the
resolution sought by the contractors is 91 a dispute arising from a
cgrnme[daJ transaction that did not take place; and.. thererore. there is no
commercial transaction between tbe parties that can be the basis for an

,Homey fee a}yard under I.e. § lZM1l0(3.l.

(emphasis added) (quoting Brower v. E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co.. 117 Idaho 780. 784, 792
P.2d 345, 349 (1990); Idaho Newspaper Foundation v. The City o.lCascade, 117 Idaho 422,424,
788 P.2d 237.239 (Ct.App.1990)).
In the present case. Plaintiff sued Defendants based on his father's promise that if he
managed and operated his father's business for a highly reduced salary, he would inherit the
business when his father retired. The fact that this case is dealing with a family business that
was to be inherited by Plaintiff demonstrates the non-commercial nature of the suit. Instead of
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT or MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES· 3

this being a business deal gone awry, this is a case about a son dedicating his life to a family .
business based on a promise that he would someday inherit such business. Plaintiff gave up his
job and dedicated his life to a family business that he was to inherit. Clearly the gravamen of
Plaintifrs lawsuit was to reso]ve a dispute over

all

inheritance he was promised,not to resolve a

dispute over a commercial transaction.
Further~

as was the situation in Idaho Branch inc.. no commercial transaction ever

occurred between the parties. Although Plaintiff's claim was based on his father's broken
promise to leave Plaintiff the business, there was no transaction from which the dispute atose.
Instead~

\

Plaintiff was suing based on a transaction that did not take place. Had Plaintiff actually

received the business from his father and then sued, Defendants may have an argument with
respect to their entitlement to fees however without a transaction there is no basis for fees.
B.

The Attorney Fees Requested By Defendant.\! Are Not Reasonable.

Although Plaintiff strongly contests Detendants' entitlement to attorney fees, should the
Court determine some fees are awardable. the amount requested is excessive and must be
reduced. In determining the amount ofattomey fees, the court is vested with discretion. DeWills

interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288, 678 P.2d 80 (t 984). When considering the amount of
attorney fees to be awarded under Idaho Code § t 2~ 120. the court must consider the factors set
forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857. 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986).
. The Rule 54(e)(3) factors include:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3)
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; (4) the prevailing charges for
like work; (5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (6) the time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; (7) the amount involved
and the results obtained; (8) the undesirability of the case; (9) the nature and
length of the professional rclationsrup with the client; (10) awards in similar
cases; and (11) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if the court finds
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF M0T10N TO orSALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 4
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it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case.

The court may also consider any other factor it deems appropriate in the particular case. I.R.C.P.
54(c)(3)(L).

BccaLl.')e the court'g discretion to award attorney fees is limited to awarding fees which
are reasonable, and because in determining a reasonable amount of fees the court must consider
the specific factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3), a party seeking fees must present the court with
sufficient information from which to determine a reasonable fee award ba5ed upon the Rule
54(e)(3). See Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra at 769. 483. In other words. the party seeking

fees has the burden to supply the court with sufficient information from which to determine the
reasonableness of the fees requested and a reasonable amount to be awarded. See Sun Valley

Potato Growers, supra~ Leuunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005).
Tn Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra, the Supreme Court of Tdaho addressed the moving party's
burden to supply information to the court:
If we require the trial court to consider the enumerated factors in rule' 54(e)(3)~
then ;t logically follows as a corollary that the (ourt must bave sufficient
inrormation at its disposal concerning those factors. Some information may
corne from the court's own knowledge and experience, some may come from the
record of the case, but some obviously can only be supplied by the attorney of the
party who is requesting the fee award .. ,
We believe it is incumbent upon a partt seeking attorney fees to present
sufficient information for the tourt to consider factors as they specificalJy
relate to tbe prevailing party or partie.III seeking fec.!.
Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra (citing Hackell v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261. 264~ 706 P.2d

1372, 1375 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added) (affinning the district court's denial of a fee award
on the basis the moving party failed to present sufficient infonnation for the court to consider the
Rule 54 factors). Further, am.ong the factors the trial court should consider in determining a
reasonable fee award i.s whether the moving

party~s

counsel has made a good faith effort to
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exclude from the fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or othern.ise unnecessary. See

Green v. Baca, 225 F.RD. 612, 614-15 (C.D. California 2005) (applying the same factors as
those sct forth in l.R.C.P. S4(e)(3) to determine a reasonable attorney fee award pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 37(a)(4)(A)).2

Defendants seek an award of attorney tees in the amount ofS1l5,749.20. Defendants are
attempting to coHect fees for over 500 hours of attorney time, 461.5 of which were billed by a
partn.er at $200!hour. Applying the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, it is clear that Defendants' request is
excessive and, given Defendants' colossal fee request, it is incumbent upon the Court

1

to

scrutinize carefully whether Defendant..;' fee request includes charges for excessive time spent or
redundant efforts.
Although there were multiple issues involved in this case, it cannot be said that the issues
involved-breach of contract and quasi-contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and fraud-·~were particularly novel or complex. As demonstrated by Defendants'
fec records submitted as Exhibit B to Defendants'
Cost.'i~

Ver~fied

Memorandum o.lAttorneys Fees and

Defense counsel spent in excess of 50 hours between 6/27/2006 and 7/18/2007 compiling

Defendants' first summary judgment motion. Not to mention the more than 30 hours spent
between 8/13/2007 and 8/17/2007 reviewing Plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment and

preparing Defendants' reply. Even after expending more than 80 hours on the first motion tor

summary judgment, Defendants spent another 20 plus hours drafting a second partial motion for
summary judgment between 3/7/08 and 3114/08 (not including the 9 hours spent drafting the
rr:ply brief on 4/25/08 and4!28/08) and approximately 9 more hours on Defendants' Second

2 See RonI' v, Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692, 800 P.2d 85, 88 (1990) ("It is well established that OUT adoption ofthe idaho
Rules of Civil Procedl1fe is presumably with the interpretation placed upon similar language in the: Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by the federal courts. [Citations omittedJ."); see also Hoopes v. Deere & Company, 117 Idaho 386,
389, 788 P.2d 201. 204 (1990).

MEMORANOUM TN SUPPORT OF MOnON TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES· 6

Motion for Summary Judgment on 413/09 and 4/6/09 (not including the 10 plus hours spent
drafting the reply brief from 4/23/09 to 4/30/09). Clearly such amount of time is excessive
considering the Umitcd legal issues and the repetitive nature of the summary judgment
memorandums. Further, the fact that such summary judgment memorandums. as well
numerous other motions

an~

a.~

the

responses and hearing notices, were drafted and redrafted and

reviewed by a partner billing at $200Ihour, rather than an

a.~sociate

or paralegal billing at a lesser

rate) is demonstrative of the excessive and unreasonable fees incurred by Defendants,
In addition to the time spent drafHng the motions for summary judgment, defense counsel
John Janis spent 8 hours on 1011 0/2007 reviewing pleadings and preparing his argument for the
summary judgment hearing the following day.3 Not to mention the additional 8 hours he spent

the following day attending the hearing and then discussing the case with co-counsel and the
clients. Clearly 16 hours for preparation and argument at a motion hearing is excessive.
Defendants have also failed to show that this was a particularly undesirable case, thereby
justifying the exorbitant amount of attorney fees sought. Although Defendants claim the "ink
dating" was something that made this case "unique and complicated," the ink dating issue wa.-;
fairly minor and does not justifY the huge amount of fees being claimed in this case. It is also
unclear how what relevance the ink dating .issue ha.!Ii to do' with the novelty of issues or the
amount of time spent on such issue "",;th respect to Defendants considering Plaintiff is the party
who hired an expert to examine the documents. Defendants wcre not overly involved in the ink
dating issue considering they merely were required to provide Plaintiff with the original
documents in order that Plaintiff could provide them to his expert. ClearJy the ink dating is not
justification for awarding exorbitant fees on a fairly straightforward case.

J This does not include the hours spent on 10/05/07 and 10/09/07 reviewing and organizing the motion pleadinss
preparing for the summary jUdgment hearing.
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Further, as admitted by Defendants, the legal issues invo.lved in this case were not novel
or particularly difficult. Clearly the legal issues in this case, breach of contract and quasicontract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud, were standard to
many litigation cases and do not support the excessive fees being requested. Defendants have
not met their burden to supplying the court with sufficient information from which to determine
the reasonableness of the fees requested and a reasonable amount to be awarded.

Clearly

requesting fees for over 500 hours of attorney time must be supported by much more than an
assertion that ink dating made this case novel. Accordingly, if the Court dctennines fees are

awardable, Defendants' exorbitant fees must be drastically reduced.
The Costs Requested By Defendants Are Not Reasonable.

C.

Under Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of CjviJ Procedure, the court may award only a
limited number of costs as a matter of right. See LR.C.P. 54(d)(l )(C) which sets forth costs
which may be claimed as a matter of right. Any items of costs not enumerated in or in an

amount in excess of that listed in Rule 54(d)(1)(C) are discretionary costs, which the court may
award

~

"upon a showing that said costs were neccss_rv and exceptional costs reasonably

inc'Qrred. and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party.'l LR.C.P.

54(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added); Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alco,.n~ 141 Idaho 307,
314~ 15,

109 P3d 161, 168-69 (2005) ("A trial court may, in its discretion award a prevailing

pa.rty certain costs where there has been 'a showing that the costs arc necessary and exceptional,
reasonably incurred. and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse
party·"1 Costs are "exceptional" only when the nature of the case itself is exceptional or when

the cost is exceptional for a particular type of case. See Jiayden Lake. supra.
In the present case, Defendants have included $553.85 tor a videographer used at
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Plaintiffs deposition as part of their costs as a matter ofright. As discus~ed above, Rule 54(d) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure details a limited number of' costs that are to be awarded as a
matter of right. Choosing to hire a videographer for a deposition is not a c(')!:\t covered in Rule
S4(d)(1)(C). The fact that Detendants chose to hire a videographer for Drew Thomas' deposition
does not mean that such expense is automatically passed on to Plaintiff. Video depositions are
not required and are merely an extra expense that must be borne by the party choosing to incur
such extra expense.
Further, the $18,747.41 in expert witness costs included in Defendants' discretionary

1

costs, are not necessary and exceptional costs awardable pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(C). Neither
the nature of the case itself nor the expert costs are exceptional for a particular type of case. This
is a standard litigation case in which Plaintiff claimed his father promised him the business in
exchange for his management and operation of the business for a meager salary. Clearly this is a
straightforward case in which hiring accounting experts to vaiue the business would be
considered highly ordinary, rather than exceptional. Accordingly. Defendants attempt to collect

$18,747.41 for accounting experts in a breach of contra.ct matter dealing with the sale of a
business must be rejected as an ordinary expense that is in no way exceptional under Role
54(d)(l)(C).

CONCLUSION
In sum, Defendants are not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12·
120(3) because (1) the Court specifically found that there is no contractual relationship; (2) the
gravamen of the lawsuit wa.c; inheritance of a family business in exchange for management and
operation of such business; and (3) no commercial transaction ever occurred. Moreover, there is
no evidence or finding that Plaintiff pursued his claims against Defendants frivolously.
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unreasonably or without foundation, thereby entitling Defendants to attorney fees under Idaho
Code § 12-121. Accordingly, Defendants' request for costs and attorney fees should be denied
in its entirety. Alternatively, the Court should exercise its discretion to reduce the amount of
attorney fees and costs sought.
DATED this 11th day of June~ 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following;

John 1. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

II. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett~I.D 83617-0188
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US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342-2927

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365~4196
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for MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

."'* ••
R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No . CV 2006-492

)
VS.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

)
)

)
)
)
)
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DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
AND A TTORNEY FEES - I

The plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees is entirely without merit
and should be denied.
The plaintiff first seeks to have the Court deny any attorneys fees in this case on the
grounds that the mandatory fees provision ofIdaho Code § 12-120(3) are inapplicable in this case

TIlis argument is frankly inexplicable and defies credibility.
To begin with, the plaintiffs own Verified Complaint in this case claims he should
be awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120. It is entirely inconsistent for the plaintiff to
now try and argue that I.C. § 12-120(3) is n2! applicable to this case when his own pleadings on file
for the last three years of this case have claimed otherwise.
In addition, the newly concocted premise that 1.c.§ 12-120(3) does not apply to this
case is "because no transaction ever occurred." (Plaintiff's Brief in Support of lvIolion 10 Disallow

Attorney Fees at p 3) (emphasi5 in original)

Here again, this factual "argument" is entirely

inconsistent with everything the plaintiff has been claiming over the last three years. In his
pleadings, and in his various depositions and affidavits on file with the Court. he has been
consistently claiming throughout this litigation that there was an actual agreement in place with the
defendants which involved the transfer of tlle Thomas Motors business and land to him at the time
his father retired, and that the defendants breached that existing agreement. As a result of the
defendants' alleged breach ofthis agreement, the plaintiff was seeking to recover millions of dollars
from the defendants. Otherwise stated, the plaintiff has been claiming for over three years in this
lawsuit that he had entered into this particular "transaction" with the defendants and the defendants
allegedly failed to comply with their part of this business deal. The plaintiff makes no effort to
explain how he or anyone else can claim they entered into an oral agreement with someone regarding
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2
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a commercial business, and that somehow does not amount to a "transaction." This defies common
sense, and if anything the exact opposite is true. An agreement between parties involving the
transfer of a commercial business would look more like the very definition of a "commercial
transaction" .
The only legaJ support offered for this argument by the plaintiff is the Idaho Court
of Appeals Decision in Idaho Branch, Inc. v. Nampa Hwy. Dis!. No.1, 123 Idaho 237, 8446 P.2d

239 (et App 1993). That appellate decision has absolutely nothing to do with this case, however,
and if anything serves to illustrate why the plaintitrs argument here makes no sense . In the Idaho

Branch case, the Nampa and Canyon Highway Districts had entered into agreements relating to the
purchase of a rock crusher and related equipment which could be used to supply the gravel needs of
these two highway districts. Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho at 238. The lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was
a non-profit cooperative association of construction contractors, along with three of its member
contractors. These plaintiffs sought to have the financing agreement between the Nampa and
Canyon County Highway Districts invalidated. Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho al 238. The plaintiff
alleged that the agreement violated that part of the Idaho Constitution that dealt with limitations on
county indebtedness. They specifically claimed that as taxpayers they were harmed by the action of
the districts, and as gravel producers they were deprived of the right to bid on future possible
contracts to supply the gravel needs of the districts. Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho at 238-239. The
Complaint did not seek to recover any financial damages at all, but only a declaratory judgment
holding that the financing agreement between the highway districts was void and unenforceable.

Idaho Branch, J23 Idaho at 239. The District Court had dismissed the case on the basis that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. Id a1244. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed this decision. but found
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DlSAU.OW COSTS
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that the plaintiffs had failed to show the Idaho Constitution provisions in question provided them
with a "protective legal interest and accordingly ruled that the plaintiff's claim for relief failed on
its merit." Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho al 244. On the attorneys fees question, the Court of Appeals
did rule that there was '"no commercial transaction between the parties that could be the basis for an
attorneys fee award under I.C. § 12-120(3):' Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho at 244.
The Idaho Branch case is thus hardly helpful to the plaintiff here. In the Idaho

Branch there was in point of fact no agreement or transaction between the parties involved in that
lawsuit, nor was anyone even claiming there was an existing agreement between the parties in that
lawsuit that was breached. That is the exact opposite of the situation pIesented here where the
plaintiff in this case has been claiming for over three years that there was an agreement between the
parties to this lawsuit that the defendants breached.
In short, the plaintiff's reliance on the Idaho Branch case here is seriously misplaced.
For the plaintiff to argue there was no commercial transaction involved in this case is not only
inconsistent with what he has been claiming for the last three years, it is simply incorrect. It is
exactly what has been the primary subject of this lawsuit from its inception.
The plaintiff also goes to the length of suggesting the gravamen of his lawsuit "was
to resolve a dispute over an iobedtance he was promised, not to resolve a dispute over a commercial
transaction." (Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion 10 Disallow Attorneys Fees at p. 4), This
argument or factual assertion is equally inexplicable. The plaintiff has never claimed tluoughout the
three years of this lawsuit that the Thomas Motors business was supposed to be part of an
"inheritance." As a legal term, "inheritance" generally contemplates property descending to an heir
upon the death of another. In any event, there is no credible way to try and distinguish this case as
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
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involving some kind of inheritance as opposed to a commercial transaction. There is simply no
doubt about the fact the plaintiff has been claiming throughout the three years of this lawsuit that he
had engaged in a business transaction with the defendants, and that alleged transaction served as the
basis for all the claims he has been making in this case.
In summary. the defendants respectfully submit that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is
squarely applicable to this case and attorney fees be awarded on that basis.

I<J~
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 1...12.- day of June, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

/Q+.....

RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this ~ day of June, 2009.

BY"}! (2~&~
H. Ronald Bjorkman - (
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this !£f.bctay of June, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy ofthe above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A. Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER
5680 K Franklin Rd., Ste. 2.20
Nampa, Idaho 83687

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[x] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E*mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
J09N. Hays
PO. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[
[
[
[

] U.s. Mail
] Hand Delivered
] Overnight Mail
] Telecopy (Fax)
[xl E-maiJ
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---

The Plaintiffs response to the Motion for Additional Sanctions is as much notable for
what it does not offer, as what it does, The Plaintiff acknowledges the Court's Sanction Order in
question, which required him to pay $5,259.50 by no later than May 1, 2009. He was given about nine
weeks to make this payment, fwm the date of the Order- The Plaintiff further acknowledges that it has
not yet been paid. Notably, the Plaintiff offers no indication of any intention to comply with the
Court's Sanction Order at any point in the future either. In other words, the PlaintifT is ultimately
acknowledging he is wilfuUy disregarding this Court's Order, and indicating his intention to continue
wilfully and/or intentionally violating the Court's Order for the indefinite future. The Plaintiff also
offers absolutely no explanation or attempted justification for his blatant disregard of the Court's
Order.
Ignoring this pwblem altogether, the Plaintiff goes on to argue the Court basically does
not have any enforcement power for an order that sanctions a party in the form of an attorneys' fees
award. That much is simply untrue, as the language ofthe rule itself makes clear. Rule 37(b)(2) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as follows:

If a party... fails to obey an order to provide or penn it discovery, .. the
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to
the failure as are just, and among others the folJowing:

"'*'"

(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof .. or dismissing the
action or proceeding on any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by
default against the disobedient party;
(D) In rule of any of the foregoing olders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders ....
IRe? 37(b)(2) (emphasis added)., In addition, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) entitled: "General
Sanctions - Failure to comply with any order," provides in pertinent part as follows:

DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS - 2
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In addition to the sanctions above under this Rule for violation of
discovery procedures, any court may in its discretion impose sanctions
or conditions,," against a party or the party's attorney for failure to obey
an order of the court pursuant to these rules.

IRep 37(e).
The point that is apparently not being understood by the Plaintiff is the order granting
the attorneys' fees to the defendant in this case was a sanction order arising out of Plaintiffs repeated
failure to comply with the discovery nIles andlor the Court's Scheduling Order. In short, the court
found that the Plaintiff andlor his counsel had abused the discovery process and sanctioned them for
that behavior, requiring them to pay attorneys' fees in the amount of$5,259.50. The Plaintiff is now
in contempt ofthat Court's finding. As indicated above, the Plaintiff is ultimately acknowledging its
contempt of the Court's Order and is further acknowledging that it fully intends on wilfully
disregarding it in the future as well. The Court's Order of sanctions was,just like the order requiring
them to supply the long overdue expert witness report, a discovery order issued as result of continued
discovery violations by a party. Clearly the Court has the power to enforce its orders that arise out of
discovery abuses as the language of IRCP 37(b)(2) and 37(e) quoted above make clear.
The power of the trial court to enforce an order requiring a party to pay money as
sanctions for discovery abuses, and order additional sanctions, is further corroborated by Kleine v

Fred At/eyer, Inc, 124 Idaho 44, 855 P 2d 881 (CI App 1992). There, the defendant moved to dismiss
the case on the grounds of the plaintiffs "failure to comply with the district court's prior order
requiring [the plaintiff] to pay the costs associated with the prior missed IME and to participate in the
IME arranged for August 12." Kleine, 124 Idaho al 47. The basis of the defendant's motion to
dismiss, in other words, was the plaintiff's failure to pay the sanction ordered costs for missing the first
IME, and then for missing the second IME appointment as well. Addressing the applicable legal
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS - 3
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standards on such an issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
The imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders
is governed by 1.R.c.P. 37(b). A district court's decision to dismiss a
case for failure to comply with pretrial discovery orders under I.R.CP.
37(b)(2)(C) and (e) is discretionary and will not be overturned on
appeal unless an abuse of that discretion is shown.
Kleine, 124 Idaho a149. Ultimately, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the district court's additional

sanction of dismissaL Again, one of the reasons for this was the Plaintitrs failure to pay the sanction
order requiring him to pay some $1,500 associated with causing the initial IME not to take place
Kleine, 124 Idaho at 46.

There is simply no question that the Court has not only the inherent and necessary
power to impose additional sancti ons for a party's failure to comp1y with a Court's standing Order, the
Court is given the explicit power to issue additional sanctions under Rule .37(b) and (e) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, as quoted above.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this

(g ~ay of June, 2009.

an is
eys for Defendants
~

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

lL day of June, 2009.

By

l.f..
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney for Defendan s
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this iflay of June, 2009, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A. Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

[ ] U,S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail
[X] Telecopy (Fax)
[ J E-mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman

[ ] U.S. Mail

Attomey at Law
109 N. Hays
PD. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[Xl E-mail
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William A. Morrow
Shelli D. Stewart
MORROW & FISCHER, PT...LC
332 North Broadmore Way, Suite 102
Nampa) Idaho 83687
Telephone:
(208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISB No.:
2451,7459
wmorrow@morrowfischer.com
sSlewart@morrow/ischet.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,

)

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

)

VB.

)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV. 2006-492
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH COURT'S
ORDER

)
)

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his attorneys of record,

the Jaw firm of Morrow & Fischer, PLLC and hereby lodges this Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant.v .Motion for Additional Sanctions jor
J

Plainr~ff's

Failure to

Comp~v

with Court's

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFBNDANTS' MOTTON FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR
PLAINTIFF"S FAILURB TO COM'PLY wrTH COURT'S ORDER - I
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the Court decline to hear all other motions filed by Plaintiff. Clearly Defendants must follow
proper procedures for collecting fees, including seeking a writ of execution.
Based on Defendants' failure to follow proper procedure for collecting a.ttorney fees
awarded by the Court, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny Defendants' Mofion for
Additional Sanctionsfor Plaintiff's Failure to Comply with Court's Order.

DATED this 15th day of June, 2009.

By:~,.£..i.~IJido!!~""';';;=:;;;""~~~~
Shelli D. Stewart

Attorneys for the Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise,ID 83701-2582

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342·2927

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
l09N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365·4196

'l';\C!i<ltltsInThoma.,. R Drnw 2197111110mn Motolli. lnc.OOO\Plcadin8s\MClTln OJ)po~/tion Motioll for S8I1clion~,(loc

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENOANTS' MOTION FOR ADOITlONAt SANCTlONS FOR
PLAINTIFF'S FAn.liRE TO COMPLY WITH COURT'S ORDER - 3
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William A. Morrow
Shelli D. Stewart

MORROW &

FISCHER~

PLLC

332 North Broadmore Way, Suite 102
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone: (208) 475~2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISB No.:
2451) 7459

wmorrow@morrov.flscher.com
sstewart@morrowfischer. com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE 5TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS.
Plaintiff.

VS.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

-------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV.2006-492
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

)
)
)

)

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff. R. Drew Thomas, by and through his attorneys of record,
the law finn of Morrow & Fischer, PLLC and pursuant to Rules 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6)~ hereby

moves this Court for an Order Disallowing Costs and Attorney Fees requested by Defendants in

MOTJON TO DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES - 1

00 11

connection with Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
This Motion is supported by the pleadings and affidavits on file, together with the Memorandum

in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, filed herewith.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED thjs 11 th day of June, 2009.

~yO~O?SCHE~ PLLC

~~ewa

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11 th day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the m.ethod indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ &:. JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise,ID 83701-2582
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box l88
Emmett,ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342-2927

US Mail
Overnight Mail

Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196

cl~m~4J~
for MORROW FISCH R, PLL
&

ImtlT;\Clicnts\T\Th()ml\~. R Dtew 21971\Tl1omllS Motor.;. Im;:.OOO\Plellding.~\Mot to DisBHow f'cC5.(iOC

MOTION TO DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES - 2
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'1'; m U1STRICT counT OF '1"1 IE TI IIRD JUDICIAL DJSTR[CT Ol~
TIlE STATH OF IDAllO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

)

)

)

Case No. CV 2006··492

)

)

vs.

.JlmGMENT

)

RONALD 0, 'UfOMAS, ELA1NB K.
'I (lOMAS mid 'JlJOMAS MOTORS,
INC,. illllclaho Corporation,

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Based nponlhc Com1's O"cleT on Plt'lintiff's Motiol110 Disallow Costs and Fees dnlcd
th(.!

~

",I day ofJlIly, 1009, (ll1d good c811'le app\!aring therefore,
IT IS I IE FtEBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 3ud DECREED that Judgment is hcrehy

cnk,\,I:d agnin,it the Phlil11 i frR. Drew 'Ihotnas rind in favor orthc neJcnd(ml~ Ron 1homas and E1<1inc

JllJ)OMFNT - 1

OOllt;

y' '

'fhol11as, iHIIH~tlrnount of ONE HUNDRED EJGlfTEENTIIOlJSANlJ mOl l'rY~FOURDOLLARS

l\ ND ONE CHNT ($11 R,08·tO 1), with intcn!st thcr~()n (lccruing attho applicable stntutury rate from
Il)l~ d<lte

forwnrd,

IT lS SO ORDERED This

/

!.1.day~
of Atlgll~t, 2009.
/ ION.
. JUNEAL
.~r;,~~
..
C. KERRLCK
District Judge

,ftfl)(iMENT - 2
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CEHTfFICAT1': OF SERVICg
Tho undel'sign0d certifies that on this ~L day of Augu~t. 2009, she caused to be
smvcd a tme Clnd conccl copy of th~ above and foregoing by the m~lhod indicated hdow, and
(~ddr~~;s;:\llo the: following:

llhll.S. Mail

Willifwl A. tvfol"l'('\\1
MORROW & FlStHm.
3.n N. Bco.:ldrll(){C Wr.ty. Stc. 102
Nmnp:i, ld:lllo lD687

r

II. It~)ntlld Bjofkm:..m

[KJ. U.S. Mail

( J Jffllld Dclivcl'cd

r ] OvC'might Mail
1Telocopy (Fax)
r ] E-mail

Fmlllcf1, Id:lho B3617~O lSg

l
r
[
I

.fohn J. J;mis
I IEPWORTrI. JANIS &. BROf)Y

f 1Hand DolivCI¢d

5J1 West Hanni)ck. Stt!. 200
P.O. Box: 25&2
Bois!.', fdilho 83701-2582

[ ] OvcmiL~ht Mail
[ ] Telccopy (Fax)
t } E-mail

AlloTm::y at Lnw
lor> N. lJays
P.O. Box 188

1Hand Delivered
) Overnight MuH

1Tctccopy (FftX)
1E-mail

[j4.u.s. Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

)

R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO DISALLOW
COSTS AND FEES

)
)

CV-2006-492

)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS,
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC.) an Idaho
Corporation,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff sought judgment awarding damages for the alleged breach by
Defendants, his parents, of an oral contract to transfer an automobile dealership, on a date certain
or to be detenninec:i,in consideration of Plaintiff undertaking to manage operation of that
dealership in the interim periQd.
By Order filed May 18,2009, this court granted Defendants' Second Motion for

Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's remaining breach of contract claims. On May 28,
ORDER ON PLAINTJFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
- 1-
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2009. Defendants filed their Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, a Verified
Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs, and a Memorandum in Support ofthe Motion.
Defendants seek the award pursuant to I.e. 12-120(3) and/or 12-121 and IRCP 54.
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees and Memorandum in Support

on June 11,2009. Plaintiff objects to the award of any discretionary costs as both unexceptional
and not reasonably incurred. Plaintiff o~.iects to an award of attorney fees on three (3) grounds:
1. Since the court found that no contract existed between the parties) there was no
"transaction" pursuant to IC 12-120(3);
2. To the extent this case concerned a "transaction," it was not a commercial tran.saction, but
a promise of an inheritance; and
3. The fees claim.ed are not reasonable.
The court heard argument on Plaintirrs Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees on June 22,
2009. 1 Mr. William A. Morrow presented argument in support of Plaintiff's motion and Mr.
John 1. Janis, on behalf of Defendants, argued in opposition to the motion.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND .FEES
Defendants seek an order awarding $2,888.66 in costs as a matter of right, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C)) $15,858.75 in discretionary costs, pursuant to l.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(D), and
$115,749.20 in attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3) and 12-121 and J.R.C.P.

54(e). Plaintiff objects to one item of the costs as of right claimed by Defendants, all the
IOn the same date, the court also beard argument on Defendants' Motion for Additional Sanctions and argument
Veith respect to the Motion for Reconsideration tiled by Plaintiff on June 2, 2009. On July 10, 2009, the court tiled
its Order on the motion for additional sanction5 requiring Piaintifi'to pay the outstanding discovery sanctions before

the cqurt would entertain any motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff filed his Notice of Payment of Attorney Fees and
Costs on July 16.2009. Since Plaintiff has not filed a notice of hearing on the motion forreconsideratron, there is
no need to address the issues raised with respect to that motion at the June 22, 2009 hearing.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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discretionary costs claimed. by Defendants, and both any award of attorney fees to Defendants
and, if sucb fees are awarded, to the amount of fees claimed by Defendants.

t. Costs
A. As a Matter of Right

As noted above, Defendants seek an award of costs as a matter of right, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54{d)(l)(C). in the amount of $2,888.66. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' claim of
$553.85 for a videotape of Plaintiff's deposition. The court finds that the cost of the videotaped
deposition is not authorized by Rule 54(d)(l)(C). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to an
award ofS2,334.81 for costs as a matter ofrlght.

B. Discl"etionary Costs
Defendants seek an award of discretionary costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(D), in the
amount of$15.858. 75 for three experts. Plaintiff objects to an award of any such discretionary
costs, for the teason that the expert costs at issue are not exceptional in the context of the issues
raised in this case.
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(D), the court may, in its discreti.on, award a prevailing party
certain costs, not recoverable as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1 )(C). where there has
been a showing that the costs are:
1. Necessary;
2. Exceptional;
3. Reasonably incurred; and

4. Assessable against the adverse party in the interests of justice.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314 (2005) (quoting Rule
54(d)(1)(D)). Discretionary costs may include additional costs for expert witnesses (in excess
of that allowed in Rule 54(d)(1)(C). [d. The trial court must make express findings as to why a
party's discretionary costs should or should not be allowed. ld. The court complies with the
Rule if it makes express findings as to the general character of requested costs and whether such
costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interest of justice. ld. This means that
the district court need not evaluate the requested costs item by item. Puckett v. Verska, 144

ldah.o 161, 170 (2007)
A cost may be "exceptional" within the meaning of the rule when incurred because the
nature of the case itself was exceptional. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314. 1he Supreme Court
has recognized that certain cases, such as personal injury cases, generally involve copy, travel,
and expert witness fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather than exceptional. Id.
Defendants seek discretionary costs for experts in the fonn of accountants and an expert
in banking. While the court .finds that the fees incurred for such experts were necessary,
reasonably incurred, and assessable against Plaintiff in the interests of justice, given the
substantive claims and the procedural history of this case, the court cannot help but conclude that
the costs incurred by Defendants in securing those experts were not exceptional in a case such as
this involving the alleged breach of an agreement to transfer a business. In light of this,
Plaintiff's motion for an order disallowing the discretionary costs claimed by Defendants is
granted.

n. Attorney Fees

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIQN TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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Defendants seek attorney fees in the amount ofSl15 l 749.20, including $660.20 for
computeriz.ed legal research tmder Rule 54(e)(3)(K), pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3)
and 12-121. .Plaintiff objects to an award of any attorney fees on the ground that there is no basis
for such an. award pursuant to either statute. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the gravamen of
this action did not involve a commercial transaction, pursuant to Section 12-120(3) and that there
is no evidence that Plaintiff pursued this action frivoJously, as required to support an award of
fees pursuant to Section

12~12L

Alternatively, in the event the court decides to award attorney

fees to Defendants, Plaintiff argues that the amount claimed by Defendants is not reasonable.
Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendants were not the prevailing party in the action.
A. Applicability of Idaho Code Section 12-120(3)

Plaintiff first asserts that Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant
to Idaho Code Section 12"120(3) because there was no commercial transaction in this case.

Plaintiffs argument on this issue involves essentially two claims: (1) there was no ·'transaction~'
in. this case; and (2) ifthere wa..~ a transaction, it was not a commercial transaction.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) authorizes the court to award a reasonable attorney fee to

the prevailing party "in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law."

1. Exjsten~e of a transsc:tion
.. 'Where a party alleges the existence ofa contract that would be a commercial
transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute and
the prevailing party may recover attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is
established. '" Peterson v. Shore, 197 P.3d 789, 794-95 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Lexington

Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287 (2004». The court finds that Peterson is
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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factually equivalent to this case for purposes of applying Section

12~ 120(3).

In Peterson, the

plaintiff brought a breach of contract action against his landlord for breach of an alleged oral

contract permitting the plaintiff to purchase the property. The district court, affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of the alleged oral
contract 197 PJd at 794. Based on this finding, the district court denied the defendants'

request for attorney fees pursuant to 12-120(3), because there was no transaction. ld At 795.
The Court of Appeals reversed this determination as "inconsistent with the applicable legal
standards established by the Idaho Supreme Court." ld
Plaintiff relies on Idaho Branch, Inc. o/the Associated General Contractors ofAmerica

v. Nampa Highway Distr. No.1. 123 Idaho 237 (Ct. App. 1993), for the assertion that no

transaction exists here for purposes of 12-120(3). In A Ge, a group of contractors who produced
gravel for use in highway projects brought a declaratory judgment/injunction action seeking to

prevent the highway district from financing the purchase of a rock crusher over a six year term.
123 Idaho at 238-39. The contractors asserted that the financing agreement violated certain

limitations on indebtedness and expenditure of highway funds in the Idaho Constitution. Id In
arguing that they had standing to maintain. tbe action, the contractors asserted that they would be

harmed by the district's action, in part, because they would be deprived of "their right to bid on
contracts to supply the gravel needs of the districts. causing them to suffer business losses. Id
j;

The district court found that the contractors did not have standing. The Court of Appeals
reversed that determination, finding that the threatened harm to the contractors as potential
bidders to supply gravel was sufficient injury to support standing. ld at 242. However, the

Court of Appeals also determined that tbe claimed injury - based on the alleged right to
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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competitively bid on contracts to supply gravel to the districts - was not protected by the
constitutional provisions at issue. Id at 244. Accordingly, the contractors were unable to prove
a necessary element to obtain the requested injunctive or declaratory relief. On appeal, the
districts contended that the district court had erred in denying their claim for attorney fees
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). Id The Court of Appeals held that the distri.cts
could not recover fees under 12-120(3), because "the resolution sought by the contractors is ofa
dispute arising from a commercial transaction that did not take place." ld In other words, the
only commercial transaction to which the contractors could have been a party, and thus put at
issue in the action, was a contract with the district to supply gravel. Since no such transaction
ever occurred - the gravamen of the suit was that the contractors were bcing deprived of the
opportunity to engage in such transactions with the district - 12-120(3) didn't apply. The
present case is readily distinguishable from ACG. because PJaintiffwas not seeking relief for
having been denied th.e opportunity to engage in a hypothetical transaction, but, instead, sought
damages for Defendants' alleged breach of an enforceable oral agreement.

2. Commercial Nature of the Alleged Agreement
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), because "the gravamen of Plaintiff s lawsuit was to
resolve a dispute over an inheritance he was promised, not to resolve a dispute over a
commercial transaction...2

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attmney Fees, p. 4. The court notes, for the
that this claim by Plaintiff further illustrates the fluid nature of the oral agreement al1cgcd by Plaintiff.
During various stages of this action, the agreement has been characterized as a contract to convey a business and
real property, a joint venture, and, now, for the first time, as a contract to make a testamentary disposition (despite
(he fact that Plaintiff has consistently maintained that Defendants promis~d to transfer the business when Defendant
2

r~ord.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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Section 12-120(3) provides that the term "commercial transaction" means Hall
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Even if the court were to
accept Plaintiff s latest characterization of the transaction as an agreement to make a
testamentary disposition, Plaintiff has not established that the transaction wa..c; for his personal or
household purposes.

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that Defendants, as the prevailing party, arc
entitl.ed to an. award ofattomey fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3).

B. Amount of Attorney Fees
I. Appli~able Legal Standards

Th.e calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within th.e discretion of the trial court.
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749 (2008). A trial court properly exercises its discretion

when it: (1) correctly perceives the issue at hand as one of discretion; (2) acts within the outer
boundaries of that discreti.on. and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. ld.
When awarding attorney fees, the court must consider the applicable factors set forth in
Rule 54(e)(3):
1. The time and labor required;
2. The novelty and difficulty of the issues;
3. The skill requisite to perfonn the legal service properly and the expe.rience and

ability of the attorney in the particular field of law;
4. The prevailing charges for like work;
R.onald O. Thomas reached a stated age or .retired, not when he died). If nothing else, the changing nature of the
alleged agreement illustrates its indefiniteness and unenrorceability.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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5. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
6. The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;
7. The amount involved and the results obtained;
8. The undesirability of the case;
9. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
10. Awards in similar cases;

11. The reasonable cost of automated legal

research~

if the court finds it was

reasonably necessary in preparing the party!s case; and
12. Any other factor the court deems appropriate in a particular case.

Jd. at 749· 750~ Rule 54(e)(3). The rule does not require the court to make specific fmdings in

the record, only to consider the stated factors in detennining the amount of the fces. Letlunich,
145 Idaho at 750. When considering the factors. the court need not demonstrate how it

employed any of the factors in reaching an amount awarded. ld.
Th.e party seeking an award of fees bears the burden of convincing the di.stri.ct court of
the reasonableness of the amount claimed for attorney fees. Jd. The party seeking an award of
fees may satisfy the in.ltial burden of production by submitting affidavits itemizing and
explaining the basis for the claim and the amount. Jd. The party objecting to a claim for fees
must file a m.otion stating with particularity the objections to the claimed fees and provide any
other info.rmation the party wishes the court to consider in support of the objections. ld.
After considering the record .in this action and applying the factors set forth in tR.C.P.
54(,')(3), the court awards Defendants attorney fees in the amount of $115,749.20. Althougb
Plaintiff objects to the reasonableness of the attorney fees, Defendants were in the position that
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES
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they had to respond to and defend against the litigation driven by the Plaintiff. A very
significant amount of time and labor had to be expended by Defendants to conduct discovery; to
respond to the activity of Plaintiff's counsel, and to raise the matters Defendants believed were
important. From the Court's own perspective, this case bas demanded a significant amount of
time on a myriad of matters. The Court certainly cannot fInd that Defendants were wasteful in
their approach to this litigation, caused unnecessary expense, or were not reasonable in the way
they conducted this lawsuit. The Court finds that the attorney fees claimed by the Defendants
are reasonable.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing. pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P.

54(e)~

the

court awards Defendants costs in the amount of $2,334.81 and attorney fees in the amount of
$115,749.20.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
.

;:;z."J

<.>7-

Dated this _---.;_'I_day of July, 2009.

~-~~
uneal C. Kerrick
District Judge

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following, either by U.S. Mail, PQstage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse basket; or by
facsimile copy:

William A. Morrow
Morrow & Fischer, PLLC
332 North BroadIDQte Way, Suite 102
Nampa, Idaho 83687
John J. Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Brody
537 W. Bannock St., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

Dated this

_..".2""--__ My of

or

,2009

SHELLY GANNON
Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

)
)

vs.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

*****
This Matter came before the Court upon the Defendants' Motion for Additional
Sanctions. among other motions. The Defendants' Motion for Additional Sanctions was based on
the plaintiffs failure to pay the sanction amounts reflected in the Court's Order of February 27,
2009, which required the plaintiffto pay to the defendants the sum of$5,259.50 by no later than May
1, :2009. The hearing on this and other motions occurred on June 22, 2009. The Court took the
various motions under advisement. but on the Motion for Additional Sanctions ruled that the
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS - 1
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Plaintiff is precluded from going forward on his Motion for Reconsideration or any other motions

r

at the very least until the sanctions award of$5,259.50 is paid in full to the defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED

Thl-LO/ d~y

(r}:.]
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0~09,

The undersigned certifies that on this
day
she caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

William A. Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER
332 N. Broadmore Way, Ste. 102
Nampa, Idaho 83687

~] U.S. Mail
[
[
[
[

] Hand Delivered
] Overnight Mail
] Telecopy (Fax)
] E-mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett. Idaho 83617-0188

[ ] U.S. Mail
fxJ Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail

John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

[)qU.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail
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William A. Morrow
Shelli D. Stewart
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC
332 N. Broadmore Way, Ste. 102
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:
(208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISB No.:
2451, 7459
wmorrow@morrowfischer. com
sstewart@morrowfischer.com
Attorneys for Appellant R. Drew Thomas

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)

THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD,
JOHN 1. JANIS AND H. RONALD BJORKMAN, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

ORIGINAL
on
~ ~'i (J'

1.

The above-named Plaintiff/Appellant, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his

attorneys of record, the law firm of MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC, hereby appeals against the
above-named Defendants to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final order entitled Order on

Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, which was entered in the above-entitled
action on the 18th day of May, 2009, on the Defondants Second Motion for Summary Judgment,
J

Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding.
2.

Plaintiff/Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment described in Paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1) of
the Idaho Appellate Rules.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Plaintiff/Appellant

intends to assert in his appeal, is as follows:
(a)

Whether the District Court erred in failing to reinstate Plaintiffs quasicontract claim (which was dismissed in the Court's November 26, 2007
decision based on its determination that there was an enforceable
contract), despite the Court's later determination in its May 18, 2009
decision that there was not an enforceable contract;

(b)

Whether the District Court erred in its May 18, 2009 decision by
determining there were no issues of material fact as to whether a material
term of the agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors required Plaintiff
to pay a monetary price to Defendants for the business.

(c)

Whether the District Court erred in its July 31, 2009 decision by awarding
attorney fees, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) and
Idaho Code §12-120(3), and costs as a matter of right to Defendants.
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(d)

Plaintiff/Appellant hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 3S(a)(S) and 4l.
As a Result of the District Court's errors, this Court should grant the
Appellant attorney fees expended in obtaining reversal of the District
Court's decisions.

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

S.

Plaintiff/Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcri pt:
(a)

The entire hearing on Defondants' Motion for Summary Judgment held on
October 11,2007, the Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding;

(b)

The entire hearing on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment
held on May 7, 2009, the Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding;

(c)

The entire hearing on PlaintifFs Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees held
on June 22,2009, the Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding.

6.

In addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate

Rules, Plaintiff/Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record:
(a)

All documents filed with the Court applicable to the October 11, 2007
hearing referenced in paragraph S(a) above;

(b)

All documents filed with the Court applicable to the May 7, 2009 hearing
referenced in paragraph S(b) above;

(c)

All documents filed with the Court applicable to the June 22, 1009 hearing
referenced in paragraph S(c) above;
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(d)

All Exhibits admitted into evidence during any of the hearings referenced
in paragraph 5 above.

(e)
7.

All affidavits filed by Plaintiffs in this matter.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the court reporter;

(b)

That the court reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of
the reporter's transcript;

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this

11tl--day of August, 2009.
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC

illiam A. Morr
Shelli D. Stewart
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this -lflay of August, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise,ID 83701-2582

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342-2927

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett,ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196

Katherine Klemetson
Court Reporter
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 454-7442

z

for MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC

ImtiT:\ClientsITIThomas, R Drew 2 I 97l1Thomas Motors, Inc.OOO\Pleadings\Appeal\Notice of Appeal.doc
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,
PlaintifflAppellant,
vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS,
And THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 36857-2009

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, SHELLY GANNON, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certifY:
That there were no exl!ibit~which were offered or admitted into evidence during the course
of this action. "'~~~~"~~_c~""~~~~
In addition to the above listed exhibits, the following will be submitted as exhibits to this
Record on Appeal.
•

Transcript on Appeal [odged September 30, 2009

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court at Emmett, Idaho this I~.!- day of October, 2009.

A

SHELLY GANNON, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District of the
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Gem,

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
R. DREW THOMAS,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS,
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
DefendantlRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 36857-2009

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, Shelly Gannon, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record, in
the above entitled cause, was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full, and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
including all documents filed or lodged as requested in the Notice of Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court
at Emmett, Idaho, this ,AI ~ day of October, 2009.

SHELLY GANNON
Clerk of the District Court

By(JAAill

Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM
R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)
)

Plaintiff!Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 36857-2009

)

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS,
And THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
DefendantlRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Shelly Gannon, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that I personally mailed, by United States
Mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their
Attorney of Record as follows:
William A. Morrow
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC
332 North Broadmore Way, Ste 102
Nampa, ID 83687

John 1. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste 200
PO Box 2582
Boise,ID 83701-2582

This is to advise each party that pursuant to I.A.R. 29 they have 28 days from the date of
the mailing of the record, including any requests for corrections, deletions, or additions with the
District Court, together with a Notice of Hearing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this dJ ~ day of October, 2009.

SHELLY GANNON
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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